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Abstract 
 
This qualitative research study compares the local construction of ‘quality’ 
through national and institutional discourses and practices in France and England. It 
examines their impact on the daily practice of academics in the cases of Sciences Po 
Paris and London School of Economics. The study adopts a social constructivist 
epistemology, a multiple case study design, and uses a Foucauldian discourse analysis 
to interpret the data. The data is gathered through an analysis of policies, quality codes, 
and audit reports, as well as twenty qualitative semi-structured interviews with officials in 
quality agencies, institutional managers, and academics. 
Many analyses of quality assurance systems in higher education have likened 
them to Foucault’s metaphorical ‘panopticon’; the conceptual framework of this study 
initially uses the concept of panopticon and modifies it by integrating Clark’s (1983) 
triangle of coordination and Ball’s (1994) policy cycle. The findings reveal that the State 
plays an important steering role: in France through project-based funding and in England 
by setting and updating quality norms. In England, a focus on students’ satisfaction 
(which in reality is a manufactured concern) has led to discourses focussing on ‘value 
for money’ and ‘excellence’ and has created a shared quality culture across Higher 
education institutions. This facilitates academics’ practice, particularly for the newly 
recruited contractual lecturers. In France, quality is taken as a static condition associated 
with the prestige and selective admission processes of the grandes écoles. This, in 
addition to the binary divide between universities and the grandes écoles and 
longstanding bureaucratic rigidities, has inhibited the creation and implementation of a 
shared quality culture. This has an especially negative impact on contractual teachers’ 
practice while permanent academics are hired and perform based on national 
frameworks.  
This research is of significance as it, a) examines quality policies and practices 
in France which is an understudied topic; b) provides a comparative analysis of socio-
historical events and State policies as well as elite institutions’ practices that have 
shaped the local definition of quality in higher education in England and France; 
c)critiques Foucault’s panopticon in light of the current developments in higher education 
quality governance, its multiple interest groups, and their power relations; and, d) argues 
that quality systems may have an empowering impacts on academics.  
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classmates. I realised that despite our age and cultural differences, we shared 
some common anxieties and coping strategies as adult distance learners. I found 
this was a relevant theme to the research I have conducted as part of the EdD 
taught modules and could help education practitioners with an insight into this 
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subject as those of younger international learners. Therefore, my IFS study 
focused on “Students’ experiences in an international EdD programme in the UK: 
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my professional knowledge in development studies, human rights, programme 
management, and environment.
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
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1.1. Setting the Scene 
 
Over the last two decades and following the Bologna Process, ‘quality’ has 
become the central ‘metanarrative’ of the European Higher Education Area 
(EHEA). Quality systems and standards have turned into a prism through which 
all aspects of academic life are examined. As a dominant discursive orthodoxy, 
quality norms have eclipsed former values and power relations within academia 
re-defining ‘how we construct and interpret higher education’ (Hoecht, 2006). 
They now offer market proper images of transparency, accountability, and 
excellence that construct ‘the truth’ and ‘produce the objects and rituals of truth’ 
(Foucault, 1977) in higher education. 
 
Quality discourses are believed to normalise a new regime of truth and 
power in which constant registration and observation frenzy is exercised to 
fabricate the behaviours, identities, and social relations of those working in 
universities, especially the academics. The pervasiveness of compliance and 
subversion in academics as they deal with quality systems has been discussed 
in several studies, e.g., (Morley, 2003; Shore & Roberts, 1993; Hoecht, 2006; 
Polster, 2007; Teelkan & Lomas, 2009; Donovan, 2016). It seems that the 
inherent assumptions of strong control and authority in Foucault’s (1975) 
panopticon have guided these and many other studies that consider quality 
mechanisms as one-way power relations with no benefit for academics who 
comply and ‘play the game’. In Foucault’s (1975) panopticon, inmates assume 
they are under constant visibility and surveillance and thus internalise the norms 
and police themselves facilitating an automatic functioning of power. This 
resembles the functions of quality norms that dismantle the traditional image of 
universities as cultural institutions and reconstruct it under the gaze of individual 
consumers and the aims of the ‘disciplinary societies’. 
 
But are these normative quality systems constructed similarly bearing the 
same impacts across European countries, universities, and their academics?  
The short answer is No. Quality systems operate in different socio-political 
and historical settings and are inevitably subject to local reconstruction.  Hence, 
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the European Standards and Guidelines (ESG) proposed by the Association for 
Quality Assurance (ENQA) serves only as a frame of reference and not as a 
directive. The European quality frames do, of course, influence HEIs as they 
borrow policies and practices from one another. But local quality norms embody 
‘commonly shared values, social meanings, culture, and history’ (Bogdan et al., 
2012) that are articulated through higher education Acts, Reports, White Papers, 
and other forms of policy discourse.  
This study aims to analyse such local conceptualisations of ‘quality’ at 
national and institutional levels and their impact on the daily practice of 
academics. To this end, I have selected the cases of France and England and 
two of their elite universities, the LSE in London and Sciences Po (ScPo) in Paris. 
The following questions are raised to explore quality as a norm-setting power 
system:  
1. How is quality in higher education defined and constructed in the 
cases of England and France?  
This will allow a comparative understanding of how different 
historical, cultural, and socio-political settings impact the 
construction and perceptions of ‘quality’ in the cases of England 
and France.  It will also permit understanding the role of different 
actors in the definition and construction of quality as a system of 
power. 
 
2.  What quality management mechanisms are in place in the two-
selected elite higher education institutions in England and France?  
This will permit an understanding of internal quality mechanisms 
deployed and the extent to which they may be a reflection of the 
wider formal national approaches to ‘quality’.  
 
3. How do academics perceive and enact quality in their professional 
practice in these two institutional cases?  
This will provide an insight into academics’ perceptions of internal 
quality mechanisms against which they are examined at Sciences 
Po Paris and the LSE and will reveal the ways these bear an impact 
on their daily academic practice.  
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I understand that as Van Dijk (2000) stated ‘quality’ is a social discursive 
construction reflecting local worldviews. I also realise that quality is a fuzzy 
concept and is open to interpretations by different actors who may be inspired by 
its assurance, enhancement, or management to attain different ends. Therefore, 
quality may mean different things to different actors in a given time and context, 
including: fitness for purpose, accountability, graduates’ attributes, graduates’ 
employability, or value for money.  
This study adopts a social constructivist epistemology, and a qualitative 
case study design. The methods of data collection include desk review of primary 
and secondary documents as well as twenty qualitative semi-structured 
interviews. The data is analysed and interpreted using a Foucauldian discourse 
analysis. 
 
1.2. Context of the study 
1.2.1. France 
 
The chapter on literature review provides more details on French higher 
education and the policy discourses that construct its quality. At this stage, 
several points are of significance. Firstly, the French higher education has two 
distinct branches: a) public universities and research units legally called Public 
establishments of scientific, cultural and professional character (EPCSP); and b) 
the elite higher education institutions called ‘grandes écoles’, legally called Public 
establishments of administrative character (EPA). Secondly, the State provides 
public funding for both sectors. However, compared to other OECD countries 
(2016:195, table B1.2)1, it is obvious that the French average funding per capita 
of 10,217 US$ lags behind the expenditure of countries like the US (21,170) or 
England (15,825).  
The third point is of direct relevance to the aims of this study and concerns 
                                                
1 Education at a glance: 2016 indicators  
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/education/education-at-a-glance-2016_eag-
2016-en#.WS2H2riLTrc# page195 
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quality. The first French quality agency (AERES) was created in 2007 by the 
famous LRU Act (Loi Relative aux Libertés et Responsabilités des Universités). 
Hence, it is only since 2007 that both universities and the grandes écoles are de 
jure subjects to reviews by a national quality agency. Between 2007-2014, 
AERES made an unwelcome attempt to instil quality mechanisms in teaching and 
research activities of HEIs as part of the wider governmental autonomy and 
excellence plans. On 17 November 2014 and under the socialist party, the 
AERES was replaced by the High Council for the Evaluation of Research and 
Higher Education (Hcéres) by the Law N°2013-660 of 22 July 2013. Hcéres has 
adopted a softer stance and has replaced the former disputed grading system of 
its predecessor with a culture of internal quality enhancement.  
The French institutional case selected in this study is the leading French 
‘grande école’ in social and political sciences: Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris 
(IEP Paris- known as Sciences Po Paris). I mainly conducted the interviews 
during 2015 when I lectured international undergraduate students there. The 
Paris campus is one of the seven highly selective Sciences Po institutions around 
France (see appendix 1) hosting local and international undergraduate students, 
dual degree Master students, and PhD candidates. 
Hereafter called (ScPo), the Paris school is in fact the only institution that 
bears the title of ‘grande école’ among other ScPo branches that were 
established from 2000 onwards. Originally called École Libre des Sciences 
Politiques (ELSP), this elite public research and higher education institution was 
founded in 1872 by a group of intellectuals led by Emile Boutmy. The ELSP was 
a response to the French demise in international politics and sought to reform the 
education of French politicians outside the usual university trajectories and 
through a pragmatic and professional training. Its instructors were -and still are- 
from among the political and economic elite including ex-ministers, businessmen, 
and high-level civil servants- who shared their professional experiences with 
students. 
The Institute underwent several reforms under Richard Descoings, the late 
Director of ScPo Paris (1997–2012): new campuses were inaugurated across 
France;  the selective admission policies were revisited to allow entry to French 
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students from marginalised backgrounds-  this initiative is called ZEP2 (Priority 
Education Zones)- and international students;   the number of scholarships and 
grants were increased; and flexible contractual recruitment of academics was 
made possible. Despite these developments, ScPo remains a representation of 
the French elitism and political power as will be discussed later. Table1 below 
provides an overview of the current situation at ScPo: 
 
Table 1: SciencesPo: key facts 
Sources: Campus France 20153;  SciencesPo official website 20164;  AERES audit 
report 20145. 
Number of students 13,000 
Number of campuses 7 
Percentage of international students 46% from 150 countries 
Percentage of students receiving scholarships 30% 
International academic partnerships 9 universities 
Number of double degree courses 15 
Revenue (2013-2014) 
(153,5 M Euros) 
State: 54,8% in 2013 (68.4 M) 
Private and EU: 45,2% in 2013 
(84.9 M) 
Alumni 55,000 (including French 
Presidents) 
Graduate employment rate 80% within 6 months (39% working 
abroad) 
Staff 4200 (200 permanent; 4000 
lecturers on contracts) 
QS world University ranking 2013-14: 214; 2014-15: 222; 2015-
16: 223; 2016-17: 220; 2017-18: 
220 
QS ranking by subject (politics & Int’l Studies) 2013-14: 16; 2014-15: 13; 2015-16: 
5; 2016-17: 4;  
 
                                                
2 Zone d’éducation prioritaire: these zones were proposed by Savary and created in 1981 to give schools 
in marginalised areas with more autonomy in providing tailored programmes.  
3 http://ressources.campusfrance.org/guides_etab/etablissements/fr/univ_sciencepo_fr.pdf; 
4 http://www.sciencespo.fr/en/about/our-campuses  
5 www.aeres-evaluation.fr/.../343523/file/AERES-S1-SciencesPoParis.pdf  
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1.2.2. England 
 
On the other side of the Manche, UK higher education has adopted 
aggressive marketing strategies prioritising internationalisation6 and quality 
assurance. Unlike France, all universities in England are legally independent 
corporate institutions and largely depend on funding from the research councils 
and students’ fees. According to the OECD 2016 Education in a Glance7, in 2013 
the UK allocated 1.1% and of its public and 0.8% of its private expenditure to 
tertiary education while the average OECD levels were 1.2% and 0.5%, 
respectively. Under the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act the previous 
polytechnics and universities have been unified and subjected to external 
scrutiny. The Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) was established in 1997 following 
the Dearing report8. The role of QAA is to ' safeguard standards and improve the 
quality of UK higher education wherever it is delivered around the world’, (QAA 
strategy, 2014-17). Based on the latest Higher Education Act (HERA, 2017), a 
student body will be created to give even more prominence to students’ voices in 
quality mechanisms and QAA will be only one among other agencies who can 
bid for conducting quality evaluations. I will discuss these in details in the 
literature review. 
 
The English institutional case selected in this study is the leading institute 
in social and political sciences: the London School of Economics and Political 
Science (LSE). ScPo and the LSE are elite institutes:  the LSE is part of the British 
‘golden triangle9’ just as ScPo is a privileged grande école among an increasing 
number of grandes écoles in France. Despite their rivalry, the LSE and ScPo offer 
dual Masters degrees in international relations, European studies, urban policy, 
and public affairs.  
                                                
6 https://www.hesa.ac.uk/pr229  
7 http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/education/education-at-a-glance-2016_eag-
2016-en#.WXyxGvSLTrc# page209  
8 http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/dearing1997/dearing1997.html  
9 The Golden Triangle is created by London, Cambridge, and Oxford and includes the elite universities: the 
Oxbridge, and a handful of London-based universities, including: Imperial College, King’s college, LSE, and 
UCL. 
 21 
 
 
The LSE was founded in 1895- some 20 years after the creation of ESLP 
in Paris- following the recommendations of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science and by members of the Fabian Society10, Beatrice and 
Sidney Webb. As a public research institute, the LSE aimed ‘to create and share 
knowledge addressing major social challenges and to shape a better world’11 and 
has continued doing so through ‘research, education, creative intellectual debate 
and public engagement’ (ibid). Just as ScPo is a good example of French 
perceptions of quality, the internal quality mechanism of the LSE may be 
considered as a reflection of the wider English risk-based approach to quality. 
However, it shall be noted that the LSE may not be considered as a shining 
example of excellence in England as it recently only received a ‘bronze’ award in 
the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF 2017).Table 2 provides more details 
about the LSE. 
                                                
10 ‘The Fabian Society is Britain’s oldest political think tank. Founded in 1884, the Society is at the 
forefront of developing political ideas and public policy on the left’: http://www.fabians.org.uk/  
11 http://www.lse.ac.uk/intranet/LSEServices/financeDivision/pdf/15-0757-FinancialStatements-Proof-
7Dec.pdf 
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Table 2: The LSE: Key facts 
Sources: the LSE official webpage12; the LSE 2015 financial statement13; 
The Times14 
Number of students 9,600 
Number of campuses 1 
Percentage of international students 68% from 140 countries 
Percentage of students receiving 
scholarships 
30% 
International academic partnerships 12 universities 
Number of double degree courses 18 
Revenue (2014-2015) 
(229.6 M) 
71.6 % (Tuition fees, 
consultancies,   
              catering and residences,   
              endowments) 
17%     (Funding Council  
Research  
             grants) 
11%     other sources 
Alumni 160,000 
(Nobel Prize winners; British MPs) 
Graduate employment rate 83.4% within 6 months 
Staff 3,300 (44% from countries outside 
England): 2,000 full-time and 
1,300 part-time 
QS world University ranking 2013-14: 68; 2014-15: 71; 2015-
16: 35; 2016-17: 37; 2017-18: 35 
QS ranking by subject (politics 1 Int’l Studies) 2013-14: 2; 2014-15: 3; 2015-16: 
4; 2016-17: 3;  
 
                                                
12 http://www.lse.ac.uk/aboutLSE/keyFacts/home.aspx  
13 http://www.lse.ac.uk/intranet/LSEServices/financeDivision/pdf/15-0757-FinancialStatements-Proof-
7Dec.pdf  
14 http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/education/gooduniversityguide/article4212194.ece  
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1.3. Rationale 
 
1.3.1. Significance of the study 
  
The primary significance of this study is that it fills a gap that exists in 
research on systems designed to promote quality (QA, QE) in French higher 
education. Throughout the EdD degree, I mostly concentrated my research on 
topics such as internationalisation and quality of higher education particularly in 
the context of England. I was able to choose from among an abundant number 
of articles and books on these topics. I was struck by the limited number of books 
and articles on the same topics in the French context. Therefore, I considered 
that conducting and sharing the results of a comparative research on quality in 
France would be a worthwhile effort.  
Additionally, this study fills a knowledge gap that exists in the literature on 
the ‘situated meaning of quality’. This is a gap that cannot be filled by the large 
scale and quantitative studies that are mainly conducted at the EU level- although 
they are invaluable contributions on which this study builds on. The European 
University Association (EUA) has, for instance, led several consecutive projects 
to explore internal quality cultures and definitions that are dominantly quantitative, 
for instance: The Quality Culture Project (2002-2006) ‘Examining Quality Culture 
in Higher Education Institutions, EQC project (2009-2012). As a comparative 
qualitative case study, the current research provides a real-life account of how 
quality is differently constructed through local power networks and cultural 
frameworks. The existing policy oriented and quantitative case studies may 
provide an insight into the ‘end-result’ rather than analysing the conditions, 
policies, and practices that have shaped quality. Additionally, as a cross-national 
comparative analysis, this study is particularly advantageous because it 
‘uncovers the unique features and unconscious assumptions that possess our 
vision when we study only a single country, generally our own’ (Clark, 1983:2). 
Another added-value of this study lies in its focus on the impact of quality 
mechanisms on academics’ practice. Several studies have shown that there is a 
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mismatch between planned quality systems and their intended impacts on 
academics (Harvey & Newton, 2007; D’Andrea, 2007; Dill, 2007; Rosa et al., 
2012). In addition, many studies have considered quality mechanisms as 
panopticons with no transformative benefits for academics. For instance, Shore 
& Roberts (1993) compare QA to Foucault’s panopticon where all inmates 
regulate their own behaviour under the supposedly constant gaze of inspectors 
inside the central watchtower; Terry (1995:9) considers quality audits in 
Australian universities as an ‘education panopticon’; Harrison (2003) sees the 
establishment of CNAA in the UK as a panopticon; Morley (2003:170) states that 
the QA systems are panoptical and create ‘major misrecognition and inequalities’. 
Similarly, Drummond (2003) points out the resemblance between ‘knowledge 
economy’ discourses in higher education with Foucault’s technologies of self by 
the means of which individuals change themselves to become moral or ethical 
subjects in a panopticon; and Telkan & Lomas (2009) indicate that studies across 
European countries have shown no transformative impact of QA on academics’ 
practice and students’ learning. Seyma & Smith (2016) argue that performance 
management mechanisms in South African universities act as ‘panopticonism’ 
that embed intellectually repressive conditions in academia.  Likewise, Rochester 
& Hyslop-Margison (2016:108) indicate that internal quality assessments are 
‘clearly mechanisms of ‘panopticonic’ surveillance, ideological manipulation and 
political control’ that ‘result is increasingly passive faculty unwilling to exercise 
their full spectrum of academic freedom and collegial governance responsibilities’  
These portrayals dominate the literature and justify the ‘interest to further 
investigate how individual teachers experience QA’ (Rosa et al., 2012) and the 
ways the norm-setting QA mechanisms may have an impact on their practice. As 
Newton (2010) emphasised, only empirical studies carried out in university 
settings are capable of providing such ‘situated’ understandings which makes the 
current study a worthwhile research and a complementary effort to the existing 
knowledge on the topic.  
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1.3.2. Professional/Academic motivation 
 
While writing on quality in higher education in England, Morley (2006:85), 
refers to an extract of her conversation and states: ‘a French professor laughed 
out loud when she heard that student completion rates were performance 
indicators in Britain. She reminded me that the opposite is the case in France- 
the fewer students who left the course successfully, the higher its status’. This 
interesting example is only one among my own observations that motivated me 
to conduct this study. 
By the time I was conducting the interviews for this study in 2015, my 
experience of ‘quality’ in the French education system was enriched by a PhD 
ERASMUS exchange experience (2012-2013) in a public university (Rene 
Descartes-Sorbonne V), and the second Master’s degree that I pursued (2013-
2014) at ScPo (Paris School of International Affairs- PSIA). In addition, I worked 
as a part-time English teacher at the British Council-Paris and as an adjunct-
professor in political sciences at ScPo and gained an invaluable insight into the 
ways French children, youngsters, parents and teachers perceived learning and 
teaching quality.  
The big missing link between my British and French higher education 
experiences was the ‘quality of service’. It seemed to me that service was an 
unknown Martian expression that has never been translated into the culture of 
the French public and private institutions- unless of’ course one paid an overrated 
price for a bag made of the skin of a tortured dead animal in a luxurious brand 
shop.  And worse yet, everyone seemed to be used to this chronic lack of service 
as every time I opened my mouth to complain, people replied: but we are in 
France, you know?!  
I did not wish to- and neither could I afford to- find a remedy to this chronic 
shortcoming. What interested me was unfolding the underlying reasons that 
created two strikingly different approaches to educational quality in the two 
countries. As a teacher and a student, I yearned for explanations that 
differentiated my experiences in a French university, a French grande école, and 
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a British university. More importantly, I wanted to know the underlying socio-
cultural reasons that created these different approaches to quality. 
This thesis is, therefore, a documentation of my professional experience 
and reflections and a review of literature. It has provided a unique opportunity of 
reflective practice in the course of my professional and academic endeavours. I 
am hoping it would help me with my future professional trajectory as I mean to be 
involved in an academic or a 'quality-related' professional exercise in learning and 
development. I am convinced that this study is also worthwhile for fellow 
practitioners in academia, as it offers a comparative scrutiny of how daily 
academic practice is shaped, constrained, and altered by quality control systems 
which in different degrees of intensity are intended as policies that are panoptical 
for working academics. 
1.4. Ethical concerns 
This study was conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the British 
Educational Research Association (BERA, 2011).  
The use of secondary sources of information, i.e., policy texts and 
discourses gives rise to ethical concerns related to the ‘responsibilities of the 
researcher to the community of educational researchers’. I made a 
conscious effort in safeguarding the reputation of the community of educational 
researchers by maintaining honesty, integrity, and professionalism in all stages 
of research including data collection, analysis, and report writing. I also took 
measures to ensure the authenticity of texts and their sources. In order to respect 
my ‘responsibilities to participants’ the interviews were conducted respecting 
the criteria of ‘informed consent’, ‘confidentiality and anonymity’. All interviewees 
received emails with an outline of the study that invited them to voluntarily take 
part in the study knowing that they could withdraw from the study at any time. 
Furthermore, each participant has been given a pseudonym and all information 
that reveals or leads to their identity has been extracted. I also understand that I 
have a ‘responsibility to educational professionals, policy makers and the 
general public’. Accordingly, the outcomes of this study will be published and 
shared with all the participants as well as the larger audience interested in 
educational research.  
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1.5. Impact of the study 
As a qualitative study, the findings of this research can offer several 
benefits. It provides a deeper understanding of the underlying local power 
relations that form quality norms and discourses and how these are internalised, 
negotiated, and practised. It provides a basis of comparison and an overview of 
the best practices for quality managers and practitioners in each context. In 
addition, it can benefit sociologists as it provides an insight into a social institution, 
i.e. higher education, that usually mirrors the collective conscious of any given 
context.  Additionally, English and French faculty members may develop a better 
understanding into the impacts of two different conceptualisations of ‘quality’ and 
how these could be beneficial or preventative in the daily practice of their 
colleagues. In fact, as this study helped me engage in a reflexive practice, I am 
hoping that it would also help other academics in doing so. 
1.6. Delimitations of the study 
This study is limited in its scope and coverage as it is a small-scale 
research. As a comparative case study, it provides detailed information within a 
limited time and space. Therefore, it may not be extended to other cases and 
contexts or to the same contexts in another time span. However, it can provide a 
reliable and solid basis for further research. It is important to note that the two 
selected universities are elite institutions and may differ from other public or 
private institutions in their contexts. Another limitation is, of course, my restricted 
time and ability as a researcher to read all the literature available on the topic. In 
addition, it is only inevitable that my personal and professional experiences and 
the choice of language play a role in the reconstruction of the local reality of the 
cases. Another researcher, using other methods and other language codes may 
have written a completely different thesis on the same topic. 
1.7. Outline of the Study 
The next chapter after this introduction is dedicated to the literature review. 
The chapters following the literature review will discuss the conceptual 
framework, methodology, findings and analysis of data, and a final chapter will 
be on ‘discussions, reflections, and further recommendations’.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
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2.1. Introduction  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the modalities of power, 
styles of higher education systems, and the construction of ‘quality’ in France and 
England. The main focus is on the period following the 1999 Bologna Process, 
however it also looks further back whenever necessary. In reviewing the history 
of higher education in the two contexts, I have followed the advice of Durkheim 
who in 1905 called on students’ ‘attention to the importance of history for the 
understanding of the sociology of education’ [1956a] asserting that ‘in reality, 
there is nothing in my knowledge of sociology which merits the name, which 
doesn't have a historical character’ (1982a:211; quoted in Bellah, 1959:448).  
 
This literature review is divided into three main sections. The first part is 
called ‘quality assurance in higher education: the origins of a modern 
panopticon’. The aim of this part is to sketch out the broader international and 
the European context that altered the traditional value systems in higher 
education. The second section is called ‘Understanding French higher 
education: the history and the Politics of the State’ and the third part is 
‘Understanding English higher education and its risk management’. These 
two chapters analyse the local historical, political, and socio-cultural trends in 
higher education systems and the gradual developments in quality conceptions 
in France and England, respectively. I have conducted this literature review 
bearing in mind that quality is a ‘contested enterprise’ that is constantly negotiated 
and reconstructed through local policies and discourses.  
 
Prior to reviewing of the literature, some of the keywords are defined 
below:
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2.2. Key terms 
 
Evaluative State:  With the rise of the neoliberalism in 1970s, the ‘welfare State’ 
lost its legitimacy and was replaced by a new ‘Evaluative State’ as Giannone 
(2014) explains. The Evaluative State assumes a ‘facilitating and strategist’ role 
in higher education through new modes of public management and apparent 
democratic ‘but deeply conservative’ (Morley, 2003) quality assurance discourses 
and policies. In this study, the Evaluative State is used to refer to a shift in 
governmental attention from merely monitoring the financial inputs towards an 
evaluation of outputs or outcomes through quality assurance agencies and their 
reports (Neave 1998; Humfrey, 2011). 
 
New Public Management: Simply put, NPM is an application of ‘corporate 
governance’ (Hénard & Mitterle, 2010) rules of the game, i.e., ‘disaggregation, 
customer satisfaction, competition, entrepreneurial spirit to public institutions 
such as universities in order to increase their efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and 
quality of services’, (Berg et al. 2008). In this study, I agree with de Vries (2010) 
and consider NPM as an abstraction that is implemented in great variety 
‘explained by the characteristics of the various countries, distinctive political 
regimes and organisational and institutional cultures’.  
 
 
Panopticon: The word ‘panopticon’ is composed of two parts: both taken from 
Greek with ‘pan’ standing for ‘all’ and ‘Opticon’ - optikón- meaning: sight or 
seeing. As a concept, panopticon was first used in 1791 by the English 
philosopher and social reformist, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) to describe an 
ideal society or an institution where a few could administer instruction, discipline, 
and regulation over many and maintain order and social control. The term later 
appeared in Foucault’s ‘Discipline and Punish’ (1975) as he considered social 
institutions such as education systems deploy ‘surveillance, hierarchy, discipline, 
and classification by means of which individuals become ever more regulated 
and controlled’ (Oxford dictionary of sociology, 2009:544). As shown in Chapter 
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1, a number of studies have used Foucault’s panopticon framework to analyse 
the influence of QA/QE systems on HE and academics. Whilst this study uses 
the concepts employed by Foucault (e.g., norm-setting power of quality 
discourses and agencies) it does not assume that systems of surveillance have 
the degree of control over individuals or institutions that many have claimed. 
Consequently, I use the term panopticon to describe a system of governance that 
demonstrate the norms, regulations and discourses pertaining to ‘quality’ 
designed to create a shared quality culture across HEIs and their academics.    
 
Power: This study adopts the definition of power by Foucault (1979:18) as 
particular techniques of the State not so much ‘to impose laws on men, but rather 
to dispose of things’. Power produces forms of subjectivity ‘that the individual 
internalises and thus becomes the agent of their own disciplining, rendering 
themselves docile at the same time as more capable’ (Mann, 2008). As Foucault 
explains, power operates through: discourses and discursive practices; 
disciplinary practices and bio-power (controlling the way we live through 
education, public health); and via technologies of self (that individuals internalise 
and obey). 
 
Risk-based management:  This study adopts Douglas (2009:46) definition: ‘risk 
management is the identification, assessment, and prioritization of risks followed 
by coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, monitor, and 
control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events. Risk management is 
one of several new approaches to quality assurance and has emerged based on 
new developments in the UK as ‘a means of calling universities to account against 
the background of a pan-European loss of trust in institutions and the growing 
use of markets as instruments of public policy’ (Raban, 2014: 89). 
 
Quality: is the main concept of this study and despite having attracted much 
attention in research, still remains an ambiguous and contested theme (Harvey 
& Williams, 2010 Maguire & Gibbs, 2013) ‘on which different worldviews can be 
projected’ (Saarinen, 2008a: 342). This means that quality can mean different 
 32 
 
things to students, academics, institutions, administrators, employers, 
governments and professional organisations (Zou & Rasmussen, 2012). Quality 
as a word originates from Latin ‘qualis’ meaning ‘what kind of’. As a concept in 
higher education, there are five ways in which quality can be understood, as 
Harvey and Knight (1996) suggested: excellence of the end product or service, 
perfection or consistency based on standards, fitness for purpose whether public 
or private, value for money to meet customers’ expectations, and transformation 
of students (empowerment). In this study, quality is understood as a value-laden 
concept that is an ‘intrinsic part of policy making’ (Neave, 1998, p. 265); it 
operates as a norm-setting steering instrument through which different interest 
groups negotiate and maintain their power in governing higher education by 
‘limiting other interest groups’ power to influence the debate’ (Filippakou, 2011, 
P.17).  
 
Quality Assurance (QA): in this study QA is based on the definitions of Morley 
(2003) and Woodhouse (1999) as a series of policies, attitudes, actions and 
procedures necessary to translate particular rationalities and moralities into new 
forms of governance and professional behaviour. QA is a political technology with 
common-sense assumptions that re-engineers higher education and creates a 
power relation between the observer and the observed. It is a governance tool 
that balances out the power of universities as autonomous institutions through 
different purposes of ‘accountability, accreditation, government/state control, 
improvement/enhancement, international reputation, public 
reassurance/confidence, public information, punishment, ranking, regulation of 
academic standards, resource allocation/reward, standardisation’ (Williams, 
2010: 5-6).  
 
Quality enhancement (QE): is a continuous process of maintaining and 
improving quality at different levels of an institution which ‘links internal quality 
culture (autonomy, transparency, and effectiveness) to external quality 
mechanisms- in this sense, external audits serve as triggers for internal quality 
development (Gvaramadze, 2008). 
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Quality culture (QC): this study adopts Kleijnen et al. (2009: 235) definition: 
‘characterised by two elements: a cultural/psychological element of shared 
values, beliefs and expectations at individual/staff level as well as a 
structural/managerial element with defined processes at institutional level, the 
ensemble of which enhance quality and aim at coordinating individual efforts’. 
Within a quality culture approach, quality as transformation enhances individuals’ 
(staff and learners) educational experience and quality as enhancement 
maximises institutional autonomy, transparency, and effectiveness (EUA, 2007). 
 
 
2.3. Quality Assurance in Higher Education: the origins of a 
modern panopticon 
 
2.3.1. The International context 
 
As major actors in public service, higher education systems adopted 
quality management mechanisms by the mid-80s. Total quality management 
(TQM) was a management tool used by the Japanese car industry, e.g., Toyota 
Production System (TPS). It was based on Deming’s 1986 ‘shewhart cycle’ also 
known as ‘PDCA- Plan, Do, Check, Action cycle’ and its underlying philosophy 
was the Japanese Kaizen- literally meaning ‘continuous improvement’ or ‘change 
for better’. Kaizen emphasises ‘continuous self-monitoring, improvement, 
preparedness, and work ethic’ (Morley, 2003) for all employees- managers and 
workers alike- to eliminate waste and to increase profit through standardisation 
and surveillance. According to Prata Savitskaya & Stensaker (2010), higher 
education systems adopted TQM either ‘voluntarily or due to national 
requirements’ as part of their attempt to attract and satisfy customers in a context 
of the rising importance of neoliberal market rules. 
 
The temptation to adopt TQM was manifest in the willingness of local 
authorities to ‘modernise the higher education’ hence maintaining their soft power 
in steering the higher education. Rappleye (2012:124) explains that ‘references 
to elsewhere’ are in fact means of ‘political production... that are deployed to both 
catalyse and stymie attempts at reform…. and could come in the form of 
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legitimation, caution, scandalising or glorification’. Such reforms are made 
possible when a big push creates a wave of ‘epidemiological temptation...and the 
rush to do something because others are doing it’ (Neave, 2014:33 in Amaral & 
Rosa, 2014).  
 
It is important to emphasise that the concept of QA was not at all a new 
one in the European higher education systems. As Neave (1994:116 quoted in 
Rosa et al. 2007) emphasises quality is not “here to stay” if only for the self-
evident reason that across the centuries of the universities’ existence in Europe, 
it never departed’. Forms of QA in higher education could already be 
distinguished in the Middle ages: Oxbridge had self-governing communities of 
scholars; the University of Paris had an accountability scheme under the 
chancellor of the cathedral of Notre Dame; and at the University of Bologna the 
quality of teaching was controlled and led by students, according to Amaral & 
Rosa (2014). Quality has been indeed woven into the very fabric of universities. 
However, quality was an almost exclusive concern of those inside the universities 
who had the authority and the knowledge to judge and ensure it within academia 
and the discipline.  
 
There are several convergent factors that can explain the adoption of TQM 
in higher education. One reason was the massification and expansion of higher 
education and the consequent need to convey reliable information about 
provision to a larger and a more heterogeneous body of students (Land & 
Gordon, 2013). In such a context, quality assurance is seen as ‘the antithesis15’ 
of mass higher education (Morley, 2003). As Henkel (2000) and Delanty (2001) 
state, the underlying assumption was that a mass system could not be left to the 
intrinsic motivation and commitments of the academics and HEIs were to be 
regulated through an external form of scrutiny.  
 
The other element was the change in the perceptions of the role of the 
                                                
15 The Hegelian triadic idea "thesis–antithesis–synthesis: Also called the dialectic method, this approach 
includes an initial proposition (thesis), the possible criticisms and negations of that thesis (antithesis), and a 
final stage where the conflicting ideas are reconciled in a new form (synthesis).  Dialectic is a dominant 
approach in education system of France. For more info on French education system: Nadeau, Jean-Benoit; 
Barlow, Julie (2003). Sixty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong: Why We Love France But Not The French. 
Sourcebooks, Inc.  
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higher education in the climate of neoliberalism and under the watch of the 
evaluative State. The ‘economic crisis, the rising numbers of unemployed, the 
emergence of neoliberal discourses, the advancement of technology and 
globalisation, the diversity in types of institutions, students and staff recruited, 
and the programmes offered were at the origin of a new perception of universities 
shaped by an economic rationality’, (Teixeira, 2009a, 2009b; Trow, 2001; 
Teichler, 1988). HEIs were now seen as institutions in charge of training a skilled 
workforce for the globally competing knowledge economies as opposed to their 
previous role as ‘social institutions with specific cultural and social functions’ 
(Gumport, 2001). Therefore, by the end of 80s, a synergy between ‘plural 
modernisations of the academy, polity, economy, society, and culture’ (Scott, 
1995:9-10) could be observed that defined higher education as a ‘commodity and 
a service, tradable and governed by different stakeholders’ (Dale et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 1 below summarises the shift from the traditional to the quasi-
market university and the external elements that have triggered such a shift.  
 
Figure.1: summary of elements triggering a shift towards quasi-market universities,  
Juliette Torabian, Dec 2016. 
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2.3.2. The European Political Agenda: attractivity in a competing market 
 
In Europe, the official establishment of the European Higher Education 
Area (EHEA) and a new approach towards quality is associated with the signing 
of the Bologna Process in 1999. As Huisman & Westerheijden (2010:63) explain 
one significant ‘action line in the 1999 Bologna Declaration was to promote 
‘European cooperation in quality assurance with a view to develop comparable 
criteria and methodologies’ (the 5th Bologna objective).  
 
By joining the Bologna Process, the European countries created what 
Weber calls a ‘legitimate power’. The Bologna process is the emblem of the 
EHEA epitomising Aristotle’s ‘ideal of politics’ where a new order is negotiated to 
create unity out of diversity. The construction of the EHEA was a political 
production that appropriated the global trends of open and competitive markets 
in higher education to the European context and shuffled the long-established 
power relations in academia by imposing rules of NPM and external QA. 
Otherwise, as mentioned before, the concern for quality has existed as long as 
the European university itself.  
 
To pursue the objectives of the EHEA, the ENQA16 was eventually 
established in 2000 and its role has been further emphasised in the 
Communiqués of Prague (2001), Salamanca Convention (2001), Berlin (2003), 
Bergen (2005), and London (2007) declarations.  The ENQA is regarded as the 
potential contributor to and coordinator of the European Standards and 
Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG). It attempts to create the conditions of 
trust, relevance and comparability of degrees, mobility, and attractiveness of HEIs 
within the EHEA. The ENQA remains the main organisation to share information 
on good practices in QA among the European States, quality agencies and HEIs. 
Several other European institutions have been also established to implement the 
5th objective of the Bologna Process. These include: The European University 
Association (EUA); the National Unions of Students in Europe (ESIB); and the 
European Association of Institutions in Higher Education (EURASHE). 
                                                
16 In 2004 the Network was transformed into the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher 
Education (ENQA). http://www.enqa.eu/index.php/about-enqa/enqa-history/  
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 The ENQA exercises soft power over the European HEIs that aspire to 
compete in the global market and see their own competitive power reinforced as 
part of the EHEA. For instance, according to Stensaker (2003:152), QA 
mechanisms across European countries are developed based on the ENQA’s 
recommendations and are generally characterised by four elements: ‘a national 
coordinating body that administers the evaluations conducted; an institutional 
self-evaluation phase; an external evaluation; and the production of a report’. The 
relationship between the ENQA, the States, their quality agencies, and the HEIs 
may better be explained by using the example of a tilt-a-whirl (a fairground 
attraction), as shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2: tilt-a-whirl 
 
Similar to a tilt-a-whirl, the ENQA provides a rotating platform for the States 
and their HEIs to evolve in different directions and at variable but controlled 
speeds. Thus, the HEIs assume their autonomy while they are in fact attached to 
the platform (ENQA) at fixed pivot points (the States). The rotation of this 
platform, i.e., the new norms of ENQA, will be transferred to the rotating cars (the 
local quality agencies) resulting in centrifugal and gravitational forces that keep 
the complex national systems of higher education under the control of the 
platform. The weight of the passengers (HEIs) may intensify or decrease the 
spinning motion of the cars on a tilt-a-whirl. That means the HEIs’ with already 
established prestige may be better positioned or more resistant to the scrutiny of 
quality agencies in comparison to the newly established universities (i.e., the new 
passengers with a lighter weight)! Likewise, the passengers (the HEIs) may 
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change their position so as to reduce the impact of the external norms (rotation 
of the platform). For instance, the rise of ‘quality enhancement’ restores 
academia’s grip over defining and practicing quality as opposed to the external 
QA regimes (Amaral, 2014) while risk-based QA alters this power relation 
favouring the States and their policies. Finally, the role of the market can be 
assigned to the person sitting in the control cabin outside the tilt-a-whirl with the 
possibility to slow down or increase the speed of the whirl thus controlling the 
gravitational force on HEIs and the States’ rotational trajectory. 
 
In the next part, I will analyse the local construction of quality in French 
HE. 
 
2.4. Understanding French higher education: the history and 
the politics of the State 
 
This part is an introduction to the French higher education system. It 
includes three main sections including: A fragmented and Centralised 
Bureaucracy: A higher education for the political elite; Towards an 
evaluative State: post-1968 to 2012; Cosmetic changes: recent 
developments under the Socialist Party (2012-2017). I have particularly 
focused on the French grandes écoles for two reasons: a) ScPo is a grande école; 
b) grandes écoles’ training and degrees generally represent the dominant local 
definition of quality. This section will provide a background to the findings of the 
study and will help answering the research questions.  
 
 
2.4.1. A fragmented and centralised bureaucracy: a higher education for 
the political elite  
 
French higher education is a uniquely complex system which is difficult to 
read from the outside. Its centralised system is an aggregation of sharply 
hierarchical institutions that are funded and governed by different ministries and 
non-State partners which does not assent to the more habitual divide between 
private and public institutions. According to Clark’s (1983) categories, the French 
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system is a typical example of a ‘single public system with multiple sectors’- 
Mascret (2015) affirms this is still the case today. The French higher education 
has certain other identifying characteristics including: a historically inscribed 
vertical differentiation between the universities and the grandes écoles; a deeply-
rooted republican belief in meritocracy;  the central role of the State and its 
political and legal instruments in the governance of the sector;  a separation 
between research and teaching;  a dominant culture of specialised professional 
training for the political elite in the grandes écoles and the scientific education 
limited to the universities;  an omnipresent egalitarian belief in access to 
university education as a public service which also regulates youth 
unemployment; and a perpetual closed circle of power and influence shared 
between the elites, i.e., the State and the grandes écoles 
 
To understand the French higher education, it is necessary to go back in 
time. 
 
The history of university in France dates back to the Middle Ages. The 
‘University of Paris’ was established in the 13th century- blessed and approved 
by the Church as was the case with Oxford and Cambridge in England. Between 
the 13th and the 16th centuries universities kept appearing around the country, 
e.g., Universities of Toulouse (1229); Grenoble (1339); Valence (1452); and 
Reims (1548). While the Kings and the Church maintained their authority over the 
universities, these early HEIs enjoyed an established monopoly over the training 
and appointment of their students to the highest political or religious posts. This 
part of universities’ role was later on handed over to a parallel system of 
institutions called: grandes écoles.  
 
Why did the grandes écoles take precedence over universities? Fridenson 
(2011)17 explains that by the 18th century due to political and social realities, 
universities have turned into confined bastions of the discipline and pure theory 
and ‘suffered from teacher absenteeism and shallow curricula’ (Bienaymé, 
1991:660). The country needed roads, bridges, schools, and a trained personnel 
for State’s administration and the universities failed to respond to these needs. In 
                                                
17 Interview no. 240785, 17 May 2011, AEF 
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addition, as Attali (1998) affirms, the central political power has perpetually feared 
the dominance of the universities particularly under the rising influence of the 
Church and has therefore sought to reduce their power.  
 
Subsequently, both during the monarchy and after the 1789 revolution, the 
State invents a parallel system of grandes écoles where it can play the central 
role, train the elite, and respond to the practical needs of the society. Some 
prominent examples of the State’s lateral system include:  Collège de France 
(1530), and the ‘special schools’- later known as grandes écoles- like ‘Ecole des 
Ponts (1747), Ecole Polytechnique (1794), Ecole des Mines (1783), Ecole Libre 
des Sciences Politiques (1872), Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA-1945), 
and Ecole Normale Supérieure (1794). Gradually, the universities slip down the 
hierarchy ladder and the grandes écoles assume their role as the means of ‘social 
reproduction’ for the political elite. 
 
Universities endure further degradation during the 18th and the 19th 
centuries. In 1793 universities were abolished due to their analogies with the 
professional guilds. ‘The revolutionary intellectuals wanted to create a new higher 
education system more targeted towards professional needs’ (Beretz, 2014:154). 
In 1805, the Napoléonic model emerged which one would assume has been 
organised in a completely different manner compared to the universities of the 
‘old regime’. Yet this was not the case. Napoléon can, in fact, be considered as 
the heir of the ancien régime rather than the founder of a new university as 
Amestoy (1968) explains. The Napoléonic Model was a continuation of a 
centralised ‘hierarchical configuration of institutions and disciplines’ 
(Bourdieu,1984) that executed the death sentence for universities in France, as 
Musselin (2001) states.  
 
I second Musselin. The Imperial university represents a reproduction of 
the confederacy between the State and the elites who managed to wipe out even 
the word ‘university’ from the texts until its resurgence in the law of 10th July 1896 
on the constitution of universities. In addition, the Napoléonic model was in sharp 
contrast with the German Humboldtian Model. The Imperial University mirrored 
‘the French revolution… which was as much or more a bureaucratic, mass-
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incorporating and state-strengthening revolution as it was (in any sense) a 
bourgeois revolution’ (Skocpol, 1979:179). Thus, contrary to many Continental 
higher education systems at the time, the French system is the least influenced 
by the Humboldtian concepts of the centrality of discovery of knowledge, 
integration of teaching and research, decentralised public authority at regional 
and national levels, and prominence of philosophy and social sciences over pure 
science (Mascret, 2015; Berets, 2014; Ben-David, 1977).  
 
The ‘elite-building’ grandes écoles- as Bourdieu (1996) called them- 
continued to overshadow the universities in 19th and the 20th century. By the end 
of the 19th century, the French HE system continues to be further layered 
horizontally and vertically and the universities remain at the bottom of the vertical 
layers compared to the grandes écoles. By mid-20th century, even more 
specialized schools are established by the ministries and chambers of commerce 
to compensate for the failure of universities and to train their own employees. 
Thus, the French higher education remains inscribed by what Neave (2014) 
considers a “Manichean18 dualism” between the universities and the grandes 
écoles that appropriated the reproduction strategies of the elite facilitating their 
‘transition process from “classmates” to “caste mates” (“copains de classe puis 
copains de caste”)’ (Beretz, 2014:155). This is how the grandes écoles gradually 
came to embody the local definition of prestige and hence of quality while 
universities were equated with lower quality and thus requiring a multitude of 
modernising reforms. 
 
 
2.4.2. Towards an evaluative State: post-1968 to 2012 
 
The French universities experienced the first wave of reforms under the 
Edgar Faure law of 12 November 1968. The main concern of this law was to 
revitalize the role of the universities through increased autonomy, participation 
and multidisciplinarity. The law was a response to the students’ revolt in 1968 but 
did not bring tangible changes to the established conventions. As Clark (1983:64) 
                                                
18 A religious movement initiated by Mani (born in 216 AD in Persian Empire) based on a dualistic view of 
good and evil. 
 42 
 
explains, the grandes écoles and their elite were by then so ‘untouchable that it 
never even became an issue in the great 1968 French educational crisis or in the 
midst of attempted and effected reforms of the following decades’. Vasconcellos 
(2006) has an interesting observation and argues that the inegalitarian approach 
of the French HE system continues because Faure’s bill only targeted 
universities, their student recruitment, and their teaching. It actually did nothing 
to push the grandes écoles to give up their selective entrance exams and respond 
to the rapid massification of the HE sector (A 300% rise between 1958-68).  
 
The central bureaucratic power is so deeply inscribed into the very habitus 
of the French universities by 1968 that the realisation of the Edgar Faure’s bill is 
crippled midway despite General De Gaulle’s decision to reform HE. As Kumar, 
(1975:401) explains: ‘The students got university reforms, wide ranging on paper 
but largely nullified in practice by the hostility and inertia of university 
administration’. A Sharply hierarchical and centralised system like the French 
higher education creates normative and cognitive conventions that resist 
evolution and change. These organisational norms establish a framework within 
which the professional identities and activities of employees are defined. Hence, 
any attempt to reform could be interpreted as a threat to the employees’ identities 
and the traditional frames of reference with which they identify themselves hence 
provoking resistance and rejection.    
 
Nonetheless, the wave of reforms continued from the 1970s onward. The 
interesting point about these reforms is that there seems to be a strong continuity 
in the public policy towards higher education despite apparent cleavages 
between the socialist party (PS) and the right-wing Republicans (LR-previously 
known as UMP). As Neave (2012:67) observes ‘a far greater effort of French 
higher education policy over the past four decades has been taken up with 
attempting to solve problems of authority, purpose, study and curricular structure 
generated by the sustained growth of the student Estate in the universities, not 
the grandes ecoles’.  
 
A very first step towards a performance-based HE is taken by the Savary 
law of 1984 which: a) groups universities, research units, and colleges under one 
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legal title (EPCSP); b) sets their new role to be a rapid creation of new courses 
to respond to the needs of the increasingly diversified student population; and c) 
creates the National Committee of Evaluation (CNE) to control the ‘rate of delivery 
of new courses’. This Committee was an ‘Independent Administrative Authority’ 
(AAI) that directly reported to the President and not to the Minister of higher 
education. 
 
The CNE, can be considered as the launching pad of the evaluative State 
because it introduced the notion of evaluation into French HE. The universities’ 
research sector continued with its own evaluation through the National 
Committee for Scientific Research (CoNRS) created in 1945, the National 
Committee for the Evaluation of Research (CNER) created in 1989 and the 
evaluation unit of the Ministry of higher education Mission for Scientific, technical 
and pedagogy (MSTP) that was created in 2003. The CNE focused its 
evaluations on the overall scientific and pedagogic policy of universities. Its 
evaluations were conducted in a collegial manner: its reports were shared with 
the universities and their relevant ministries that had the liberty in adopting the 
recommendations of the reports; and a four-year report was drafted for the 
President of the Republic. As Neave (2014) explains: ‘The essential purpose was 
to open a ‘lateral’ flow of public information between institutes of higher 
education’. 
 
The advancement of the performance-oriented logic in France has its own 
characteristic. It is true that the 1984 Savary law revitalizes ‘the French 
universities by:  a) bestowing them the title of establishments’ (Musselin, 2005); 
and, b) by creating the CNE to help them progress; yet it legally confirms and 
hence widens the binary divide between the grandes écoles and the universities. 
In fact, the 1984 Savary law adopts a completely opposite direction compared to 
the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act in England that facilitated putting an 
end to the existing binary divide between the polytechnics and the universities in 
the UK. Another peculiarity can be observed in the Organic law of finances 
(LOLF, 2001) that pushed for the creation of a funding system based on annually 
set objectives and performance indicators (excellence funding). Nonetheless, as 
Neave (2014 & 2012) clarifies, the legislators did not succumb to the notion of 
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higher education as a consumer good or the privatisation and extension of 
competitive entrance exams to universities. They circumspectly guarded their 
universities as a ‘public service’ under the authority of the State.  
 
The French State pushed for a culture of external QA in 2006. To do so, 
the State dissolved and merged the three evaluation agencies, (CNE; CNER; 
MSTP) and created an independent agency called the Agency for the Evaluation 
of Research and Higher Education (AERES). The AERES was ‘tasked with 
evaluating research and higher education institutions, research organisations, 
research units, higher education programmes, teaching and degrees and the 
approval of staff evaluation procedures...to improve the quality of the French 
research and higher education system in accordance with the European 
recommendations and decisions of European ministers in the context of the 
Bologna Process’ (AERES website, 2016)19. The AERES administered cycles of 
evaluation in five designated regions of A, B, C, D, and E (see appendix 2) 
following a logic similar to that of QAA in England, i.e., a self-evaluation stage by 
the university, the visit of the experts, and the publication of a final public 
evaluation report (see appendix 3).  
 
The AERES can be considered as part of a crisis management package à 
la française as French higher education faced the reality of globalisation and the 
higher education market mechanisms in 2003, in a rather harsh way. In the 
Shanghai ranking of that year, only two French universities appear in the top 100- 
‘Pierre et Marie Curie university as 65th and the Ecole Normale Supérieure as 
102nd’, (Veltz, 2007). This created a traumatic shock wave in the country. The 
State grasped this opportunity to reform the HE and to showcase the then 
questioned ‘excellence’ of the French universities. The Campus France note 
no.47 (2015)20 provides a summary of the reforms following the 2003 shock: 
creation of PRES (Pôles de recherche et d’enseignement supérieur) in 2006 that 
aimed to group and pool together the resources of universities, research centres, 
and the grandes écoles of one territory to increase the chances of each PRES21 
                                                
19 http://www.aeres-evaluation.com/Agency/Presentation/Profile-of-the-Agency  
20 http://ressources.campusfrance.org/publi_institu/agence_cf/notes/fr/note_47_fr.pdf  
21 More information on the website of the higher education and research ministry in France: 
http://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/cid20724/les-poles-recherche-enseignement-
superieur.html#creation-role-pres  
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unit in ‘being more visible and gain a place in the rankings’22; the 2007 law on the 
freedom and responsibility of universities (LRU);  and the 2013 ESR law which 
pushed for universities’ autonomy, accountability and performance-based 
funding.  
 
Therefore, AERES was created as part of a broader and delayed response 
package of the French evaluative State to an external shock. Normally, when 
governments wait to see the impact of a new initiative- such as the establishment 
of quality agencies- in other countries, they are considered to be adopting a free-
rider policy. This helps them reduce costs by learning from others’ experiences 
and by adopting the best practice. However, the delay in the establishment of 
AERES in France cannot be interpreted as a case of free-rider policy. Garçon 
(2012) 23 explains the reason is: ‘there is a vanity, a certain provincialism, an 
ancestral condescension à la française with regards to the US on the one hand 
and Europe on the other. Even today, while the Shanghai ranking showed that 
our system was far from the best, France remains convinced that the whole world 
envies them...the higher education in France is schizophrenic’. 
 
However, the establishment of AERES did not reduce the authority of the 
State in steering HE. Quite the contrary. It reinforced ‘long-standing systematic 
identities’ (Rappleye, 2010:123). For instance, the Agency was categorised as an 
AAI while its president and members of council were nominated by the State ‘from 
among researchers, teachers, entrepreneurs and parliamentarians who are 
known for the quality of their job’ as the former president of AERES, Jean-
François Dhainaut (2008)24 explained. This explains why Neave (2012) considers 
the AERES as an end product of the gradual deviation of the CNE from 
independence and representing a return to national process of policy formation 
rather than acting as an honest broker. 
                                                
22 DGES, "la coopération entre ls grandes écoles et les universités", texte préparatoire au rapport prévu à 
l'article 13 de la loi de programme pour la recherche du 18 Avril 2006, 25 Octobre 2006, page 5 
23 L'enseignement supérieur français est schizophrénique’, by François Garçon in Le point 20/06/2012. 
Available at:  
www.lepoint.fr/socieite/l-ensiegnement-superieur-francais-est-schizophrenic-20-06-2012-1475488_23.php.  
24 L’AERES passée au crible : y-a-t-il une révolution de l’évaluation ?  Numéro Spécial réalisé en 
partenariat avec l’agence d’évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur, l’Officiel, no.30, 
Sept-Oct 2008. Available at:  www.jfmela.free.fr/aeres_supplement-ors.   
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2.4.3. Cosmetic changes: recent developments under the Socialist 
Party (2012-2017) 
 
With the arrival of the Socialist party in 2012, fervent opponents of the 
AERES found an occasion to express their criticism. Many of the academics and 
scientists considered the evaluations of the AERES detrimental to their former 
collegial evaluations and resented the new evaluation-sanction reports that 
promoted competitiveness through grading. However, the university presidents 
argued that a total abolition of evaluations of the AERES was unnecessary and 
a few adjustments could improve its process (Mascret, 2015; Chevaillier, 2013). 
Motivated by political manoeuvring and symbolic policy actions, rather than any 
intentions to rupture with the quality policies of the former Right-wing government, 
the Socialists under Mr. Holland replaced AERES with another AAI called (Haut 
Conseil de l'évaluation de la recherche et de l’enseignement supérieur- Hcéres).  
 
The Hcéres was created on November 2014 by decree no. 2014-1365. 
Certain changes were introduced: a) the agency is not to evaluate but to 
supervise and validate the evaluation processes that would be handled by 
universities and research centres themselves; b) the evaluation reports on 
research teams and teaching would have a detailed confidential part and a 
synthetic public part and; c) finally, two students were included in the agency’s 
board which was not the case in AERES (Hcéres report of activity, 201425; 
Mascret, 2015). Despite these cosmetic shifts, Hcéres remains under the 
authority of the State: the president of Hcerés is nominated by the government 
who in turn nominates the three directors of the Agency's departments.  
 
Prior to the election of President Macron in May 2017, the final policy 
directive under the Socialist Party was a White Paper published on 31st Jan 2017. 
The French higher education system has not had a clear overarching strategy up 
until the publication of this White paper according to Clark (1983) and 
Vasconcellos (2006). Drafting such a national HE strategy was first suggested in 
                                                
25 Rapport d’activité 2014 de l’Agence d’évaluation de la recherche et de l’enseignement supérieur 
(AERES), Présenté par Didier Houssin, Président en exercice du Hcerés et adopté par le Conseil le 17 
décembre 2014, www.Hcéres.fr/content/download/.../RAP_2014_22122014VD.pdf  
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the 2013 ESR law. In 201426 an initial report on priorities for the national strategy 
was submitted to the minister of HE based on which the recent 2017 White Paper 
was developed.  
 
Both the 2014 Preliminary Report and the final 2017 White Paper 
recognise that the French higher education system is in crisis, yet surprisingly do 
not include ‘QA or QE’ as part of the remedy. The subject of external evaluation 
is dealt with in the last and the shortest chapter (V) in only 4 pages of this 240-
page document. It encourages prioritising teaching over research and suggests 
adding a ‘pedagogic knowledge exam’ to the general recruitment exam for 
lecturers and professors.  
 
The new HE White Paper reiterates the authority of the State, this time ‘not 
as the central decision maker but as the strategist State that has confidence in 
its HEIs’ capacity to implement the vision of the White Paper’ (White paper 
2017:5027) and focuses on five objectives to ‘build the France of tomorrow’ 
including: a) reconstruction of the economy and the society; b) 
internationalisation;  c) improving equality of access for all;  d) inventing the higher 
education of the 21st century;  e) responding to the aspirations of the youth.  
 
While the publication of the 2017 White Paper is a positive step, I do not 
detect a Copernican revolution in this brand-new French strategy (StraNES)28.  
Particularly, because supplemental to this White paper is the latest Code of 
Education that was published on 13 July 2017. It further emphasises the binary 
divide between the universities and the grandes écoles and fails to include 
tangible directives to equally enhance quality in both sectors.  Nonetheless, as 
the State assumes a strategist role, one might conclude that the most recent trend 
in quality would be a move from external quality assurance towards internal 
quality enhancement mechanisms.  The real impact of this White Paper will 
remain unknown until the Senate and the national assembly and several 
                                                
26 Stratégie nationale de l’enseignement supérieur Rapport d’étape du Comité StraNESA Monsieur Benoît 
Hamon, ministre de l’Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche et Madame 
Geneviève Fioraso, secrétaire d’Etat à l’Enseignement supérieur et à la Recherche Par Sophie Béjean, 
présidente du comité StraNES https://cache.media.enseignementsup-
recherche.gouv.fr/file/STRANES/05/3/Rapport_etape_StraNES_8_juillet_-_17h04_339053.pdf 
27 Livre blanc de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche 2017, 
28 La Stratégie Nationale d’Enseignement Supérieur  
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overlapping committees discuss it thoroughly for the next three to four years- and 
I am being very optimistic in this assessment. 
 
Next, I will delineate the construction of ‘quality’ in higher education on the 
other side of the Manche, in England. 
 
 
2.5. Understanding English higher education and its risk 
management 
 
This section describes the key historical moments and political decisions 
that have shaped the higher education quality in England. In order to sketch out 
the gradual construction of quality mechanisms, I have divided this section into 
three main subsections: a) The pre-1992 higher education; b) The post-1992 
HE; and c) recent developments under the Coalition government: the shift 
towards risk management.  
 
Before I start this section, it is necessary to point out the following: the 
higher education system in Britain has a federal structure. Clark (1983:57) 
categorises the British HE as a ‘multiple public system: multiple sector’. This 
means that there are several kinds of HEIs including a hierarchy of universities, 
technical colleges and polytechnics, teacher-training colleges, and a set of 
dispersed further colleges all of which operate under a distinct region: England, 
Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. Within the scope of this study, I have 
focused on the English universities. Additionally, as the government has 
attempted to create incentives for QA and QE through funding, it has been 
necessary to delineate the shifts in funding schemes to understand the change 
in quality approaches. 
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2.5.1. From the medieval era to pre-1992: the development of a binary 
system 
 
England is home to two of the oldest universities of the World: Oxford and 
Cambridge, commonly known as ‘Oxbridge’. It is in the 12th century that Oxford 
university was established as King Henry II banned English students from 
attending the University of Paris29 and so Oxford University become home to 
disaffected English and European students and scholars who ‘abandoned Paris 
during times of crisis in 1167 and 1229’ (Marlow-Ferguson & Lopez, 2002:1486). 
Cambridge University was founded in 1209 and was granted a Royal Charter by 
King Henry III in 123130. The elitism and selective admission policies of the 
Oxbridge resemble the French grandes écoles.  
 
Unlike the University of Paris that was suspended for a century during the 
turmoil of the French revolution (1793-1896), Oxbridge maintained their elite 
reproduction role without interruption. In effect, the two universities jealously 
safeguarded their monopoly in training the political elite opposing, at any 
occasion, the establishment of new universities until the 19th Century. I 
emphasise ‘the political elite’ because the Oxbridge tradition was to train the best 
people for the government and for the church but not for industry, unless of’ 
course that was in the family line. As Clark (1983:97) comments ‘going to the 
government was proper, working at the industry was not’.  
 
Between the 12th and the 19th centuries the English universities expand 
at a slower pace compared to that of French universities. But this is not the only 
characteristic that sets the two higher education systems on different paths. 
Universities in England remain independent from the central government unlike 
the French HE that inherits the Napoléonic model. It is true that the central 
government in England keeps a hand in regulating provision through Royal 
Charters by ‘her especial grace, certain knowledge and mere motion’. But all 
academic decisions will be normally taken by academic bodies or on their advice 
                                                
29 www.ox.ac.uk/about/organisation/history?wssi=1  
30 www.cam.ac.uk/about-the-university/history/early-records  
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(Moodie, 2012:827).  Clark (1983) explains that the Anglo-saxon tradition of 
higher education glorified liberal education; blended research and teaching in the 
professional role of its teachers; distributed authority at the lower and the middle 
levels through trusteeship and collegial academic bodies hence providing equal 
opportunities for all instructors to discuss and vote over issues of concern. This 
is obviously different from the highly centralised French system that concentrated 
on re-producing elites through professional training in its grandes écoles. 
 
Eventually, the English universities experienced a tangible expansion in 
their number and a shift in their roles in the 19th and the 20th centuries. The 
industrial revolution created a need for skilled labour that could not be ignored 
and thus a series of universities- generally known as the Red Brick universities- 
were established with local and industrial funds between 1850 and 1889, e.g., 
University of Leeds for the textile industry. Hence, the role of the universities shifts 
from institutions with monopoly over the training of the political elite to that of 
national assets in the training of the labour force required for the industrial and 
economic growth of the country. Later in the 19th century, Newman (1852) 
describes universities as more than instruments to the industry and as institutions 
with wider responsibility ‘to cultivate the public mind and raise the intellectual tone 
of society’.  
 
There is an interesting point to note with regards to the expansion of 
English universities and colleges. While in France it is the State that develops the 
parallel system of grandes écoles as a way of maintaining its authority, in England 
the higher education system grows alongside the society. The English 
universities, polytechnics, and colleges emerged in certain locations under the 
authority of local councils based on ‘uncoordinated initiatives of different interest 
groups’ (Neave & Clark, 1992) and the subjects taught kept changing in response 
to the local needs. One could claim that the binary divide between Oxbridge and 
the red bricks was an ‘early sign of limited confidence in new self-governing 
universities’ (Moodie, 2012:833) just like the French State mistrusted the 
universities.  
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Consequently, the English higher education did not form a coherent 
centralised system like that of France. This is clearly pointed out in the 1963 
Robbins report: ‘Even today it would be a misnomer to speak of a system of 
higher education in this country, if by system is meant a consciously coordinated 
organisation’, (Article 14). The central government would make sporadic attempts 
to regulate this ‘system’, but as will be observed it takes a few more decades and 
the rise of neoliberalism to make the English higher education yield to the central 
power. In fact, the logic of decentralised and autonomous HEIs remained strong 
enough to secure public funding and to resist governmental criticism although the 
HEIs did not form a coherent system. Of’ course this was during the time when 
the ‘welfare State’ arguments made common sense. The ‘truth’ at the time was 
that the State was gaining with each student graduating from higher education 
and thus it was only normal for the State to invest in higher education through 
public funding.  
 
While these arguments were accepted, they gave rise to a notion of central 
planning that was not practised by the government before this period. The central 
government needed an instrument: a) to keep its steering power over the 
increasing number of universities and b) to deal with the financial needs of these 
independent institutions without being accused of interference. Subsequently, the 
University Grants Committee (UGC) was established in 1919. As a buffer 
between the State and the academia, the UGC was tasked with the following: 
‘Consult with universities and reflect their financial needs to the government 
(advisory role); Receive governmental ‘block grants’ from the Treasury and 
independently distribute it among universities (distributary role); and to collect and 
publish information about the universities (transparency role)’, (Neave & Clark, 
1992 Moodie, 2012). The UGC helped the State in keeping the universities at 
arm’s length between WWI and WWII but more importantly it safeguarded the 
autonomy of universities as it left the responsibility of spending public funds to 
the internal wisdom of the academia.  
 
Then came the famous Robbins Report of 1963. The Report emphasised 
the importance of public funding for further expansion of institutions and the 
development of individual capacities. Although the topic of quality is at best a 
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peripheral concern in the report, it does talk about ‘quality of provision’ which has 
no equivalent in French HE policies of the same period, as was discussed in the 
previous section. The Report demanded universities to produce ‘as much high 
excellence as possible [and to] safeguard standards’ setting ‘the tone and pace 
for other institutions...fostering intellectual excellence’ (Article 40). The 
Committee did not, however, propose any directive on how universities should 
maintain excellence in their provision and delivery because they believed in 
universities’ academic freedom and knew that ‘great pains have been taken to 
see that this position of financial dependence should not impair their legitimate 
rights of self-government’ (Article 15).  
 
The legacy of the Report is due to the fact that by questioning whether a 
British HE system really existed, It set the foundations for a unitary system and 
thus became ‘the blueprint for Britain’s modern system of higher education’ 
(Takayama, 2010:36). Several developments followed the Robbins Report. One 
is that the traditional funding relationship through UGC was maintained until 1989 
when two new funding councils were created for polytechnics (PCFC) and for 
Universities (UFC). Unlike UGC, these Councils were formal legal corporations 
‘with power to make, or not to make, payments and to attach conditions to them’ 
(Neave & Clark, 1992:768). Another steering instrument in the hands of the 
central government was the Department of Education and Science (DES) that 
was created right after the Robbins Report in 1964.  
 
Under Ms. Thatcher’s government that applied neoliberal market rules to 
all public services including HE, the power relations between the State and the 
universities altered. The change arrived slowly but surely as the Conservative 
government (1979-1997) planned to take the upper hand in its struggle with 
inexorable universities. For instance, the pillars of the first assessment of 
research based on which universities could receive funding were established in 
1989 by the UFC. In 1992, HEFCE inherited this exercise and administered it 
under the title ‘Research Assessment Exercise’ (RAE). In 2008, HEFCE 
announced its intentions to update RAE and following consultations with 
stakeholders such as UUK the exercise was reframed as ‘Research Excellence 
Framework’ (REF) in 2014. This is only an example of a new regime of truth 
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formed under neoliberal common-sense arguments including: the need for 
common regulations in a rapidly expanding higher education system and the role 
that the HEIs were to play in the fast-growing international markets. 
 
The need for a common system of shared standards led to the creation of 
the first Committee of Chancellors and Principals (CVCP-now known as 
Universities UK-UUK) in 1983 with the mission to establish Academic Standards 
for universities. In 1986, the Committee proposed three formal codes of practice 
on external examiners, postgraduate training and research, and research degree 
examination, as Brown (2011b:36) explains. The DES was doubtful about the 
extent the universities actually implemented these guidelines. As a result, the 
second CVCP that was established in 1989 recommended the establishment of 
an Academic Audit Unit (AAU) to extend the validation, accreditation, and quality 
audit activities of the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA) in 
polytechnics and colleges to universities. 
 
The establishment of the AAU could be interpreted- although this was not 
its initial intention- as a step towards creating a unitary higher education system 
which would be easier to control. To briefly explain my point: The ‘parallel running’ 
of two audit systems proved to be an ‘unwelcome precedent’ due to the ‘costs 
and resourcing implications of the new regime’ (Brown, 2011b:41). And therefore, 
the White Paper of 6 May 1991 clearly stated that the government was willing to 
consider the opinion of some of the universities’ and polytechnics’ representatives 
to create a unitary audit system merging the CNAA and the AAU to ensure 
effectiveness of regulations and quality assurance across all higher education 
institutions in the United Kingdom (DES, 1991: 26-27). For a unitary audit unit to 
operate across all institutions, a logical next step was ‘breaking down the 
increasingly artificial and unhelpful barriers between the universities, and the 
polytechnics and colleges’ (DES White Paper, 1991:12) and creating a unitary 
higher education system. 
 
 
This meant: a) creating a single funding structure for all institutions 
(merging the Polytechnics and Universities Funding Councils); and, b) 
dismantling the CNAA and paving the way for the creation of a new system of QA 
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for all institutions. And the argument for a new quality regime sounded reasonable 
and necessary because it was presented as a way to protect quality while the 
system expanded and as local and international competition intensified. Brown 
(2011b:39) asserts that this provided the basic rationale for the assessment of 
HEIs.  
 
 
2.5.2. The post-1992 era: the beginnings of quality enhancement  
 
In 1992, two documents set the English higher education on a new 
trajectory: The White Paper Higher Education: A new Framework and the 1992 
Higher and Further Education Act. As Ratcliffe (2017) explains, the divide 
between the polytechnics and the universities was already blurred with the former 
offering undergraduate and research degrees and the latter delivering more 
vocational degrees. This reinforced the efforts of the State and thus through the 
1992 Act the binary divide was ended and ‘a newly formed Higher Education 
Quality Council (HEQC, 1992-1997) was given responsibility for QE, while the 
Funding Council for England had responsibility for QA’ (Gosling, 2014:66). 
Interestingly, none of the documents provided a definition of quality or of QA, 
apparently because there was a confusion in the minds of civil servants and 
ministers about the whole topic. As Williams (2010:7) explains, what was clear 
was ‘a desire to subject universities to some form of external inspection. Was the 
chief motivation, indeed, hostility towards the universities because of their lack of 
accountability? It seems likely.’ 
 
By 1997 when the labour majority government of Tony Blair took over, the 
‘quality war’ was already declared. The government considered QA as a stimulus 
sharpening the competitive edge of the universities, while the institutions still 
favoured academic self-regulation and strongly opposed the new arrangements. 
Brennan & Bellingham (2013:2) confirm that ‘in many ways, it was seen by some 
as a ‘war’ about power as much as it was a ‘war’ about process’. 
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To reconcile universities and the government, the Dearing Report31 
pointed out the costly and redundant processes of the Teaching Quality 
Assessments (TQA) conducted by the Funding Council and the quality audits and 
quality enhancement analysis conducted by the HEQC. It questioned the utility of 
such a parallel system ‘as institutions 'learn' how to achieve high ratings’ (Dearing 
Report, 1997:158). As a remedy, the Report recommended to gather the parallel 
processes of subject review and institutional audit under a single Quality 
Assurance Agency (QAA) with three main functions: ‘quality assurance and public 
information; standards verification; the maintenance of the qualifications 
framework’ (Dearing report, 1997:161, article 10.83). Thus, the creation of QAA, 
according to Brown (2010:136) was a compromise between the universities’ and 
the government's view as to how quality is best protected, but it was a 
compromise ‘born of exhaustion rather than conviction or resolution’ (ibid).  
 
There are certain interesting facts about QAA that can help better clarify 
the steering role of the government. QAA is independent from the government 
but there has been a ‘clear expectation’ as to the role and activities of the agency 
in response to government priorities (Harvey, 2002; Owen, 2014); however, its 
officials are not nominated by the government as is the case with the quality 
agencies in France. QAA acts as a bureaucratic instrument that normalises the 
‘soft power’32 of the government through its Code of Practice. The universities 
and the Agency’s collaboration in QA processes is reminiscent of the definition of 
soft power by Nye (2004) who suggested ‘power with others can be more 
effective than power over others’.  
 
The role of QAA is significant but limited. The Agency conducts periodic 
reviews in six-year cycles verifying the procedures and systems used in 
institutions to ensure the quality of their awards. As Jackson (2010:79) explains: 
‘One of the objectives for the audit and review activities undertaken by QAA is to 
contribute to the promotion and enhancement of high-quality teaching and 
learning’. Ever since 2001 and the disenchantment of universities over subject-
                                                
31 The full text of Dearing Report is available at: 
http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/dearing1997/dearing1997.html  
32 In a most recent publication by University of Southern California Centre for Public Diplomacy and 
Portland Consultancy firm called ‘The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017’, the UK 
government occupies the second place following France in its use of soft power mechanisms. 
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review processes, the audit processes ‘has been decided by the controlling 
authority of an ad hoc group comprising the Higher Education Funding Council of 
England (HEFCE), UUK, and GuildHE (the latter two bodies together 
representing the institution's’ interests) with a government observer to keep a 
close eye on what is going on and give a nudge when deemed necessary’ 
(Williams, 2010:10). The real power lies in the hands of the government (through 
HEFCE and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS33); the 
Funding Councils; and the HEIs. 
 
2.5.3. Recent Developments under the coalition government: the shift 
towards risk management 
 
In the current quality regime in England, all HE actors are expected to 
ensure the quality of students’ experiences. In fact, the ‘idea of central regulation 
under the auspices of the State remains intact’ (Filippakou et al. 2012:114) while 
a move ‘from higher education funding to higher education regulation’ is practised 
(Black et al., 2015:17).  
 
The role of students in QA mechanism has been emphasised since 2010 
and following the increase of students’ fees recommended by the Browne Report 
(2010). Holmwood (2011) claims, ‘The Government White Paper on Higher 
Education makes frequent reference to excellence of UK higher education, but 
proposes measures that will dismantle it...as they turn their back on the very 
significant social, political and cultural benefits that universities provide’. The BIS 
2011 White Paper ‘Students at the Heart of the System’ reiterates the importance 
of students’ experiences and satisfaction and proposes a genuinely risk-based 
approach to the regulation of universities. ‘In many ways, the 2011 white paper 
has built on: a new emphasis on the centrality of the student experience; a need 
to ensure better public information about higher education; and a closer 
engagement with the ‘public interest’ (HEPI Occasional Report 6, 2013:1).  
 
                                                
33 The BIS was created in 2009 as a merger of Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) 
and the Department for Business, enterprise and regulatory reforms, (BERR). The DIUS was, in fact, the 
first governmental department created in 2007 responsible for HE.  
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The risk-based approach to quality is nothing new in the UK HE, it has only 
taken new turns. As Raban (2014:88) explains the trend started more than ten 
years before the 2010 White Paper and when the Funding Council adopted risk-
based financial regulations in judging the performance of universities. The 
purpose of risk-based approach ‘has not been to reduce but to re-focus 
accountability of institutions’ and to push for the forces of competition to replace 
the burdens of bureaucracy in driving up the quality of the academic experience’ 
(Raban, 2014:93). A risk-based approach would permit ‘a more diverse, dynamic, 
and responsive’ (BIS, 2011:3) HE system providing a basis for tailored external 
reviews by QAA based on the ‘individual circumstances’ of each provider 
(HEFCE, 2012:3-5). Although risk remains undefined, there is an understanding 
that the risk-based approach will provide QAA and HEFCE with a basis to deal 
with universities differently.  
 
More recently and in conformity with this risk-based approach, several new 
initiatives have been adopted. For instance, HEFCE announced a 
comprehensive review of the existing QA arrangements of universities in May 
2015’ (Boggs, 2016). The Council has also previously created a public website 
on Key Information Sets (KIS) including NSS34 data on the nature of learning 
experiences (Eggins, 2014). In the same vein, in 2015 the government introduced 
the ‘Teaching Excellence Framework’ to mirror the existing REF and to help 
promote the significance of teaching on an equal ground with research. In 2016, 
QAA revised the operating model of quality assessments and BIS published 
another White Paper ‘Success as a Knowledge Economy: Teaching Excellence, 
Social Mobility and Students’ Choice’ proposing to ‘designate a higher education 
quality body, which will gain statutory authority to design and operate quality 
assessment’ (ENQA website, 2017).  
 
The very latest developments in quality policy lean towards further 
students’ engagement and an emphasis on teaching excellence at the subject-
level. To this end, the Higher Education and Research Act (HERA-2017) clearly 
proposes a new regulatory body ‘the Office for Students’ and considers QAA to 
                                                
34 National Student Survey originally initiated in 2005 and has been conducted by Iposs MORI on an 
annual basis.  
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be one among other independent quality bodies that will collaborate with this new 
Office and apply for HEFCE tenders to ensure quality of Standards and good 
academic experience. Furthermore, HEFCE is running a ‘Teaching Excellence 
Framework Assessment at Subject-level’ from Autumn 2017 to Spring 201835. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
  
The quality mechanisms in higher education have become sites of power 
struggle in both France and England. While the French universities are gradually 
granted some autonomy, they still operate in a highly centralised higher education 
system controlled by the State and its instruments like Hcéres. The English 
universities have safeguarded their historical autonomy but are subject to an 
increasing central regulation with more power given to students’ voices. The 
quality system in France was developed quite late (2006) and has ever since 
changed sluggishly mainly through governmental decrees that are whittled down 
as they pass through the bureaucratic rigidities of the system. In England, during 
the last three decades, the quality system has provoked much negotiation and 
debates and has grown to be ‘one of the most elaborate institutional and control 
mechanisms in the world’ (Brown, 2010).  
 
The two quality agencies (QAA and Hcéres) are registered in the ENQR 
and follow a similar pattern of institutional audit in cycles of 6 and 5 years, 
respectively. Both are independent and have an advisory role but QAA occupies 
a more significant place in the quality game compared to Hcéres as it will be 
further discussed in Chapter 5. In their local quality panopticon, the role of QAA 
has been altered and reduced due to power exercised by the HEIs and other 
academic bodies such as UUK, Guild HE, and HEPI, for instance. The role of 
Hcéres in France has been kept minimal as the political elite, i.e., the Ministries 
and the grandes écoles have maintained their power in steering the HE.  
 
The are some general traits that define the higher education in the two 
nations. Elitism is one example. It has survived through ‘selective’ universities: 
grandes écoles in France and Oxbridge in England allowing the reproduction of 
                                                
35 http://www.hefce.ac.uk/news/newsarchive/2017/Name,114768,en.html 
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‘la noblesse d’Etat’ as Bourdieu (1989) explains. Additionally, both HE systems 
have yielded to the primacy of neoliberalism and have adopted EHEA’s QA 
policies; but, as it was explained in this review, their national QA systems have 
been developed based on essentially different epistemological justifications and 
history.  
 
 Therefore, it would be unwise to make cross-national comparisons based 
on these similarities. For instance, transparency and communication have guided 
the English quality policy model while the French have remained loyal to their 
ancient belief ‘vivons cachés, vivons heureux’- live hidden, live happy’- in their 
quality models and reports. Thus, as a comparativist, without empirical evidence, 
I will be in danger of giving way to my ‘penchant for unexplained homologies, 
inexplicable correspondences and would-be self-explanatory parallelisms’ 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977:188). To avoid this, the data analysis and discussion 
chapter will further delineate the quality discourses, policies, and practices in both 
cases. Prior to that, the next two chapters will explain the methodology and the 
conceptual framework adopted in this study.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
METHODOLOGY & METHODS 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
The choice of methodology, methods, and epistemology adopted in this 
study are informed by the overall aim of the study and its research questions. The 
study aims to delineate mechanisms of power that construct ‘quality’ in HE of 
England and France. It also aims to analyse the impact of these local perceptions 
on the daily practice of academics in the two selected institutions (ScPo Paris 
and the LSE).    
 
Congruent with the aims of the study, I have adopted a social constructivist 
epistemology and a qualitative case study design. The methods used to collect 
data blended semi-structured interviews and desk research. This permitted 
triangulation of data and facilitated a more reliable and valid picture of the realities 
of the two cases. As Krug (2011) emphasised, data triangulation is a favourable 
method because it helps to see a problem from different angles and aims at 
corroborating the phenomenon under study. The data from the semi-structured 
interviews and the desk research was analysed using a Foucauldian discourse 
analysis which facilitated a genealogy of political, cultural, and power relations 
that construct local perceptions of quality. The outcome of the data analysis was 
then discussed to answer the three research questions of the study.  
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the rationale behind the above-mentioned 
choices and why they best fit the purposes of this study. I will also provide a 
detailed account of the processes of data collection and analysis.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
Among the three major approaches to social research, interpretative social 
science (ISS) accentuates socially constructed meaning and value relativism that 
best corresponds to the aims of this study. The origins of the ISS can be traced 
back to the German sociologist, Max Weber (1864-1920) and the German 
philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911).  
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As neo-Kantians and proponents of anti-positivist methodologies, both 
Weber and Dilthey argued for the study of social action through interpretative 
rather than the positivist empiricist approach used in natural sciences. Unlike 
Durkheim, Weber believed in multiple causes- and not in monocausality- for any 
social action the understanding of which called for systematic and interpretative 
methodologies. Likewise, Dilthey believed that while the aim of natural sciences 
was to arrive at law-based causal explanations, the main task of social sciences 
was to understand the organisational structures of historical and human life.  
 
Two of Dilthey’s philosophical concepts are relevant to the purposes of this 
study. These include his idea of ‘cultural systems’ and ‘external organisation of 
society’. The cultural system, in this study, alludes to the political or economic 
power networks that go beyond national borders and people voluntarily join them 
for political, economic, scientific reasons. An example is the European countries 
joining the Bologna process and creating the EHEA. Another example is the 
neoliberal worldviews that have motivated the French bourgeoisie to maintain 
their ‘reinvention capacity’ (Gordon, 2004) through a proliferation of the number 
of management and commercial grandes écoles. Both EHEA and neoliberalism 
are, therefore, cultural systems. 
 
By contrast, the external organisation of society refers to institutions like 
the family or the State that we are born into. In this study, the external 
organisation of society manifests itself in established networks of power and 
knowledge, i.e., the social class, the universities, the grande écoles, the States 
and their legal and political institutions. These act as priori conditions to reserve 
the hegemony of the elite over others as a justified pure reason independent from 
experience in a Kantian ontology. Dilthey claims “enduring causes bind the wills 
of many into a single whole” (1883/SW.I, 94) within which relations of power, 
dependence, and property can be established’36. 
 
Drawing on Dilthey’s idea of verstehen, Weber proposed an empathetic 
understanding of social action and the impact of structure on it. The concept of 
Eklarendes Verstehen entails an empathetic understanding of the ‘everyday lived 
                                                
36 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dilthey/  
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experience of people in specific historical setting’ (Neuman, 2011:87). As 
opposed to Aktuelles Verstehen or direct observational understanding, Weber 
argued for an understanding of the reasons and motivations that inform people’s 
thoughts and decisions and therefore their actions. He asserted: ‘we shall speak 
of ‘social action’ wherever human action is subjectively related in meaning to the 
behaviour of others... social action is… the primary object of an ‘interpretative 
sociology’ (Weber, 1981:159). This epistemology guided my choice of data 
collection and analysis methods. It helped me go deeper than my initial direct 
observations and reflections in order to understand the reasons and motivations 
that constructed quality in the two cases of my study. 
 
Based on the above-mentioned tenets of interpretive sociology, therefore, 
this study is informed by a social constructivist epistemology. Originally coined by 
Berger and Luckmann (1966), the basic tenet of this approach relies on the fact 
that ‘people make their own social and cultural worlds at the same time these 
worlds make them’ (Fairhurst & Grant, 2010). Since reality ‘is a product of social 
processes...created in particular places and under specific historical 
circumstances’ (Neuman, 2011:89) a positivist or an essentialist approach that 
project a fixed meaning onto reality was not well-suited for my study. On the 
contrary, the social constructivist approach allowed me to explore ‘quality’ as it is 
framed and perceived in each society and by the ensemble of individuals 
interviewed during a fixed historical period of time when this study was 
conducted.  
 
My choice is, in fact, informed by an eclectic reading of concepts and 
theories in sociology.  In accordance with Foucault’s concept of knowledge and 
power (1972), within any society, there exist ‘regimes of truth’ and mechanisms 
for the reproduction of that ‘truth’. The truth is usually established through 
continuous discursive practices of a distinct group of individuals and their 
diffusion apparatuses and institutions that result in a Durkheimian ‘collective 
conscious’. In fact, society acts as an external force as it brings about the need 
to conform and it acts as an internal force because its norms and values are 
already formed in the collective consciousness of individuals. The discursive field 
is formed and dismantled based on political and economic priorities of the time 
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and is thus characterised by temporality and spatiality. For instance, as a child 
during the Iran-Iraq war we were taught to associate tulip with martyrdom, 
patriotism, and blood. This was our reality. However, I am sure none of the 
Iranians born after the war have a similar understanding of tulip, and neither do I 
today.  
 
Hence, by adopting a social constructivist epistemology I am assuming the 
following: I understand that knowledge is subjective and reality is fluid and 
changing. This entails that knowledge is socially constructed by technologies of 
power and is sustained through signs and norms shared among members of a 
cultural system. This collective conscious assumes that truth is singular and 
normalises this particular reading of truth through ‘surveillance and monitoring 
which…. are reinforced by legal structures’ (Grbich, 2007:147).   
 
This perspective also implies that this study offers subjective knowledge 
jointly constructed- by the sample of participants and myself- through our 
interactions within a certain frame of time and space. This has several 
implications. I realise that the interpretation of the data could be affected by my 
identity and life experiences despite my efforts to assume a reflexive position. 
And that my own subjectivity has been constructed through interactions with the 
researched sample and the literature.   
 
Additionally, identities and positions of the selected sample of participants 
as well as the choice of cases, i.e., the LSE and Sciences Po may have had an 
impact on the outcomes and findings of this study. As elite institutions, the 
selected cases may not reflect the wider and the more generally applied quality 
policies across universities; additionally, the data obtained from the small sample 
of part-time academics in both cases may potentially have affected the outcomes 
of the study. In other words, had this study used other universities as cases and 
a larger sample of interviewees, the findings of the study could have been 
different. The current findings are social constructions of the sample institutions 
and individuals interviewed and may not be taken as a representation of the 
higher education systems in France and England.  
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3.3. Design 
 
A qualitative multiple-case study design is adopted which is compatible 
with the social constructivist perspective of the study as explained below. 
 
Within the same logic and in order to explore the social construction of 
‘quality’, this study is a qualitative- and not a quantitative- social research. The 
qualitative approach could best provide the flexibility necessary for understanding 
the collective perceptions that construct quality in each case. Had I remained 
attached to my personal experience and generalized this understanding, then my 
analysis could have suffered from bias and a limited viewpoint. As Robson (2009) 
explains, when a researcher brings assumptions and preconceptions it affects 
the way they behave in the research setting. For instance, during the interviews 
this impacts the kind of questions they ask and diverges their data selection, 
reporting, and analysis processes. I certainly wanted to avoid such a bias. Thus, 
it was through a flexible qualitative design that I could help develop an 
understanding of the societal and individual versions of reality from the 
perspective of the respondents.  
 
In conformity with the social constructivist epistemology, and the flexible 
qualitative design of the study, I chose a multiple case-study design. 
 
Why a case study? Simply because I aimed to ‘investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth within its real-life context using multiple sources of 
evidence’ (Yin, 2009:18). The central idea was to investigate quality as 
constructed, reproduced, and practised in real life contexts in France and 
England using preliminary observations, literature review, policy documents, 
legal and institutional texts, and individual interviews. As such, a qualitative case 
study design allowed employing multiple methods and facilitated triangulation of 
data. As Robson (2009) asserts, multiple methods of data collection can help 
addressing different but complementary questions about a phenomenon 
therefore increasing the validity of the research.  
 
I selected two national cases (France and England) and within each case 
 66 
 
one sample higher education institution, i.e., Scpo Paris and the LSE. The choice 
of institutions was based on the following considerations. Congruent with the 
purposes of research in an EdD programme, this study was to provide the 
opportunity to examine educational institutions with which I had a close 
association. This meant selecting ScPo Paris as the French institutional case 
since I was working there at the time of data collection for this study. I, then had 
to select an institutional case that could be the closest equivalent to ScPo Paris. 
From both my teaching experience at ScPo Paris and reading the mission 
documents and the literature, the LSE, as an established University specialising 
in the Social Sciences, seemed to be the best choice.  
 
Why a multiple case study rather than a single case study? The study 
could very well focus on one case, either France or England and still be 
presentable as an EdD thesis. However, the advantage of a multiple case study 
was that ‘more rigorous analytic conclusions could be derived from a multiple-
case study compared to a single case study’, (Yin, 2009:53). As a comparative 
research, this study could, therefore, delineate the power relations that are at play 
in the construction of the quality panopticon in each case; it can also facilitate a 
new insight into the underlying worldviews that make the two cases similar or 
different as part of the larger EHEA.  
 
3.4. Methods of data collection 
  
In this part I will explain the methods that were used to collect and analyse 
the data. The data was collected drawing on primary and secondary courses and 
was analysed using a Foucauldian discourse analysis. 
 
 
3.4.1. Primary sources of data collection 
 
Primary sources are those documents that provide a first-hand evidence 
about the topic of research, i.e., quality. These include: government documents, 
Acts, Laws and White Papers, quality codes, institutional external evaluation 
reports, internal quality frameworks and their mission statements. They provide 
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evidence of the activities, priorities, definitions, debates, functions, and policies 
that shape and construct quality at national and institutional levels. Furthermore, 
first-hand evidence about how quality is perceived and enacted can be retrieved 
from individual interviews that I conducted for this study. The interviews allowed 
me to investigate ‘varieties of human experience’ (Steiner, 2006:481) and helped 
me unfold the meaning of the interviewees’ lived experiences. 
 
3.4.1.1. Primary documents: individual interviews 
 
A total of twenty interviews were conducted including ten interviews in 
each case.  The interviews were semi-structured which meant that I had some 
predetermined questions in mind that I adjusted according to the interviewees’ 
position and professional function. The semi-structured interviews allowed 
omitting or adding certain questions that seemed more appropriate in each 
occasion. Each interview lasted for approximately one hour including the 
greetings and the wrap-up hence adding up to 20:01 hours. Ten interviews were 
conducted face-to-face in France and in the French language; the others were 
conducted online through SKYPE and in English as detailed below: 
 
● Four interviews were conducted with officials in the national quality 
agencies in England (QAA) and France (Hcéres), i.e., two interviews in 
each quality agency;  
 
● Four interviews were conducted with universities’ quality managers and 
directors of departments or campus, i.e., two at ScPo and two at the LSE;  
 
● Twelve interviews were conducted with academics at ScPo and the LSE, 
that is six interviews in each case. To understand whether full-time senior 
and part-time junior academics differed in their perceptions of institutional 
quality mechanisms, I conducted three interviews with senior academics 
and three interviews with junior academics in each institution. 
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3.4.1.2. Primary documents: national and institutional  
 
The semi-structured interviews allowed an accumulation of in-depth 
information on the subject of inquiry. To complement this information, I also used 
other sources of information including governmental HE policies, quality 
agencies’ codes, and the selected universities’ strategies and audit reports. 
These documents permitted:  
 
a) an understanding of the general worldviews of quality set forth by the 
political elite and their legal and institutional instruments. The analysis of the 
discourse in these main documents helped me answer the first and the second 
research questions of this study;   
 
b) an understanding of academics’ experiences in the light of national and 
institutional definitions of quality. This facilitated responding the third research 
question. 
 
There exists a wide number of governmental HE policies in each case and 
I had to choose from among them. To this end, two factors were essential in 
creating the short list of documents: the research questions and the timeline of 
the study.  Tables 3 and 4 below show the list of selected national documents in 
the case of France and England, respectively. These documents were used to 
answer the first research question. As can be observed, the selection of 
documents follows the same time logic that was used to present the literature 
review.  
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Table 3:  
Selected national documents for analysis: the case of France 
Pre-1968 ● Edgar Faure 1968 law 
Post-1968-2012 ● Savary law 
● The 2006 LOLF law 
● The 2006 AERES 
● The 2007 LRU 
● The 2013 ESR law 
2012-2017 ● The 2014 Hcéres law 
● The 2015 HE Finance law 
● The 2017 White Paper 
● Hcéres Strategic Plan 2016-2020 
 
 
Table 4 
Selected national documents for analysis: the case of England 
Pre-1992 ● The Robbins Report 
Post-1992-2010 ● The 1992 ACT 
● The Dearing Report 1997 
● The 2003 White Paper: The Future of HE 
● The 2004 White Paper: Equipping our 
Teachers for the Future 
● The 2010 Browne report 
● The 2011 White Paper: Students at the 
heart of the System 
2010-2017 ● DES 2016 White Paper Success as a 
Knowledge Economy 
● HERA 2017 
● QAA 2017-2020 
 
 
There are two reasons why there are more documents in the post-1990s 
parts of both tables: 1) the focus of the study is on ‘quality’ following the 1999 
Bologna Process and the documents that date before this period have been 
analysed in order to demonstrate the possible shifts in quality trends; 2) as a 
qualitative case study with a social constructivist approach, it is important to 
delineate the most recent trends and definitions of ‘quality’ in both cases.  
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I also read and analysed institutional documents in order to address the 
second and the third research questions. Table 5 below lists the selected 
documents in the case of ScPo in France and the LSE in England.  
 
Table 5. List of Institutional documents 
ScPo 1. SciencesPo 2022: Document  
    d'orientation stratégique  
2. SciencesPo enquête jeunes   
    diplômés promotion 2014  
3. Rapport d'évaluation de  
    Sciences Po Paris: AERES  
    (2014) 
The LSE 1. The LSE institutional audit 2006 
     & 2011 
2. The LSE Teaching Quality  
    Assurance and Review Office  
    (TQARO) mission statement 
3.The  LSE Strategy plan  
    2015-2020 
 
 
3.4.2. Secondary Sources 
 
Secondary sources permit further analysis, discussion, and interpretation 
of the primary sources.  
 
There is an abundance of secondary sources on both topics of higher 
education and quality, especially in the case of England. Quality in higher 
education has been delineated from different perspectives and with different 
aims. The list is long but I can refer to some authors who have focused on defining 
quality (Harvey and Green,1993; Harvey, 2006; Van Kemenade, Pupius and 
Hardjono, 2008); or some who have focused on external quality assurance 
(Harker, 1995; Danø and Stensaker, 2007). There are also articles and books 
that focus on audit (Cheng, 2009); national systems in England (Brown, 2011 
Drennan, 2001; Turnbull et al., 2008) or in France (Neave 1988 & 2014; Musselin, 
2005; Chevaillier, 2013). In contrast, comparative studies- such as Neave (1989 
& 2014)- on quality in HE in France and England are not that abundant.  
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3.5. Data collection  
 
In this section, I will provide a detailed account of the process of data 
collection including the selection of the participants, the ways I approached and 
informed them about the topic of the study, how and when the interviews were 
conducted, transcribed, and translated.  
 
 
3.6. The participants 
 
To answer the research questions of the study, I approached several 
individuals in the two quality agencies, ScPo, and the LSE. I aimed to interview 
four groups of individuals: quality agencies’ managers; quality managers and 
department/campus directors at the selected HEI cases; senior permanent and 
junior contractual academics. 
 
The differences in the French and English HEIs started manifesting 
themselves at this stage. It was much easier to understand ‘who’s who’ at the 
LSE compared to ScPo. This is also noted on page 12 of the AERES 2014 
evaluation of ScPo: ‘The need for clarification and simplification applies to the 
internal administrative organization… ScPo self-evaluation report does not 
present an organizational chart expounding intelligibly the articulation of the 
various bodies existing within ScPo and making it possible to easily identify the 
circuits leading to the decision making’. Consequently, the process of locating 
and contacting participants at the LSE was less of a hassle compared to ScPo 
where I had local access. Of’ course the good news was that I was lecturing at 
ScPo at the time and this facilitated my access to potential interviewees. 
Nonetheless, it took me almost double the time to find potential participants from 
among managers and department directors at ScPo.  
 
I knew that academics working in different disciplines could have different 
ways of understanding quality and this could bear a negative impact on the 
reliability of the data gathered. To avoid this situation, I selected the same 
academic department at the LSE and at ScPo.  
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In the case of the LSE, locating academics of a department required a 
simple search on their website. I used the available mailing list to send the 
invitation letters to potential interviewees. I was also assisted by an administrative 
member of the LSE who helped me with contacting the potential interviewees, 
particularly the heads of departments and the junior academics. In the case of 
ScPo, I first had to conduct an informal investigation asking colleagues and some 
of the administrative personnel to give me a clue about the departments and how 
I could find a mailing list. Through contacting a senior academic and by attending 
some of the departmental events as well as website search, I got in contact with 
other members of the department (both senior and junior academics) and 
eventually created a mailing list through which I sent out the invitation letters. 
Eventually, I approached about 20 academics in each university and received six 
positive responses including from three full-time senior and three part-time junior 
academics. The academics at ScPo were more available and more interested in 
the topic of the research, while for the ‘time-poor’ academics of the LSE the topic 
seemed redundant.  
 
3.7. The process 
 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted during three months 
following the thesis review panel meeting (for extract samples of interviews, see 
appendices 5 & 6). While still exchanging with my supervisors in February and 
early March 2015 and revising the thesis proposal, I started compiling the lists of 
potential interviewees in France and England as explained above. In addition to 
my own search for potential participants, a few of the academics directed me 
towards some of their colleagues whom they thought would be willing and 
available to participate in my research. The first interview was conducted on 17 
March 2015 in France and the last one was also an interview in France on 26 
May 2015 (see appendix 4).  
 
I followed a set of steps for each interview. The first step was to draft the 
interview invitation letters in French and in English (see appendices 7 & 8). The 
general information included the aims and the significance of the study, the 
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research questions, and the methods of data collection. I also assured 
participants that their anonymity and confidentiality will be respected should they 
volunteer to take part in my study and that they could leave the process at any 
time. Before sending the invitation letters, I personalised them based on the 
individual I was contacting. For instance, the letter for managers in quality 
agencies included a few lines on the significant role of quality agencies in my 
research and how the participant was best positioned to provide first-hand 
information on the topic of my study.  While, the letter to academics emphasised 
their role as practitioners and the fact that their daily experiences of internal 
quality mechanisms were significant to the purposes of my study. Each letter 
included the name and the title of the participant, the approximate duration of 
interviews, and my special thanks and appreciation for the time they allocated to 
reading the letter and the time they may choose to allocate to my research by 
volunteering to participate.  
 
The next step included much negotiation and a touch of persuasion. Once 
a potential participant responded positively the next step was to reply immediately 
and to propose several one-hour time slots while assuring them that I was 
completely flexible in arranging my time based on their availability. A few of the 
interviews were scheduled easily without much negotiation. However, for a 
majority of participants, I wrote an approximate number of twenty emails to set 
the date and time, to reschedule because they had new priorities, and to remind 
them that their participation was a meaningful contribution to my research. Some 
of the online interviewees cancelled their interviews just a few minutes before the 
agreed time and emailed me later to set another date. The face-to-face interviews 
in France went rather smoothly and almost without cancellations- of’ course I 
sometimes had to wait in front of participants’ offices for 45 minutes or an hour 
until they could be available for the interview. 
 
The procedure during the online and the face-to-face interviews were 
similar. At the start of each interview, I thanked the interviewees for their 
participation. I then asked the participants’ permission to record our conversation 
and started recording once they agreed. The SKYPE interviews were recorded 
using both a camera and an audio recorder to make sure every word was properly 
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recorded. The face-to-face interviews were audio recorded only. I opened the 
discussion by a short reminder of the aims of the study and then used a first probe 
to let them initiate the conversation. For the SKYPE interviews, I logged into my 
account at least 15 minutes prior to the agreed time I checked the quality of the 
connection and made sure that I had a pen, a few papers, and my probe lists 
handy. I also made sure that there was the least possibility of disturbance during 
the interviews. For the face-to-face interviews, I always arrived 20-25 minutes in 
advance in order to find the interviewee's office and announced my arrival to their 
assistance or colleagues.  
 
During the interviews, I tried to remain neutral and objective. I used both 
nonverbal and verbal strategies to maintain a fluid conversation and to obtain as 
much relevant and accurate information as possible. I also kept noting down the 
key points mentioned during the interviews and used probes to allow further self-
initiated explanations by the interviewees. As Neuman (2011:306) explains, ‘a 
probe is a neutral request to clarify an ambiguous answer, to complete and 
incomplete answer, or to obtain a relevant response’. I realised that a three to five 
second pause was an effective strategy during the face-to-face interviews. For all 
interviews, particularly during the SKYPE interviews, I asked neutral questions 
such as: ‘what do you mean by that’, ‘can you elaborate your point’, ‘any other 
experiences’, ‘did I get you right’ or ‘so if I want to rephrase what you just said…’. 
 
Each interview took approximately one hour. At the end, I thanked the 
participants and later on the same day sent them a thank you email as well. 
 
The next step was to transcribe the interviews. I started the transcription 
while I was conducting the interviews. Nonetheless, it took about two and a half 
months after the final interview to finish the transcription. For every one hour of 
interview, I devoted an approximate of 8 hours to the transcription task. While 
transcribing, I also consulted the relevant literature and went back and forth 
between the interview texts and the literature to make sense of participants’ 
discourses. It took me another one and a half months to translate the French 
texts. In sum, the whole process of interviews, transcription, and translation took 
six months.   
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3.8. Data analysis 
 
This part is an account of the methods I used to analyse the policy 
discourses and the data obtained from the interviews. I will explain why and how 
I used a Foucauldian discourse analysis. 
 
3.8.1. A Foucauldian analysis of data 
 
Why a Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA)? Because it best suited the 
purposes of this study based on the following arguments. As Bernstein (2003:32) 
asserts, ‘language is considered one of the most important means of initiating, 
synthesizing, and reinforcing ways of thinking, feeling, and behaviour which are 
functionally related to the social groups’ and thus ‘language-use facilitates 
development in a particular direction rather than inhibiting all other possible 
directions’. In agreement with Bernstein, Foucault (1980) enunciated an 
inescapable interconnection between knowledge and power and proposed three 
ways through which power operated in societies. These include: discourse and 
discursive practices (Foucault, 1972); disciplinary practices and bio-power 
(Foucault, 1979); and technologies of the self (Foucault, 1988). Foucault defines 
discourses as ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ 
and as such ‘produce frameworks of sense and obviousness with which policy is 
talked and written about’ (Ball, 2006:44).  
 
Therefore, my concern in analysing discourses wasn’t with the linguistic 
sense of language use but with the discursive regularities that constitute and 
maintain a cartesian dualism between what quality is and is not in the two higher 
education systems of England and France. By using FDA, I could understand the 
way quality discourses are formulated and demonstrate: a) the shift in power 
relations between the States, the universities, and other HE actors; and b) the 
sanction and reinforcement methods that create incentives for adoption of a 
particular reading of quality in each case; c) the impacts these bear on the 
practice of academics.  
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Based on the tenets of FDA and to answer the research questions of this 
study, as a first step I focused on: 
 
● what particular arguments or ideas were associated with quality and how 
they produced meaning and subjectivities, 
● Whether there existed a particular quality culture that formed the basis of 
statements, arguments, and ideas that constructed quality at national and 
institutional levels  
● How quality was presented and pursued and for whose interest (the 
technologies or logics of power that are implied and produced by the use 
and choice of sentences) 
● What was accepted, rejected, or excluded over time. 
 
I had two types of texts to analyse: the policy texts and the interview texts. 
In analysing the policy discourses, I mainly looked for ‘discontinuity, ruptures, 
threshold, limits, series, and transformations’ (Foucault, 1972:9) that have 
created a particular quality regime in each of the cases. In analysing interview 
discourses, I was looking to understand: 
 
● the conceptions of the respondents about the quality of education and the 
ways they integrated their understanding in their practice;  
● their perceptions of external and internal quality mechanism and how 
policies and practices may differ, e.g. between the grandes écoles and 
universities in France;  
● their perception of QA/QE effectiveness;   
● the organisational values that academics regard as preferable and 
effective;   
● their perception of these values in day-to-day practice. 
● If quality norms have created a shared culture among academics. 
 
In the next stage, I sought to identify and interpret the discursive 
construction of quality discourses. I did this by drawing on theories of chaos 
(Lorenz attractors; Nash equilibrium); psychology (operant conditioning; positive 
and negative reinforcement; group effect; coping strategies); political economy 
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(big push; free-rider policy); game theory and coordination; organisational policy 
and practice; diplomacy and international relations (divide and rule); Marx’s 
capital and means of production; Weber’s rational action; Hegel’s dialectic; 
Gramsci’s hegemony; Clark’s model on authority in higher education; Ball’s 
model of policy cycle; as well as concepts of teacher professionalism; types of 
internationalisation; and project management, among others.  
 
 The next stage involved understanding the relation and the position of 
these discourses within the wider socio-cultural and historical moments that had 
constructed HE and its quality systems-which I have already explored in the 
literature review. This helped me analyse and map the possibilities of action as 
well as the relationship between discourses and subjectivities. I, then, simply had 
to present and report the findings in an orderly manner under each RQ. 
 
Prior to presenting the findings, the next chapter discusses the conceptual 
framework adopted for this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter depicts the conceptual framework adopted in this study. It 
explains the main concept and outlines my subjective perspective of it. The 
conceptual framework presented here is developed based on Foucault’s 
panopticon model. It draws on and modifies Burton Clark’s triangle of 
coordination (1983) and Stephen Ball’s policy cycle (1992) to create the 
panopticon model that suits the purposes of this study and one that reflects the 
current multi-actor governance of HE quality systems in the two cases. 
 
4.2. Panopticon: Foucault’s portrayal of power 
 
The main concept of this study is the panopticon. It is the way I have looked 
at quality in higher education. I tried understanding if and how and by whom the 
quality panopticon has been constructed in England and France and if the 
outcomes of this study could eventually agree, critique, or even modify Foucault’s 
portrayal of panopticon.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Jeremy Bentham, "A General Idea of a Penitentiary Panopticon" (1787). 
 
The physical design of a panopticon, as seen in the above Figure 3, 
includes a circular watchtower in the middle of a larger circle of cells with 
transparent walls and doors that are completely opaque from the outside. The 
inmates either are or assume they are under constant surveillance by the other 
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inmates and the watchtower and therefore by internalising the regulations 
become their own police.  
 
The reason I used panopticon in my thesis is that quality systems use 
similar power techniques of visibility, transparency, surveillance, and permanent 
registration to reward and punish and to normalise a series of individual and 
institutional behaviours in higher education so that self-regulation ensures 
external power redundant.  
 
 
Figure 4: an inside view of the panopticon 
 
The panopticon gaze can be reconstructed in any social institution 
including health or education systems. In his 1975 book ‘Discipline and 
Punishment’, Foucault takes the example of the plague-stricken town to explain 
how the panopticon traverses throughout ‘hierarchy, surveillance, observation, 
writing’ to ‘induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that 
assures the automatic functioning of power’- what he calls the Biopower.   
 
The Biopower is one impact of the panopticon ‘that produces subjectivities 
which are suited to the world in which techniques and disciplinary practices 
operate’ (Mann, 2008:64). The world created by the panopticon becomes what 
we take to be ’the truth’ and the means by which we establish, judge, and seek 
the truth. Such regimes of truth are bound by the cultural and historical contexts 
of each panopticon and create technologies of self that lead individuals to conduct 
themselves in ways that comply with the truth created by the panopticon. 
 
There seems to be an undeniable resemblance between the techniques 
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used in the panopticon and methods used in the plague-stricken city of Foucault 
and the current quality systems in HE systems. The possibility of the plague 
striking a town resonates with the ranking systems of higher education. It 
facilitates the exercise of power by differentiating between ‘healthy towns’, i.e., 
the universities on top of the ranking lists from ‘plague-stricken towns’ or the 
universities at lower places in the ranking lists. The quality indicators are there to 
reduce such risks and to immune the HE systems against the plague. To be safe 
and different, therefore, the universities shall internalise the external quality 
measures and monitor their own processes and staff. The same logic applies to 
academics therefore leading to a ‘biopower’ among practitioners who gradually 
internalise and adhere to internal quality and audit regulations.  
 
The concept of panopticon is at the basis of conceptual model of the study 
and can help me analyse whether and to what extent such a panopticon is 
constructed in the two national and institutional cases through definitions, 
mechanisms, and discourses of quality and in what ways this panopticon affects 
the daily practice of academics. To this end, I shall first clarify who is in the 
watchtower and who observes whom and through what means. In other words, 
what ‘interest groups’ constitute ‘le regard’ or ‘the gaze’ and how they exercise or 
negotiate their power in the quality panopticon.  
 
4.3. The conceptual framework: the quality panopticon and its 
integral parts 
 
This section presents the conceptual framework. I will first introduce the 
building constituents of the framework and will finally put them all together to 
present the conceptual framework as a whole. It is important to note that the order 
by which I have presented the components of the panopticon do not represent 
the importance of one component over others.  
 
4.4. The norm-setting processes: how they operate 
 
This conceptual framework uses and modifies Stephen Ball’s policy cycle 
(1992). As Fung & Lui (2017:16) explain, his framework shifted away from former 
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State-centred policy analysis model that was proposed by Dale (1989). Ball’s 
original policy cycle is developed based on a postmodernist, relativist, and micro-
oriented approach to educational policy analysis. It is, therefore, ‘characterised 
by less distinct hierarchies’ (Vidovich, 20001:3) and attempts to ‘distinguish the 
extent to which practitioners are actively involved in the formation of policy 
discourses and the active interpretation which occurs to link the policy text to 
practice’ (Vidovich, 2001:7). I have used Ball’s cycle to demonstrate the ways 
quality norms and power are negotiated in the quality panopticon. The original 
1992 cycle, as illustrated in Figure 5, included three components: the context of 
influence, the context of text production, and the context of practice.  
 
 
Figure 5: Stephen Ball’ policy cycle 1992 
 
I have modified and used Ball’s 1992 policy cycle as a component of this 
study’s conceptual framework. I have replaced context of policy text production 
with the context of policy discourse production. Ball (1994) made a distinction 
between ‘policy as text’ and ‘policy as discourse’. The former is based on literary 
theory and implies agency of actors and the latter draws on Foucault’s concept 
of discourse and reflects the ways ‘the texts are discussed as a form of social 
practice’ (Saarinen, 2008:722). I have used ‘context of policy discourse 
production’ in order to include both ‘policy as text’ and ‘policy as discourse’ 
inside the cycle. I understand higher education policies are discourses (oral and 
texts) that ‘at any given time result from the power of a particular social group to 
implement its ideology’ (Lawton, 1992). It is through both oral and text discourses 
that ‘social and political issues are constructed and reflected; power relations are 
negotiated and performed; social relations are reflected; and reproduced and 
ideologies are at work in complicated and invisible ways’ (Paltridge, 2008:179). 
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Figure 6 below is the modified cycle that I have used as part of my conceptual 
framework.  
 
 
Figure 6.: modification to Ball’s policy cycle. 
 
One shortcoming of the above Figure 6 is that it fails to reflect the relation 
between the external forces such as the EHEA or global initiatives with local 
quality policies. As discussed in the literature review the global and the regional 
policies are not readily adopted by the local HE systems (Marginson & Van der 
Wende, 2007). Nonetheless, local education policies are not produced in a 
vacuum and are definitely influenced by a variety of commitments, values, and 
experiences that combine situated, professional, material, and external contexts’ 
(Baun et al. 2011). To reflect this, I have integrated external (global/EU) 
institutions and policies into my conceptual framework as part of the interest 
groups. 
 
 
4.5. The actors in the panopticon: Whose interest? Whose 
power? 
 
To complete the conceptual framework and demonstrate the other actors 
in the quality panopticon, I have drawn on and modified Burton Clark’s (1983) 
triangle of coordination as explained below. 
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Burton Clark’s triangle of coordination is to this date one of the most 
popular conceptual tools addressing the question of authority in higher education 
systems. As shown in Figure 7, his triangle included three sources of authority: 
State, the market, and the academic oligarchy and provided a ‘heuristic for 
studying, comparing, and classifying national higher education systems.’ 
(Marginson & Rhoades, 2002:283).  
 
 
Figure 7: Clark’s triangle 
 
As Maggio (2008:3) explains: ‘Clark refers to each of these three systems 
as “ideal” types, presumably to avoid the implication that national systems will 
typically fall neatly into one classification or another. He situates these systems 
as the three vertices of the triangle because together they constitute the principal 
“interest groups”. The academic systems are the result of the coordination, 
interaction, and competition of these interest groups. In fact, his model ‘assumes 
each of these modes of coordination to be at least partially mutually exclusive for 
one another’ therefore, bearing a “zero-sum effect.  
 
Here are my proposed modifications: 
 
1. Clark’s triangle does not include global forces that are increasingly 
significant in how higher education policies and practices are altered. 
Hazelkorn (2017) has also noted this shortcoming in Clark’s model. I have 
attended to this matter by integrating global/EU discourses and institutions 
as a source of power, as mentioned before. 
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2. At the time when Clark was developing his framework, quality agencies 
and internal managers were not a dominant constituent of higher 
education systems worldwide. His notion of academic oligarchy referred 
to academic intermediary bodies, such as University Grant Committee in 
the UK that distributed public budget among universities in a collegial 
manner (Ferlie et. al., 2008); or the academic chairs who had the privilege 
and the power to negotiate different aspects of their institutions with the 
local government, e.g. in the case of Italy, France, and Germany (Clark, 
1983). Ever since Clark, higher education subsystems have become 
bigger and more strategic. Subsequently, I chose to replace Clark’s 
academic oligarchy with three components: ‘Institutional management’ 
to refer to individuals with managerial responsibilities in HEIs including 
deans, campus directors, quality managers, administrators; ‘academia’ to 
refer to professors, lecturers, and any other individual involved in teaching, 
e.g. assistants; and Students occupy a separate place as they are gaining 
more power in HE systems. I have also replaced Clark’s ‘State authority’ 
with ‘national political bureaucracy’ to include the State and its 
bureaucratic and political instruments such as QAA in the UK and Hcéres 
in France, the ministries and their officials.  
 
3. Clark’s model is based on coordination among three interest groups which 
corresponds to my understanding of how different actors in HE systems 
work to create the quality panopticon. Coordination is not about pulling the 
components of authority together. It is rather about differentiation. Clark 
himself (1983:271) noted this fact and stated that dominant pressures in 
the higher levels take the form of standardisation and evoke integration 
and adaptation. Hence, coordination differentiates those that can integrate 
and those that resist change and experience stalemate. Differentiation is 
also one way that Foucault said power operates and quality systems 
essentially use such coordination practices. They divide individual 
practitioners or institutions into ‘types’, ‘hence enabling their inclusion or 
exclusion either spatially or socially, or both’ (Mann, 2008). These 
‘classifications take on the quality of the ‘truth’ and obscure their historical 
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production’ (ibid:120). In the panopticon, each of the above-mentioned 
interest groups have their own watchtowers and share the central 
watchtower as they coordinate.  
 
4. Another significant concept in Clark’s triangle- that was missing in Ball’s 
model- is the market.  Unlike Clark, I do not think that market is one of the 
interest groups of the triangle of coordination. It may well have been at the 
time when he was developing his concept. Market has indeed grown to 
occupy the background against which the whole system of higher 
education and their actors operate. All actors of the panopticon are 
operating based on market rules. The State’s mission is to stimulate the 
strength of the market and prevent and repair its failures. Students act as 
consumers in higher education markets and institutions adopt market 
behaviours to attract more fee-paying customers by means of 
differentiating their quality of service and delivery. Academics are part of 
the higher education labour market exchanging their teaching hours with 
an income. They adopt market proper behaviours to differentiate 
themselves from their colleagues and compete to gain local and European 
grants. Likewise, the European council has used market incentives to 
create EHEA to harmonize and increase the competitiveness of the 
European higher education systems and it maintains its power in the 
research market through funding. Therefore, in the conceptual framework 
of the study, all three sides of the triangle of coordination are driven by 
market incentives.   
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Figure.8 below illustrates the conceptual framework of this study. 
 
 
Figure no. 8. The conceptual framework of the study, 
Juliette Torabian, 2017 
 
 
As observed in the conceptual framework, the quality panopticon gaze has 
itself become a distributed watchtower. No one can revolt against the central 
watchtower because at any given instance, at least two or three actors’ can be 
communicating and coordinating in there. No one actor knows who watches and 
who is being watched but they all know someone is watching.  
 
All actors struggle to gain more power in the quality panopticon and all 
have the power to filter or alter the influence of the other. I have shown this 
filtering or adopting power by using discontinued lines in the middle of each circle 
of actors. The struggle for power is still a zero-sum game. Each actor has a 
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certain amount of accumulated knowledge of others. But this information is 
always asymmetrical. Hence it may not be enough to sanction or omit others but 
it is enough to reward or punish them for their behaviour within the quality 
panopticon. The consent over the ‘truth’ is achieved through ‘hegemony’ 
(Gramsci, 1971) of the ideologies of the political elite and as they ‘attempt to 
appropriate the device to impose their rule by the construction of particular code 
modalities’ (Bernstein, 1996:193 quoted in Christie and Martin, 2007:20).  
  
This conceptual framework could be reminiscent of a song by ‘The Police’ 
(1983) that I used to listen to as a young teenager:  
Every breath you take, 
Every move you make, 
Every bond you break, 
Every step you take, 
I'll be watching you! 
Oh, can’t you see, you belong to me! 
 
The next chapter presents the findings of the study and responds to the research 
questions.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSES 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data and findings of the study and 
answers the research questions. Under each question, the first part delineates 
the findings in the case of France followed by findings in the case of England 
respecting the same order in which the literature review was presented.   
 
The findings under RQ1. are based on an analysis of a selected set of 
policy discourses. When answering RQ2., I have drawn on institutional 
documents, websites, and audit reports as well as interviews with quality 
managers and heads of departments at ScPo in France and the LSE in England. 
And finally, to answer RQ3, I have used the interviews with the permanent and 
contractual academics in the aforementioned institutions. Each section starts with 
the relevant RQ and ends with an answer based on the findings of the study.  
 
In accordance with BERA guidelines (2011), I have used a coding scheme 
to safeguard participants’ anonymity. I have used PCT as an abbreviation for 
participant followed by a number from 1 to 20, for example: PCT 12 or PCT 4. It 
is important to note that there is no association between the numbers and the 
identity, the professional status, or the nationality of the interviewees. The 
numbers are simply used for the sake of clarity and ease of data representation.  
 
 
5.2. RQ1. How is quality in higher education defined and 
constructed in the cases of England and France?  
 
This part depicts the findings that facilitate answering the first research 
question. It attempts to unfold the relations that link actors, instruments, and ideas 
in regulating quality in France and England. It will help understanding how ‘quality’ 
is defined at national level, how these definitions may have changed, and what 
underlying ideologies have facilitated the construction of the quality panopticon.   
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5.2.1. ‘L'excellence à la française’: the actors and ideas defining quality 
 
An analysis of the main HE Acts, Reports, and Bills that have been issued 
since 1968 reveals several interesting facts regarding the French approach to 
‘quality’. The main findings include: the intentional absence of grandes écoles in 
policy discourses; evaluation used as a euphemism for quality; and autonomy as 
a steering instrument.  
 
5.2.2. The phantom of the Opera: The grandes écoles 
 
When as a teenage I read the 1901 book of Gaston Leroux ‘The Phantom 
of the Opera’, I never thought I’d actually find a real-life equivalent for it in the 
French higher education system. To my surprise, the first striking finding of the 
study is that the HE policy in France knows only one target: universities. The 
grandes écoles are the phantoms of the French HE. By this, I do not mean to say 
the grandes écoles are excluded from the policy discourses. I am simply pointing 
out that no HE policy document is exclusively devoted to ‘quality’ in the grandes 
ecoles while these institutions play a very important role in how ‘quality’ is 
perceived. This was affirmed by one of the interviewees: 
PCT10: ‘...again all the things that I just said about the way the government 
has pushed for quality is in the case of universities…. well the grandes écoles are 
also evaluated… but...they are different…let’s say we focus on universities 
because the main challenge is there…’ 
This reflects a historical differentiation between the grandes écoles and 
the universities in France and how this bears an impact on the practice of the 
quality agency and its auditors. The French ‘truth’ associates quality with prestige 
and these are epitomised in grandes écoles, therefore HE acts and bills mainly 
target universities. One of the interviewees had an interesting point about the 
power relations between Hcéres and ScPo: 
PCT 10: ‘...the Agency won’t evaluate Sciences Po Paris as it evaluates 
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other institutions...it is a particular case...I mean if you look from outside you 
would think the quality is not good because most of their teachers are contractual, 
the agency’s criteria does not match their case...because the contractual 
teachers at Sciences Po Paris are all well-known professionals and the students 
are selected too, so the quality is already there…but the Agency would go and 
evaluate Sciences Po at Lille or another city because they organise joint courses 
with universities and so these are more of standard courses that the Agency can 
potentially go and look at…’ 
This is in line with Gordon’s (2004) arguments that after the 1789 
revolution and the first Empire, the bourgeoisie reinforced their network in Paris 
in concordance with the centralisation policy of the State. Not much seems to 
have changed as the treatment ScPo in Paris receives is different from other 
ScPo institutions. Another participant referred to the accreditation systems in 
grandes écoles: 
PCT 6: ‘…. you see quality assurance existed in a very secondary way….it 
was linked to the creation and accreditation of the écoles…. I am thinking in 
particular of engineering écoles, business écoles...you know...they have long 
been there and they knew what quality meant, they practised it...’ 
Other participants held similar ideas, for instance one of them said: 
PCT 10: ‘...Well an example is the CTI (Commission des Titres 
d’ingénieur) ... it was created in 1933 …. universities have totally discovered 
quality assurance... And what’s even worse, some of them, they still have not 
discovered it. No, it's obvious, we're not in Britain... The écoles know... they have 
their own vision, universities are starting to know.’ 
The above extracts demonstrate another French ‘truth’ that considers 
universities as institutions unable to reform themselves just as they weren’t 
centuries ago. To prove this, one participant had an interesting suggestion: 
PCT 6: ‘… I’ll give you a challenge, go to 5 or 6 universities, you know …. 
randomly, ask them what is the meaning of ‘learning objectives’...I challenge 
you… go there and see if you can find even one university where they have a 
clear understanding of learning objectives… and I am not even talking about 
intended or achieved learning outcomes…. it’s not even worth going that far… 
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you see… we are on planet Mars...these things are clear in other countries… like 
your other case, England...really… go and see for yourself... this will be a 
beautiful challenge….so you see quality in French universities is a very 
complicated task to pursue…’ 
Garçon (2012) confirms that the difference that exists between universities 
and grandes écoles has a paralysing impact on the whole system and 
demonstrates a total lack of confidence in universities and a low self-esteem 
among universities themselves.  
But there are several other reasons why universities are the target of 
reforms. The number of universities are almost double the number of grandes 
écoles according to the latest Education Code (13 July 2017)37, there are 142 
EPSCP including universities, while there are only 90 EPA including the grandes 
écoles. Moreover, international rankings target universities and the French 
experience of the 2003 Shanghai ranking was quite bitter. As Garçon (2012) 
points out: ‘in 2003 we woke up and found that 1.3 million students were 
macerated in this container whose flow was not renewed’.  
 The above set of reasons may be legitimate but they aren’t convincing. A 
deeper explanation lies in the historical relation between the State and the 
grandes écoles as it was discussed in the literature review. Grandes écoles are 
‘state-building institutions38’ that embody ‘the creation myth of the national 
intellectual, social, and political projects, the legacy and promise of scholarly 
purpose and national advancement’ (Ordorika & Pusser, 2007:192). Regardless 
of being funded and run by the State or the non-State sector, these institutions 
have ‘powerful linkages to historical and contemporary social and intellectual 
movements’ and ‘stand as the reification of a particular form of national 
sovereignty... the symbolic national saga of national pride, opportunity, and 
development through higher education.’ (ibid).  
Besides, if the State was to question the educational quality of the grandes 
écoles by issuing direct Acts and bills, it could risk putting its graduates’ capacities 
under question. This could create a tension inside the bourgeoisie network that 
                                                
37 https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071191  
38 Authors state that the notion of ‘State-building university’ has no equivalent in the English-speaking 
world. 
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‘has reproduced itself through the grandes écoles even before the 1789 
revolution’ (Gordon, 2004). Instead, the State has a social contract with the 
grandes écoles to safeguard these emblems of French excellence and 
chauvinism. As such, it can maintain its steering power in these legally 
autonomous institutions through funding and a softer external scrutiny. It may be 
absurd, but it is an archaic ‘truth’ from Napoléon’s time (1812) that no government 
questions ‘what seems to be at the origin of lack of competitivity in French industry 
and the economic slump’ (Garçon, 2012).   
To be fair, though, a few examples exist where grandes écoles appear in 
HE policy discourses. But why they appear in the texts is only an affirmation of 
my above arguments. For instance, a 2008 Report to the Minister39 asserts: 
‘universities and the grandes écoles are essential components of the knowledge 
economy...and a forced marriage between them for the sake of the highly 
questionable benefits of a unified system would be a source of trauma that our 
country does not really need…. the partnership must be based on a shared 
project where there is an added value in acting together’. In another occasion is 
in 2013 when the Minister of the time, Ms. Fioraso proposed that the preparatory 
classes for the grandes écoles (CPGE)40 could collaborate with some universities 
to allow them select the best students. The presidents of the preparatory classes 
and universities considered this proposal to be ‘without ambition, inspiration, and 
courage and completely unfit for the 21st century universities...and completely 
silent when it came to the real problems of budget for universities’ (Le Figaro 
Etudiant, 2013)41. This proposal was omitted from the ESR law of 2013. 
                                                
39 Report to the Minister of Higher Education and Research prepared by the Rector of Lyon III University, 
Mr. Christian Philip: ‘What partnership to build between universities and the grandes écoles’.  
40 The ‘classes préparatoire aux grandes écoles’ also referred to as ‘Prepa’ are an important part of the 
power network in France. These are intensive courses that replace the university curriculum following the 
baccalauréat and aim to prepare the young high school graduates for the grandes écoles. At the end of this 
period, students sit for the selective entrance exam of grandes écoles. The Prepa are ranked annually based 
on their performance. 
41 Une loi pour rapprocher universités et grandes écoles. By Marie-Estelle Pech. (2013).  
www.etudient.lefigaro.fr/les-news/detail/article/une-loi-pour-rapprocher-universites-et-grandes-ecoles-1458    
 95 
 
 
5.2.3. Beware! In the language of Molière, it is called ‘evaluation’ not 
‘quality’ 
 
Another interesting finding of this study is that the word ‘quality’ is avoided 
in almost all discourses (oral and written) and at all times as part of a conscious 
political strategy of both Left (PS) and Right (LR) wing parties. The word ‘quality’ 
is treated as a taboo, a euphemism that shall not appear anywhere in a formal 
discourse. An interviewee said: 
PCT 6: ‘we don’t talk about quality because immediately everyone thinks 
that we are going to act like the police and that we are going to deploy sanctions 
against them...well you know this was all caused by the AERES giving grades (A, 
B, C, D) to research units that led to people working in those badly noted units 
lose their jobs...this has marked the spirits and you see even before that quality 
was a pejorative….’ 
The word that replaces ‘quality’ across all legal and policy texts as well as 
reports is ‘evaluation’ which is a curious replacement, semantically speaking. One 
of the interviewees talked about the challenge of conducting internal and external 
quality assurance because: 
PCT 10: ‘when you talk of quality assurance, you talk of controlling the 
quality...they consider this as surveillance...the police...but when you say 
evaluation it seems more familiar because all academics and universities are 
used to evaluation...professors evaluate their students...they give their views on 
one another's’ work in their offices...you see?... so, it changes…’ 
As discussed in the literature review, QA is a term borrowed from the 
market and the industry. It follows a logic of models like the PDCA to ‘identify, 
analyse and eliminate variations (defects) in processes and outcomes’ (Leahy et 
al. 2009:70). It includes the NPM mechanisms of self-evaluation and quality 
assurance. What differentiates QA from Evaluation is not their intent but the 
perspective. Unlike QA, evaluation does not have market roots, it is part of 
governmental legislations that promote compliance. It is the kind of activity that 
was conducted by the CNE or MSTP in France or by the UGC in England. Hence, 
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‘evaluation’ creates a ‘déjà vu’ situation and reminds the French academia of the 
‘good old golden years’ when the CNE or MSTP conducted evaluations that did 
not put their identity and capacities under question as does the new QA systems. 
Evaluation is less threatening and less aggressive compared to ‘quality’- although 
no euphemism has ever been reported to have changed the reality.  
One of the participants talked about the reality of evaluations and the 
negative reactions that it provoked in HEIs and said: 
PCT 6: ‘... they say that they have to prepare lots of time-consuming and 
irrelevant documents...putting this in this paragraph...that in that paragraph...as if 
they have nothing else to do...and then the results come and the presidents of 
the universities...well some of them did this...they said you are not marked well 
so goodbye...your unit is closed...’ 
Of’ course as Pumain & Dardel42 (2014) rightly explain: although the 
AERES has been fervently criticised for the ‘grading’ incidents, but it is important 
to recall that AERES was not at all responsible for the way its grading system 
was used by the decision-makers’.  But as one participant said: 
PCT 5 ‘: ... we arrived at a stage where no one was even reading the long-
winded audit reports, they would just look at the grade and decide...it was 
horrible...it showed the complete unawareness of people who were reading these 
reports about the aims and objectives of these reports…’ 
Nonetheless, the grading system created an exclusion and sanction 
paranoia and so left a negative impression in academia. Another interviewee 
confirmed the above comment and continued:  
PCT 6. ‘You see, this is why even when you look at the law that established 
Hcéres as the agency for quality assurance, you have to go up and down the text 
to be able to read between the lines to understand that this institute is supposed 
to assure quality…. the word quality is avoided at all costs…’ 
This comment indicates that the French academia resists QA and this is 
why the State and the institutions adopt soft methods and discourses to avoid 
                                                
42 L’évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur’, Report to the HE Minister. 
https://cache.media.enseignementsup-
recherche.gouv.fr/file/Actus/98/8/Rapport_Pumain_Dardel_295988.pdf.  
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clashes. One participant referred to the universities’ resistance against external 
QA mechanism and said: 
PCT 6: ‘...I talked to a university president, she said only three other 
presidents knew what the ESG was...and if the presidents don’t know how can 
you expect others to know...and so when you talk of the ESG and quality 
assurance, they look at you and say...what is that ‘thing’ you said?... that’s again 
your European machine, isn’t it?... so, you see, there is much work to be done…’ 
This perhaps explains why the French HE system seems to be in a 
perpetual crisis situation: External changes are rejected by the HE system and 
its people. To manage the situation the French evaluative State has been more 
flexible and has pushed for ‘improvements rather than any real positive or 
negative sanctions’ (Moray, 2010:74). In fact, the State has drawn two 
conclusions from the rejection and resistance of the HE system. Firstly, it has 
learnt to avoid imported jargons like QA or performance-based ranking, because: 
PCT 7: ‘philosophically, France has a view of what higher education is… 
and that is different from the Anglo-Saxon world...for instance the ranking 
systems...that is a very Anglo-Saxon approach...we have moved towards this 
Anglo-Saxon system. it’s no secret...but...you must beware of these rankings...it’s 
more a matter of learning how to present your information to be on top of the 
list...we look at things differently…’   
And secondly, it has diluted the QA mechanism in order to maintain its role 
in the panopticon in a more invisible and distributed way. I will briefly explain my 
point: 
As was mentioned in the literature review, the French HE system has seen 
three ‘evaluating’ bodies: The first entity was the CNE (1984-2006), followed by 
AERES (2006-2013), and finally the Hcéres (2014- now). Their mission included: 
evaluation of HEIs, Research units, and Teaching. As the time has passed, 
certain fundamental characteristics have differentiated these evaluation agencies 
and the general policy of the State. The CNE had a ‘reference book’ of 32 pages 
that was published to help the HEIs evaluate their procedures, their potentials, 
and their outcomes. The AERES was already more aggressive. As Croche (2015) 
explains the word ‘Agency’ referred both to the American model and to the 
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modernisation of the administration. The Agency also had a ‘Guide’ for evaluation 
rather than a book of reference. While the evaluations of CNE were collegially 
conducted and its reports caused little or no contradictions, the new ‘Agency’ was 
an external entity imposing vigorous self-evaluations and was publishing publicly 
accessible audit reports based on a set of predefined indicators. As one of the 
participants said:  
PCT 10: ‘...in terms of training, the first phase of the agency was to work 
with the institutions for self-evaluation. Because in France self-evaluation was not 
something very widespread… It was first of all a matter of record keeping for the 
department... writing them as well as possible so that the ministry would not be 
angry. It took four years for institutions to react to self-assessment as they were 
asked to provide specific documents on self-evaluation, etc. It is a positive point 
of the AERES to have pushed for a dynamic of self-evaluation, that is to say to 
really think internally on the teaching and how to improve it by answering a certain 
number of criteria…’ 
But following the grading scandals and closure of some research labs 
during 2008 to 2011- as some of the participants referred to-, AERES was already 
adopting a new softer approach. As Pierronnet43 (2014) analysed, the ‘Guide’ for 
evaluation had 41 pages in 2009-2010; during its last evaluation in 2014-15 (wave 
E) and before handing over the power to Hcéres its ‘guide book’ had only 16 
pages. The decrease in the number of pages is indicative of a trend of 
simplification in the number and details of indicators and therefore a move from 
a detailed quality assurance to a more distant steering through quality 
enhancement. According to one of the participants:  
PCT 6: ‘… Hcéres has been much more interested in the processes and 
procedures that institutions have put in place to guarantee quality...they have 
committees to help them do this...periodic reviews... participation of students in 
this reflection … participation of other partners…’ 
Another participant confirmed that the ESR law (2013) has changed the 
way the State and the now autonomous HEIs communicate. This has led to a 
                                                
43 L’AERES adopte un nouveau référentiel d'évaluation des établissements, 10 Feb 2014. Educpros blog. 
Available at: blog.educpros.fr/romain-pierronnet/2014/02/10/laeres-adopte-un-nouveau-referntiel-
devaluation-etablissmenet/   
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change in the approach adopted by Hcéres: 
PCT 6.: ‘...so the State will not, anymore, look at each and every teaching 
course but to the package that the institution is offering … is it consistent as a 
whole? So, this has changed the work at Hcéres... from the wave E onwards 
Hcéres looks at what has been done and not what will be done...so the HEIs 
present their project, the ministry says OK here is your budget and then after five 
years we will go to see if they have implemented their projects...we analyze what 
has been done, the current state of affairs…’ 
It is true that following the 2014 law that proposed the establishment of 
Hcéres, there is a feeling of change in the relations between the HEIs and the 
State. As part of this change, for instance, the Hcéres does not have a ‘guide’ for 
evaluation but a ‘referential for evaluation’. The new referential combines 
research and teaching under one heading while they were separate in the AERES 
guide book; it has a section dedicated to the ‘success of students’ while the former 
guide book included a chapter on ‘students’ experiences. In short, it is more 
simplified and less descriptive. Additionally, as one of the participants said: 
PCT 10: ‘...our evaluation is posteriori...the role of the Hcéres has been 
weakened and I do not think that it is an accident...it was a voluntary choice… 
the government thought it should respond to the criticism and so perhaps by 
changing the name of the Agency this could be done...and there was another 
practical reason ... the State could not evaluate the ever rising number of 
courses… so it said we are going to create a national framework that clearly says 
what is a Bachelor's’ degree, what is a professional degree, etc., and give the 
universities the academic autonomy to design their programmes and then the 
Hcéres will come ... after five years...to see what you have done.’ 
This indicates that the change toward quality enhancement is well under 
way in France but the State still plays a central role in steering ‘quality’ through 
funding and the evaluation reports of Hcéres. As one participant explained: 
PCT 7: ‘In France it is the State which brings the budgetary aspect. So 
that's a very important point. It is worth saying that the higher education 
institutions... despite their autonomy... operate with rules of public law that are 
defined at the highest level of the State apparatus. So already there is a 
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difference with the Anglo-Saxon world... a big difference.’ 
The difference between England and France lies in two main points, 
among others: one is the direct role of the State in funding the HEIs in France; 
the other is the project-based funding which sounds softer as it avoids using the 
word ‘performance’ hence helping the State avoid further resistance within 
academia.  
In fact, the State now suggests to partner with universities to minimise risks 
like the one that happened in 2003 Shanghai ranking. The first Report of the 
Hcéres (2016) insists that the Agency is the HEIs’ partner in progress. Since the 
president of the Agency is nominated by the President of the Republic, his 
message of partnership implies a change in the State’s policy from directive 
rational planning to a model of self-regulation through incentives. However, and 
despite all efforts, only one Comue44, i.e., ‘Paris Sciences et lettres’ appears in 
the top 100 universities in the 2018 Times Higher Education (THE) ranking and 
only at 72nd position.  
 
5.2.4. Universities! You can run but you can’t hide 
 
The third finding of the study is the use of ‘autonomy’ as a key word across 
different policy texts and the shift in its meaning. In the 1968 Edgar Faure law, 
universities’ autonomy is reminiscent of the State’s trust in the capacities of 
cultivated professors and students to participate in the governance of universities. 
The 1984 Savary law- abrogated in 2000- follows suit but prefers to create an 
evaluating body (CNE) anyways.  
                                                
44 Communauté d'universités et établissements (COMUE) is a grouping plan that replaced the former PRES 
initiative (based on Article 38 of 2013 ESR law). It is an initiative by the French State to group universities 
and grandes écoles in a territory in order to increase their visibility and improve their position in international 
rankings. However, these have only created further bureaucratic layers with more power for the State 
through performance-based funding and has privileged larger universities and the grandes ecoles that enjoy 
more autonomy and budget.  Rollot (2017) calls these initiatives as ‘empty shells that are used to further 
differentiate HEIs and complicate the scenery with no positive impact on the position of French HEIs in the 
rankings’. The 2018 Times Higher Education ranking has once again caused much debate over the 
dysfunctioning of such governmental initiatives that are considered archaic and inegalitarian. 
http://orientation.blog.lemonde.fr/2017/09/06/comment-organiser-notre-enseignement-superieur/; also see: 
http://jfmela.free.fr/jfmblog/?p=349;  https://www.senat.fr/rap/r07-382/r07-3822.html 
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Autonomy takes a new meaning with the controversial 2007 LRU law that 
indicates ‘the universities should benefit from a governance system that is better 
adapted to the challenge of excellence and provision of education to a greater 
number of students’. It is clear that the State is faced with an inability to continue 
directly managing the universities in an increasingly expanding HE system. At the 
same time, it implies that universities, too, should be engaged in reform 
processes if they desire ‘excellence’ in their teaching and research. One 
participant confirmed this point and said: 
PCT 6: ‘...you see the former approach where the Ministry ordered and the 
universities obeyed...the approach of the last twenty years...It does not work 
anymore.... because mass education has meant that universities have had to 
adapt to receive more people and the situations have been different from one 
region to another…’ 
The autonomy project of the State had two aims: ‘a) contain public 
expenditure and allocate funding based on performance; b) make universities 
accountable as they assume responsibility of their own strategy and resource 
planning’ (Mascret, 2015:78). As one participant mentioned: 
PCT 5: ‘Autonomy, if you like, meant that the government discharged 
some of its responsibilities towards the universities… it was a way of successive 
governments, whether left or right to say...well...the universities will manage and 
this way we will have fewer problems...because when we impose things there are 
demonstrations and protests on the streets ... this way we are not imposing 
anything and they are responsible for their own decisions…’ 
Practically, this was true. The State gave more power to the President of 
the universities to use and manage their allocated public budget and their 
personnel (which was handled by the State till then). One of the participants said: 
PCT 6. ‘...but autonomy had a great advantage: it has allowed universities 
to adapt to their local context and to seek all possible help and support locally... 
they have even secured international partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Emirates, 
Qatar, Singapore… this was not the case before...we were very much confined 
within our national borders and what the Ministry had to say... and that's 
important... Because suddenly, the universities that wanted to play the game 
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started realising their potentials…’ 
As De Boer and File (2009:21) explain, ‘through competition and greater 
institutional autonomy’ HEIs are stimulated to respond to ‘their customer’s 
demands for relevance’ while the government elaborates a system of incentives 
and sanctions to steer them from a distance and to ‘redress government failures’. 
Another participant thought that autonomy was beneficial for universities but 
considered that: 
PCT 10: ‘...it wasn’t well prepared and it did not include all the necessary 
tools for the process to flow smoothly across the sector…’ 
In fact, the State was obliging universities to fully assume autonomy until 
the deadline of 1st of Jan 2012 without really giving them the wings to fly. In effect, 
the 4th Report45 of the LRU follow-up committee (30 Jan 2012) states ‘all 
universities are as of now autonomous but the process is still incomplete...the 
process cannot be reduced to legal aspects and must extend to teaching and 
research...and the role of the State should evolve concurrently with the new 
status of universities’. One participant mentioned that a few bigger universities 
who already had established local partnerships with other universities and 
grandes écoles under the PRES initiative and who had a better capacity to deal 
with the autonomy situation ‘advanced but other smaller universities were 
wondering what they could do... they were left behind’ (PCT 6).  
In a similar vein, in 2013 the Commission of Senators presented a report46 
to the Council of Ministers underlining the positive aspects of LRU but also 
expressing their regrets since the transfer of authority has not been based on a 
thorough analysis of the capacities of each university. The report points out some 
of the side effect have been an increase in hiring contractual teachers and a 
multiplication of course offers without a real relevance to the needs of the 
students and the society. One of the participants said that lack of proper planning 
in the transfer of authority has also slowed the process of QA in some universities: 
                                                
45 Rapport 2011 du comité de suivi de la loi LRU-Loi no° 2007-1199 du 10 août 2007 relative aux libertés 
et responsabilités des universités. http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-
publics/124000055/index.shtml  
46 L’autonomie des universités depuis la loi LRU: le big-bang à l’heure du bilan, Gillot Dominique, Dupont 
Ambroise, Sénat, 2013. https://www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2012/r12-446-notice.html  
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PCT 10: ‘...if the president of the university and his team felt that they 
lacked the capacity to deal with this new situation, they would not adopt QA and 
put their professors on the streets…’ 
  It has also created further horizontal and vertical differentiation between 
universities.  
PCT 6. ‘Autonomy has undoubtedly widened the gaps upwards and 
downwards. That is the vision I have’. 
The President of University of Montpellier said (2012)47‘well we are now 
autonomous but what it brings for us really? they gave us the management of our 
personnel and they didn’t give us the budget; but at the same time the State 
continues giving us orders- and this is also the case at grandes écoles like ScPo 
where he State appoints academics and pay their salaries outside the control of 
the school. One participant confirmed this and said: 
PCT 10: ‘...it is not an autonomy in the British sense of the word...we are 
in a semi-autonomy...for instance the salary of the permanent academics is paid 
by the State...so it is to some extent normal that the State controls some of the 
affairs…’ 
It is evident that ‘enhanced institutional autonomy has meant higher levels 
of accountability as well as more stringent and detailed procedures for quality 
assurance at the state as well as institutional levels (‘the rise of the evaluative 
state’) ... In many respects deregulation has become re-regulation at another 
level within the higher education system’, (De Boer & File, 2009). Hence, the 
‘autonomy plan’ has in fact helped the State in keeping its powerful position in 
steering the HEIs more than anything else, as one participant concluded: 
PCT 6: ‘...This is not the case elsewhere. So, it is a semi financial 
autonomy, the state stays at the background anyway. In research, for example, 
we still depend more or less on the State, if only because we respond to calls for 
tenders, we respond to programs launched by the State, or by the European 
programs. So somehow we remain attached to the state.’ 
                                                
47 Sauvons l’université: A l’heure de la LRU, V. Soulé, Libération, 30 Jan 2012; 
http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/01/30/a-l-heure-de-la-lru_792111   
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5.2.5. The English excellence and discipline: anticipating and avoiding the 
plague 
 
 This section presents an analysis of the findings on the English HE policy 
and quality code and some of the interviewees’ input. It is divided into three parts:  
a) Anticipating and avoiding the plague: the English excellence and discipline; b) 
Kaizen à l'anglaise and quality life cycles; c) from a trustworthy to a risky 
business. 
The first finding here indicates that there is an invariable consensus across 
all policies- from Robbins Report till today- that the English HE is recognised for 
its excellence across the world. For instance, the foreword of Browne Report 
(2010) states: ’for a nation of our scale, we possess a disproportionate number 
of the best performing HEIs in the world’. However, unlike the French, excellence 
is not a static phenomenon.  The English make a conscious effort to safeguard 
their excellence, even if not always completely successful. For instance, the 
Robbins Report (Article 40) asserts that ‘we must demand of a system that it 
produces as much high excellence as possible...that it safeguards standards…’  
Semantically speaking, the word ‘must’ expresses an obligation to 
safeguard standards. Hence, it rejects reactivity -which happens in France- and 
compels prevention and responsiveness instead. This approach can be easily 
detected across HE policies in England. For instance, already in (1997:3), the 
Dearing Report: Higher Education in the Learning Society proposes setting up a 
National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education ‘to make recommendations 
on how the purposes, shape, structure, size, and funding of higher education, 
including support for students, should develop to meet the needs of the UK over 
the next 20 years’. Even prior to that, the Robbins Report (1963, Article 102) gives 
‘importance to internal communications’ (P.220) as a way to ensure a coherent 
approach to the management of universities as part of which ‘technology was 
accepted into universities during the 19th century’. In France, it is with a 
considerable delay of five decades that the recent White Paper (2017:8 & 13) 
recognises, in retrospect, that ‘we are in a period of major transformation...in 
which ...technological change and changes in knowledge [is happening] ... and in 
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this new world to succeed...making our country a learning society is now a 
political objective...and the purpose of this White Paper’.  
On the contrary, the English HE positions itself in a changing world and 
therefore develops a shared awareness that institutions and teachers will have to 
respond to this changing world and the more discerning student population.  
PCT 19: ‘this may sound like a cliché, but becoming number one is easy, 
what is important is to remain number one and from my experience with the 
English higher education system, I know that there is this tendency to learn from 
the past experiences and to change for the better...this is their strength…it’s very 
different from the Continental approach...they don’t get tangled with the 
past...they move forward...and so the whole system advances…’ 
This is reminiscent of Article 1.20 of the Dearing Report (1997) that 
asserts:’ while traditional and still-relevant values must be safeguarded, higher 
education need to continue to adapt to the needs of a rapidly changing world...the 
future cannot be forecast from the past...it is clear that a policy based on ‘more 
of the same’ is not an option.’ And therefore, while respecting the autonomy and 
independence of the HEIs, the HE ‘needs continuity in the framework which it 
operates to support its achievements of quality and distinctiveness’ (Dearing 
Report, Article 1.9). For instance, one participant referred to the importance of a 
common framework of standards and said: 
PCT 11: ‘I think all institutions recognise that they have an interest in 
ensuring that quality standards in higher education are secured, it’s reinforced 
through the external examining system but there is, I think, a well-established 
understanding of what quality and standards represent in higher education.’ 
 
Another participant talked about the autonomy of English HEIs and their 
direct responsibility in providing high quality qualifications and experiences 
saying: 
PCT 8: ‘...the higher education institutions and academics enjoy sufficient 
independence to make their own decisions about how they deliver their 
courses...but there are expectations that need to be met in terms of relevance 
of the material, about the appropriateness of courses, meeting the expectations 
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of stakeholders, students, employers and so on…’ 
In a Foucauldian panopticon, these expectations are used as conditions 
to evoke a certain behaviour among the HEIs. They become an actor’s own 
rationality towards calculated ends- or their ‘instrumental rationality’ in Weber’s 
words (1978:24).  By acting upon these expectations ‘the higher education 
through excellence in its diverse purposes can justifiably claim to be world 
class’, (Dearing Report, Article 1.4). Thus, unlike the French case, there is no 
fatality in HEIs providing proof that they are excellent; on the contrary they are 
engaged in a conscious effort to safeguard rigour in their awards and are explicit 
and clear in how they go about their business. One Participant referred to the fact 
that there is a well-established understanding of quality and standards in higher 
education, because 
PCT 11: ‘…. there is no national awarding organisation and universities 
are their own awarding bodies, there is a need to try to establish some 
consistency between universities in terms of standards of higher education 
qualifications,  for example the question that a degree in history is the same from 
oxford university and oxford brookes ... you know these are challenging questions 
for the university sector... they understand they have that responsibility to provide 
that public assurance about standards in higher education qualifications.’ 
 
Therefore, while the QA mechanisms are developed to allow diversity 
throughout the system, they should ‘ensure that diversity is not an excuse for low 
standards or unacceptable quality...to maintain high global reputation of UK 
higher education (Dearing Report, Article 10.8). HEIs’ freedom means that they 
are ‘held accountable for the excellence of their academic provision, and 
distinctiveness of their research and teaching’ (BIS, 2011). Consequently, if ‘a 
university suddenly decided to devote the greater part of its resources to 
research, to the almost total neglect of teaching, would doubtless be something 
of a scandal’ (Robbins Report, Article 717). In a similar vein, another participant 
referred to a ‘genetic disposition’ of HEIs in England and said: 
 
PCT 8: ‘...I think the university system in the UK is based on sort of an 
assumption of collective responsibility between institutions and it works well 
through peer review because…. I think all institutions recognise that they have 
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an interest in ensuring quality standards in higher education.’ 
Hence, the first finding here indicates that there is a sense of renewal and 
forward-thinking in how the English HE maintains its excellence and quality 
standards. From a Foucauldian perspective, this alludes to a sub-textual agenda 
of governmentality through quality panopticon, as will be further discussed below. 
 
5.2.6. Kaizen ‘à l’anglaise’ and quality life cycles 
 
The second finding of this study echoes Morley’s (2003) thesis on the 
relationship between quality and power and the prominence of a Kaizen culture 
in the English higher education. That is, as the English HEIs have endeavoured 
towards maintaining their excellence, they have been subject to normalising 
technologies and discourses that have instilled a quasi-religious capillary power 
in the HEIs and their academics. Quality regimes have implied ‘lack, deficit, 
rescue, and renewal... reminiscent of the Christian notion of the original sin’. And 
as it takes a lifetime to redeem one’s reputation if labelled as ‘low quality’, the 
English HEIs’ interest has been in ‘the utility value or ‘just-in-time’ ...skills and 
competences’ (Morley, 2003:14). As it was discussed before, while the English 
HE has opted for well-elaborated responsive planning to avoid defamatory 
accusations in international rankings and local surveys, the French have adopted 
a reactive ‘just-in-case’ approach. 
 
What is clear is that quality routines and a focus on performativity have 
resulted in operant conditioning among English HEIs. This is a psychological 
condition where a learned behaviour is controlled by consequences (Thorndike, 
1905, law of effect is at the origin of Operant conditioning). To create such a 
condition in HE, different methods of positive reinforcement (awards for 
excellence; higher ranking) and negative reinforcement (loss of reputation; lower 
ranking) are utilised to create a series of common-sense and self-evident 
practices. The operant conditioning is a necessary arrangement towards creating 
a regime of truth among the HEIs that operate within a panopticon. The first steps 
towards conditioning HEIs were taken in the late 1980s when the English State 
was looking to initiate and engraft external quality regimes. To this end, the State 
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used a well-known strategy in game theory called ‘Nash equilibrium’. This can be 
detected from one of the participant’s comments: 
 
PCT 11: ‘…in the late 1980s there was talk about asking the inspectorate 
in schools to inspect universities as well and that was something which the vice 
chancellors found unacceptable and so they offered to do it themselves…  in fact, 
a self-regulating, self-accrediting system for QA.’ 
 
In cooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium is attained when two or more 
rational players change their strategies if others change too, otherwise there is 
no gain in unilateral change of strategy. The State pursued a change in its 
strategy to fund universities. It was clear that without the cooperation of 
universities a unilateral governmental change was irrelevant. Therefore, the State 
created an existential risk shock for universities (the inspection by school 
inspectorate) to provoke the best response from universities, i.e. adoption and 
internalisation of quality regimes. As Ulrich (2006:331) explains: the shock of 
danger is a call for a new beginning. Where there is a new beginning, action is 
possible… and this common activity...means freedom’. And the quality 
panopticon operates on the basis of the free choice of its inmates (HEIs) who 
adhere to the collective norms and police themselves.  
 
Once the quality machine was put on the rail, it had to advance and thus, 
as one of the participants mentioned: ‘over the time there has been some 
significant changes in terms of the approach to quality assurance…’ (PCT 8). 
 
The analysis of quality discourses confirmed this participant’s view and 
revealed that quality has followed a particular ‘life cycle’ -to use Jackson’s (2015) 
terminology. 
 
 The starting point for quality regimes goes back to the 1991 White Paper 
where the authorities made a vague attempt to introduce differing views of what 
QA in HE should include. I say vague because on its Page 24, the White Paper 
provides definitions for quality control, quality audit, validation, accreditation, and 
quality assessment. However, as Brown (2011: 40) has pointed out, there is no 
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precision as to the benefits or the costs of each of these regimes. It was not clear 
that audits and assessments differed and that the latter was associated with 
financial consequences. At the time, the general understanding was that:  
 
PCT 8: ‘As part of that arrangement in 92, the Funding Councils were given 
statutory obligations to assure the quality of the institutions they were funding so 
it was all about public accountability. that by giving money directly, block grants 
to institutions, there was an expectation that the institutions could demonstrate 
the quality of their provision.’ 
 
Another participant confirmed that the first round of quality cycle focused 
on public accountability and said:  
 
PCT 11: ‘...first time round there was a lot of activity in actually putting the 
systems in place, the purpose was very much the fitness for purpose and 
whether or not the institutions could demonstrate the quality standards of their 
provision.’  
 
The first cycle of quality regime resembles the first step in the PDCA cycle 
during which strategic plans are developed and tested. Logically, the step that 
follows involves learning from the plan and checking if it works properly and if 
further improvement is required to attain the expected results. And this is what 
happened during the second phase of quality life cycle in England. One 
participant mentioned: 
 
PCT 11: ‘The second round of audits that was done in 1990s was more 
about demonstrating effectiveness not whether or not the systems were there, 
the systems were established by the time of the second round of the audits but it 
asked from the institutions to provide evidence that those systems were 
working effectively and that often, involved detailed discussions at subject level 
about the practice of quality insurance within institutions….’ 
 
This participant is in fact referring to the period between 1992 to 1997 
when two parallel quality systems were run, i.e., the institutional audit by HEQC 
and the subject review by Funding Councils, as previously discussed in the 
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literature review. This period corresponds to the ‘check’ part of the PDCA cycle. 
It also represents another round of power struggle between the State and the 
universities’ vice-chancellors and marks the beginning of the ‘quality wars’ that 
eventually led to the creation of the QAA. 
 
The next phase of this power struggle sets the basis for the third cycle of 
quality life from 2008-9 onwards as one of the participants explained:  
 
PCT 8: ‘... the vice-chancellors complained about the cost of engaging in 
a second round of subject level review and persuaded the Secretary of the State, 
David Blanket at the time...and that was the end of subject review and led to the 
resignation of the QAA chief executive...it was a major upheaval for the Agency…’ 
 
The real issue was that the QAA subject review was dismantling the 
historical quality culture that in ‘the British mode had placed strong authority at 
the bottom...but has emphasised collegial over personal approach’ (Clark, 1983: 
128). Additionally, from a Foucauldian perspective, the gaze of the QAA was 
taking universities’ traditional identity away and was replacing it with an unknown 
other under a different regime of power. This gaze had a determinative impact on 
the identity of the HEIs, as Sartre (1956:263) asserts: ‘I still am my 
possibilities...but at the same time the Look alienates them from me’.  
 
In 2009, the Select Committee inquiry into higher education reverts the 
game. Instead of QAA looking into the effectiveness of universities’ quality 
systems, the effectiveness of the Agency’s institutional audits is put under serious 
question. This shift in power was due to two main reasons:  
 
a) a diminishing return: where there is a real concern over time that the 
processes of audit ‘has become less effective as quality assurance has 
become embedded within institutional practice and the methodology 
became both familiar and predictable’ (Jackson, 2015:1)   
b) a cartesian dualism with regards to the meaning and scope of QA 
mechanisms: as ‘QAA looked at systems and procedures whereas the 
select committee was concerned about issues like grade inflation, 
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value for money, or about complaints by students and how they were 
being addressed by the universities’ (PCT 8).  
 
As a consequence, the third part of the quality life cycle began when ‘the 
emphasis was very much on enhancement, on what the institutions are doing to 
improve the quality of students’ experiences in their institutions’ (PCT 11). 
 
One participant said that this study was conducted at a very important time 
because: 
 PCT 8: ‘...having ensured that institutions are taking it seriously and their 
systems work effectively and they are able to fulfil the expectations of the 
stakeholders…. There is a question mark about what happens next in terms of 
taking forward the agenda of quality insurance.’ 
 
The answer to this question is in fact the third finding of this section which 
is explained below. 
 
5.2.7. From a trustworthy to a risky business 
 
In ‘The archaeology of knowledge’, Foucault (1972) talked about analysing 
a ‘regime of practice’, ‘the regularities, logic, and self-evidence that connects what 
is said and what is done, the codes imposed and the reasons given’ (Adler et. al, 
2014:17). The logic that runs underneath the HE policy discourses in England is 
risk. A language of uncertainty, competitiveness, and risk is repetitively used to 
remind the English HEIs and their academics that their historical gains in 
excellence could be in peril if it did not: 
● safeguard standards (Robbins Report, 1963),  
● seek to continuously improve its performance (Dearing Report, 1997),  
● create genuine competition for students between HEIs which is not 
possible within the current system (Browne Report, 2010),  
● create a new fit-for-purpose regulatory framework (BIS White Paper, 
2011), 
● promote value for money and a greater choice and opportunities for 
students (HERA, 2017).  
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These are indicative of a context in which HEIs are considered as risky 
businesses in competing markets, both internal and global. The omnipresent 
risk/threat is non-personal, it is diffused, and it encompasses all aspects of HE, 
its teaching, its research, and its very identity. It demands a continuous change 
in practices to avoid risk. It simultaneously warns against the risk and provides 
the remedies. It insinuates a variety of rescue plans, e.g., accountability towards 
the general public in 1990s or accountability towards a select public, i.e., the 
student in recent years. 
It is, therefore, no surprise when the BIS White Paper: Students at the 
Heart of the System (2011) very clearly sketches out the next stage of quality 
cycle to be risk-based: 
‘We will introduce a risk-based quality regime that focuses regulatory effort 
where it will have the most impact and gives powers to students to hold 
universities to account. All institutions will continue to be monitored 
through a single framework but the need for, and frequency of, scheduled 
institutional reviews will depend on an objective set of criteria and triggers, 
including student satisfaction, and the recent track record of each 
institution’. (BIS 2011: 37) 
This is an example of capillary power capable of conditioning and 
harmonising the behaviour of all inmates so that the gaze of the panopticon can 
operate more effectively. The HE system will positively reinforce the behaviour of 
those HEIs that can justify they are excellent as they will have less frequent 
reviews while those considered as having lower quality and higher risks will be 
punished and will go through more frequent scrutiny. The role of the students who 
are ‘now paying more and should get more’ (as was first emphasised in the 
Browne Report, 2010) is now prioritised as part of the panopticon gaze. They will 
watch the HEIs through their new ‘Office for Students- OfS’ and its legal 
instrument the ‘Quality Assessment Committee’ (HERA, 2017, Articles 1 & 24). 
The role of QAA is reduced from the main agency to only one of the eligible 
agencies that are to collaborate with the OfS and go through its procurement 
processes. Within this new risk-based approach, the Agency’s strategic plan is to 
help HEIs build on their world-class quality (as shown in the title of QAA strategy 
2017-2020); and to do so it will deliver innovative new services and will remain 
accountable and transparent to its stakeholders (QAA, 2017)48.   
                                                
48 Available at: http://www.qaa.ac.uk/en/Publications/Documents/QAA-Strategy-2017-20.pdf  
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 The risk-based approach to quality bears several impacts on HEIs and 
further tightens the grasp of the panopticon. One immediate impact is a 
differentiation between the ‘leper’ and the ‘healthy’ as was the case in Foucault’s 
plague-stricken city.  one of the participants said:  
PCT 11: ‘...how would we be able to say this institution is ‘high-risk’ and 
the other one just around the corner is ‘low-risk’...we are talking about 25 years 
of trial and error in quality... there is literally no HEI that has not been subject to 
at least five audits and I can say there is no institution that has not developed an 
internal quality mechanism…there may be minor differences between institutions 
but this does not mean that we can create a list with some as low and others as 
high-risk...’ 
 The sharp vertical differentiation of HEIs under a risk-based quality regime 
resembles the Foucauldian city where the affected persons (the high-risk HEIs) 
are quarantined and are kept under constant surveillance. It can also be 
interpreted as an old political tactic: ‘divide and conquer’. In fact, dividing the 
already differentiated HEIs and their disciplines has not been a herculean 
manoeuvre of the evaluative State since the 1970s. The task is even easier now 
that the HEIs have internalised competition and engaged in the ‘reputation race’ 
(Van Vught, 2008). What is important in this recent politics of fear is that it will 
renew and accelerate a culture of compliance as the HEIs fear being quarantined 
as ‘high-risk’. It may produce a compulsion to act under an Orwellian surveillance 
while ‘the boundary between rationality and hysteria becomes blurred’ (Ulrich, 
2006:335).  
A resemblance can be detected between the French and the English HE 
politics of divide and rule. As was observed, the French government bestowed 
universities with autonomy to hold each university accountable for their own 
successes and failures. One participant stated that ‘among multiple reasons, one 
was to avoid student riots’. The English government could be pursuing the same 
goal by creating a risk-based environment in which the universities are 
increasingly individualised and differentiated- as Foucault (1982) stated 
individualisation is a way of exercising power over subjects. Consequently, if 
universities are labelled as high risk and fail to satisfy the best interest of their 
customers, then any expression of students’ discontent will be directed towards 
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universities and not the government and therefore riots in the magnitude of the 
one that followed the Browne Report of 2010 could be avoided. Hence, should 
there ever be a protest, it will be much smaller and therefore more controllable 
and it will be an internal affair between two legally autonomous institutions, i.e., 
the universities and the OfS or the student unions in the course of which no 
democratic government would interfere. Unless, of’ course the two parties invite 
the risk-defining knowledgeable State to step in and help them settle their issues.  
In this regard, one of the participants talked about the fact that there has 
been a move towards a more centralised approach in HE governance and said:  
 
PCT 11: ‘...so it does get to the root of the nature of quality assurance, 
about whether the sector should be ensuring itself or whether the government 
has a role in assuring quality and increasingly the funding council sees its role as 
protecting the interests of the students so there is that tension about whether 
students’ interests are being adequately addressed through a co-regulation 
model or whether there needs to be greater government intervention.’ 
 
 My understanding is that the State has already increased its power in 
steering HEIs. It has done so through market-oriented initiatives including the 
establishment of the OfS which is ‘to have regard to guidance given by the 
Secretary of State’ (HERA, 2017 Article 2, Item 3) and by associating a language 
of risk with the HE sector. As Jackson (2015: 3) explains: ‘the use of the term 
‘risk’ implies that higher education in England is inherently ‘risky’...the idea runs 
counter to the original intention of the AAU which was to promote public 
confidence in the security of academic standards’. It seems to me, that the 
English government is creating more cells and more enforced communication to 
inculcate the new risk-based norms in the quality panopticon while ‘its leash has 
become very short indeed’ (Raban, 2014: 92). It makes one wonder if the English 
are borrowing the French milles feuilles approach to maintain a more distributed 
power in steering the HE. But even if they are, they remain more transparent 
compared to their French counterparts because according to the 2016 corruption 
perception index49, the UK is ranked 10th while France occupies the 23rd place.  
                                                
49 This is an annual report by Transparency International that ranks countries based on the perception of 
their corruption. The higher the rank of a county, the less its perceived corruption. The 2016 report is 
available at:  
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016  
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To conclude and to answer RQ1. on the definition of quality at national 
levels in France and England, it is important to note the underlying NPM 
worldview that has given rise to quality discourses in both cases. These can be 
detected in policy discourses that allude to ‘learning society’, ‘students’ 
satisfaction’, ‘excellence’, ‘responsibility and autonomy’, ‘employability of 
graduates’, and ‘knowledge society’, for instance.  In the case of France, the State 
continues to play a central role in defining quality regimes and there has been a 
slow move from QA to QE with importance given to institutional evaluation. A 
recent study50 (2017) indicates that the French judge the quality of their higher 
education has decreased substantially in the last ten years. Nonetheless, the 
State continues to safeguard and reinforce the historical association of the 
grandes écoles with meritocracy, selectivity, prestige and therefore a perceived 
high quality, while universities’ quality is considered lower and in need of constant 
reforms.   
 
In England, the State has associated quality with funding and more 
recently with the possibility of a risk-based ranking in order to steer universities. 
Prominence has been attached to institutional audits, subject reviews, teaching 
and research excellence, as well as students’ satisfaction. The role of students in 
defining quality has increased as customers investing noticeable amounts in HE, 
nonetheless, the government has gradually increased its influence by renewing 
quality guidelines and standards.  
 
In short, the Foucauldian quality panopticon is more clearly constructed in 
the English HE discourses with a ‘shift from corporatist to one driven by pressure-
group politics’ (Filippakou & Tapper, 2008) i.e., the students. The evaluative State 
in France has been more flexible and has encouraged improvements hence 
allowing the political elite to reinvent themselves through the parallel system of 
grandes écoles.  
                                                
50 Les Français jugent la qualité de l’enseignement supérieur en baisse. (2017) Available at: 
www.vousnousils.fr/2017/03/13/les-français-judgent-la-qualite-de-lenseignement-superieur-en-baisse-
601057  
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5.3. RQ2. What quality management mechanisms are in place 
in the two-selected elite higher education institutions in 
England and France?  
 
The first RQ focused on an analysis of ‘formal’ definitions of quality in 
England and France. In this section, I have presented the findings of the research 
regarding the ‘situated’ meaning of quality in internal quality mechanisms of ScPo 
in Paris and the LSE in London. This will reveal the possible continuities or 
ruptures with the national quality policy discourses and will provide a general 
understanding of the role and authority of these sample elite HEIs in the quality 
panopticon.  
 
Prior to presenting the findings in this section, I wish to clarify that in this 
study, HEIs and their environment are viewed as elements of the same 
interconnected pattern. As patterns evolve, so do the HEIs and their environment. 
Barnett (2011:62 & 70) explains this by saying: ‘Being is always active. Being a 
university, therefore, is not a passive existence...the university is in the world and 
of the world’. Therefore, although the State exerts its power in inflicting Sisyphean 
normative quality requirements on the regulated -Chatov (1981) called this the 
‘regulatory sadism’-   it would be a mistake to assume that the HEIs are separate 
from their environment and are subjected to external forces without asserting their 
own influence on the patterns of HE. The HEIs are complex and dynamic 
organisations that may change and organise themselves into new forms as they 
are positioned and position-taking within a pattern. Consequently, a shift in 
patterns towards constructing the quality panopticon may lead to an infinite 
variety of qualitatively different internal quality systems in HEIs. These internal 
QA systems are not generic but specific to HEIs’ initial point of departure, e.g., 
resources, culture, and prestige in a certain spatio-temporal condition. In fact, 
depending on the weight of the above-mentioned external and internal attractors, 
universities evolve in chaotic patterns- also called Lorenz systems.  
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5.3.1. The case of Sciences Po Paris 
5.3.1.1. Caught between two worlds 
 
As one of the renowned ‘State-building’ institutions, ScPo is caught 
between two worlds. In one world, it is the emblem of primacy, prestige, and 
quality and, ‘it is regarded by the State as a renowned institution, an innovative 
institution, an institution that has always been intelligent and subtle...and is still 
enjoying a very good relation with the State’ (PCT 7). In the other, it is only 
another HEI competing in the international market for funding, students, 
partnerships and has now ‘more than 40% international students whose presence 
is creating a unique cultural diversity that you cannot see in other French 
universities, but which is also threatening as it brings with it an Americanisation 
of the system’ (PCT 9).  
 
Previously, in the literature review, I used the image of a tilt-a-whirl to draw 
a resemblance between the rotating cars and the HEIs; the fixed pivots and the 
States; and the rotating platform underneath with the global quality frameworks.  
ScPo has a historical weight in the local quality market and therefore as ‘part of 
a group of universities called Comue51 it is the only one among them with full 
autonomy over its pedagogy and training…’ (PCT 9). But in reaction to the fast-
paced rotations of the platform, it has not enjoyed the same weight and has been 
pushed to enter the market and adopt aggressive internationalisation in a hasty 
way- in reaction to rather than in anticipation of change that characterises the 
whole French HE sector.  
 
 Hence, ScPo is facing new challenges: ‘in 2006 ScPo had 5000 students 
in 2015 it has 13,000 students… that is more than double in less than ten years 
... and so ScPo does not work like before, there is criticism, there are complaints... 
so measures have been taken and there had been good results but it’s a work in 
progress’ (PCT 9). And although there are external quality indicators, ‘the internal 
indicators of quality are still being discussed...because they have to be valid and 
reliable so that they can then be communicated to the teachers and the 
                                                
51 ScPo Paris is part of Université- Sorbonne Paris Cité Comue (USPC) 
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staff...there is a lot of work being done in this regard ... but it is not finished…’ 
(PCT 7). The AERES report (2014:13) confirms that ScPo ‘already had a number 
of indicators and data, but until recently there was a lack in the School’s analytical 
capacities needed to use the data for decision-making’. 
 
The above comments demonstrate a pattern of continuity between the 
formal national and the situated institutional approach to quality. ScPo seems to 
have been caught by surprise by a rapid massification and internationalisation 
just like the rest of the French HE system. In reaction, it has built on its unique 
legal status as an autonomous HEI to quickly arrange for ‘an openness to the 
international world’ (PCT 9) as a lucrative business. Yet, the School seems to be 
in a crawling transitional state.  According to the AERES report the school has 
engaged in international activities since the end of the 1990s when it adopted the 
LMD cycle proposed by Bologna, for instance. However, still in 2015 when I 
worked there, the school was keen on emphasising the prominence of its 
traditional in-house culture of bureaucracy and the French ‘no spoon-feeding’ 
educational policy rather than deploying a comprehensive institutional quality 
policy that followed the anglo-saxon models.  
 
This dominant mentality was obvious in one participant’s comment: ‘at 
ScPo, students sit in classes where you have people coming from 4 to 8 different 
countries and this is already an exposure to the international world as they work 
together and do exercises and all’ (PCT 7). This means that the school is more 
reliant on the goodwill of individual students. However, transformative 
internationalisation is not about students simply rubbing shoulders but about 
integrating international understandings into the design of the programmes and 
services. 
 
The position that ScPo is taking fits the general scenery of French HE and 
alludes to what Morgan (2006:248) calls an ‘egocentric organisation’. These 
institutions ‘have a rather fixed notion of who they are or what they can be and 
are determined to impose or sustain that identity at all costs ... they see 
themselves as entities...surviving against the vagaries of the outside world, which 
is often constructed as a domain of threat and opportunity’.  
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There are several evidences for this. Firstly, page 8 of ScPo 2020 Strategy 
clearly states: ‘Sciences Po is unique and intends to remain as such’. Additional 
evidence can be traced in the complete absence of any reference to educational 
quality at ScPo Paris in the School’s 2013 and 2020 strategy documents. 
Furthermore, in the AERES 2011 audit report of ScPo the topic of ‘quality policy’ 
takes only half of a page (page 13) in this 64-pages document and even there no 
reference whatsoever is made to the school’s educational provision and delivery. 
Another telling evidence is ScPo (2013:3) strategy that refers to the ‘great 
injustices in THE rankings in which the LSE is ranked 4th while ScPo is ranked 
105th’’. These ‘scandalous great injustices’ have been felt by the whole French 
HE system following the 2003 Shanghai shock and demonstrate a ‘cooling out 
process’ (Clark, 1983) where failure or denial is the effect of a structural 
discrepancy between ends (ranking) and means of HE in France. 
 
The main findings of the study are discussed below to provide further 
analysis. 
 
 
5.3.1.2. Quality among our local elite means selection, meritocracy, and 
employability 
 
 The first finding from the data reveals that ScPo defines quality based on 
‘meritocracy and selectivity, egalitarianism, and employability of its 
graduates’ (PCT 7).  
 
Being selective equals excellence and this is confirmed on page 7 of ScPo 
2020 Strategy document that indicates: 
 
 ‘Sciences Po knows how to combine values of excellence and 
openness...We fully assume this social responsibility. We are a selective 
institution, both out of necessity, because our capacities are limited, but 
also by will because we want our students, like our teachers, to share our 
educational and scientific project ...’ 
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 In accordance with the above official statement of the School, one 
participant referred to the different ways in which ScPo is a high-quality institution 
and said: 
 
PCT 7: ‘...with regards to quality of teaching... there are two things...one is 
the recognition...this is what makes the quality of an institution, the recognition by 
the enterprises, by the State.... Then you have the quality of the students...they 
are selected from among the best...that is also an indicator of quality…those who 
study at ScPo have passed difficult exams and if they enter the institute it means 
they merit sitting in classes and listen to the well- known professionals, ex-
ministers, and Nobel prize winners …’ 
 
The link between selectivity and meritocracy cannot be an egalitarian one. 
Several studies have shown that both in the case of Oxbridge (Zimdars, 2007; 
Faust, 2013) and the French grandes écoles (Bourdieu 1989; De Saint Martin, 
2005; Karrer, 2012) admission patterns into selective institutions are in fact a 
challenge to meritocracy.  
 
This is reflected in the following statistics. According to the website of the 
Conference of Grandes Ecoles (CGE)52, the family background of grandes écoles 
students include: only 3.5% from agricultural families, 6% from small businesses, 
and 5.2% from working class.53 In the case of ScPo, the ZEP initiative has been 
at best a form of cosmetic surgery despite much propaganda. According to Prost 
(1981) and Tiberj & Riou (2004), the number of students from higher social 
background has been on the rise systematically: in 1966 (44%), in 1978 (65.5%), 
in 2007 (87.5%), while the students from lower social classes made only up to 
7.5% in 2011. Thus, the ZEP strategy has in fact legitimised the very existence 
of the selective admission policies at ScPo rather than paving the way for 
underprivileged students who ‘know that once selected they are entering the elite 
word’ (PCT 7). 
                                                
52 Created in 1973, CGE (law of 1901) comprises 265 members, of which 222 are recognized by the State 
e.g. ScPo. It also has about 20 member or partner companies and 35 associations and organizations (unions 
of teachers, training institutes, duty devotees, alumni association). 
53 CGE, “origine sociale des élèves : ce qu’il en est exactement”, www.cge.asso.fr; June 2005.  
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The idea that ‘selectivity of the student intake means quality’ is indeed 
inscribed in the ideology of ScPo. For instance, another participant referred to the 
responses to a 45 items survey that has been conducted in 2014-15. This 
targeted 3000 out of 3883 contractual teachers who provide 90% of teaching 
hours at ScPo while the permanent academics are responsible for only 9% of the 
teaching (AERES evaluation report, 2014:21). A total of 1987 of the sample- 
some 55%- responded (survey results ScPo 2014:2). This participant referred to 
the teachers’ responses to ‘why they chose to teach at ScPo Paris’ and said: 
 
PCT 9: ‘...if they come to teach at ScPo it is for the quality of 
students...because practically 9 out of 10 of students who are accepted have 
excellent grades in their baccalauréat...ScPo is highly selective...each national 
and international student’s file is carefully reviewed......and that is one aspect that 
guarantees quality at ScPo.’ 
 
 The concept of meritocracy that this participant is referring to fits a 
Foucauldian perspective of power. It is a regime of truth that appropriates an 
apolitical discourse to hide its underlying undemocratic ideology and to create 
capillary power in its subjects. On the surface, meritocracy is the antithesis of 
unjustified inherited aristocratic privilege; it is based on talent and evidence.  
Underneath, though, it adheres to the old Aristotelian and Platonic aristocratic 
virtues that separates ‘the chosen people’ from those of ‘low birth, no property, 
and with vulgar employments’ that democracy may choose. In the collective 
conscious of the French society, therefore, the selective admission to ScPo 
resonates a rupture with the aristocratic past only to replicate it with elite 
meritocracy. In Orwell’s animal farm, too, ‘all animals were equal, but some 
animals were more equal than others.’ 
 
The meritocracy discourse hides at least several realities. It hides the fact 
that the CPGE classes and the selective entrance exam were adopted in the 
1970s as the bourgeoisie played ‘the rarity card’ to raise the value of their grandes 
écoles degrees in the face of the increasing number of graduates from mass 
universities. It also hides that the students who arrive at the CPGE classes are 
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from higher social classes who have ‘both the means and the information about 
the success in the competition or the prestige of the proposed training’ (Karrer, 
2012:17). It also conceals that the 30% scholarships that ScPo is proud to provide 
to its students (ScPo Strategy 2020:7) is in fact a reproduction mechanism for its 
students from higher social classes- knowing that only 7.5% of ScPo students are 
from marginalised backgrounds. And finally, it enshrouds the complicity of the 
State with the grandes écoles as it allocates 13,500 Euros per student to grandes 
écoles compared to the average of 6,800 for university students (Karrer, 2012:25) 
 
Consequently, ScPo remains part of a local elite market of grandes écoles 
where the currency is prestige and status but not the quality of educational 
provision. Within this prestige competition, students’ characteristics at entry, i.e., 
their ‘high degree of preparation, test scores, legacy status, and so forth’ (Pusser, 
2012:45) are considered as a manifestation of the high quality of the institution. 
As Neave (2012:67) explains: ‘The essential feature of the French elite sector is 
its ability wholly to control the quality of student inflow’.  
 
The high prestige of the institution and its selective admission processes, 
then, leads to a high employability rate among the graduates. Thus, no matter 
what the quality of education has been, the ScPo graduates have a better chance 
of being recruited compared to university graduates. While a ScPo degree 
remains rare and prestigious, universities are accessible for anyone holding a 
high school diploma and they use a posteriori evaluation where instead of 
‘demanding brilliance to enter, students are considered brilliant if they graduate’54 
(Neave, 2012). And this is not sufficient for the employers, while the selective 
process of ScPo is. Thus, when I asked participants about the quality of education 
at ScPo, their response was:  
 
PCT 7: ‘.... when you have 80% of ScPo students who find a job either 
                                                
54 It is not within the scope of this study to analyse the teaching/learning conditions in French universities. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to say that an ensemble of elements lead to a high dropout rate among French 
university students within the first year of their study. These factors include: the ‘ease’ in entering universities, 
lack of students’ motivation and the irrelevance of their university fields to their personal preferences as well 
as their despair in finding a job with their degrees, crowded classes delivered in the form of ‘magistrate 
seminars’, lack of professors’ pastoral and academic support, lack of personalised support for students 
facing academic difficulties. More details can be found in Claire Donovan (from multiversity to postmodern 
university) in Routledge Handbook of the Sociology of Higher Education (2016).  
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before leaving the school or within six months following their graduation, this is 
an indicator of quality...when you have ScPo graduates at the highest levels of 
leadership in enterprises or the government that is an indicator of quality…’ 
 
Another participant added: ‘...of course there are other measures, like the 
surveys, the evaluations, the students’ feedback and meeting with the 
deans…but as I said employability of ScPo students is a very important gauge 
for the quality of the school… (PCT 9).’ 
 
  Several factors shall be considered when analysing ScPo graduates’ 
employability. Firstly, the global human capital discourses and the national HE 
policies on employability have been aligned with what the school has been doing 
since its very establishment, i.e., professional training for the elite. And in its 2020 
strategy, ScPo emphasises that it will continue preparing its students for the job 
market through ‘learning by doing’ strategies. In fact, ScPo is appropriating the 
neoliberal discourses of employability because: a) unlike the external quality 
forces that interrogate the school, employability builds on the School’s historical 
role and empowers it as a ‘first tier university producing managers and leaders’ 
(Boden & Nedeva, 2010); and b) it increases its performativity thus raising its 
place in international rankings as indicated in Table 1.   
 
In addition to the school’s strategy that has focused more on preparing 
students for private enterprises in recent years (AERES evaluation report, 
2014:21), the generations of ScPo graduates are part of a network of influence 
and wealth who can facilitate access to well-paid jobs for the younger members 
of the club. In addition, as Bourdieu (1987) states, the bourgeoisie have a 
privileged knowledge of the future economic and political shift and therefore can 
identify promising fields of study. Thus, today ‘more than 80 percent of ScPo 
graduates now go to private businesses rather than entering the government’ 
(PCT 7). This is because, following WWII, when the patriotic and nation-building 
aspirations were ripe among the elite, ENA was the righteous response. With the 
rise of neoliberalism and global trade, the elite have maintained their ‘reinvention 
capacity’ (Gordon, 2004) through new programmes of study at existing grandes 
écoles like ScPo that better prepare them for the private sector. This also explains 
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the multiplication of commercial grandes écoles since 1980 with more than 
85,000 students today.  
 
The probability of ScPo graduates’ employability is also increased due to 
their smaller classes and the type of skills the school trains them on. The 
outcomes of a research on grandes écoles graduates show, ‘some useful skills 
on the labour market are more easily acquired in grandes écoles. This is the case 
in particular of 'analytical thinking' or 'ability to command a foreign language', 
domains on which grandes écoles have heavily focused their curriculum in the 
1990s’ (REFLEX, 2009:7). This was confirmed by one participant who said: 
 
PCT 9: ‘...first it is the very nature of ScPo that we prefer debate, critical 
thinking and so we train the students to be able to speak in public, to work under 
pressure, to question the established ideas ...then it is the obligatory internship 
on the 3rd year of their study ...they get a first-hand training in the field and 
already have something to add to their CV ...we also have more than 18 
languages that are taught and this diversity prepares the students for the kind of 
jobs they apply for…these are among the factors that help the students succeed 
in the job market.’ 
 
5.3.1.3. The threats and the opportunities of internationalisation 
 
 The second finding revealed that the ambitious internationalisation of the 
school has challenged its locally established definition of quality. Among the main 
factors influencing the school, reference can be made to: the presence of an 
increasing number of international and exchange students, 45,1% in 2012 
compared to 38, 2% in 2008; creation of dual degrees and partnerships with 
universities such as: the LSE, Columbia university, George Washington 
university; and the establishment of the ‘Paris School of International Affairs’ in 
2012 (AERES, 2014:37). One of the participants referred to the different 
perception of quality in the School and said: 
 
PCT 7: ‘... we are not going to hide the truth, are we? ScPo Paris has 
moved towards the Anglo-Saxon world...I mean, we are tempted to say yes to it 
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all, but then no ... because we are a bit different ... for instance the internal QA 
objectives, quality of students’ life on campus, management ...there is a 
difference between the French and the Anglo-Saxon world and ScPo objectives 
are even different from them both...to some extent…’ 
 
The above comment perfectly fits the way chaotic Lorenz attractors work. 
Internationalisation is in fact an attractor that pushes ScPo far from its previous 
equilibrium point and towards an ‘edge of chaos’. Once at this situation and while 
the internal system at ScPo can self-organise, the School is pushed to a point of 
instability and potential chaos that will in turn create the potential for ‘bifurcation’. 
However, bifurcation from the past, i.e., leaving the old conceptions of quality and 
replacing it with new ones, may only happen if the push towards the new position 
is stronger than the longstanding local perceptions of quality. There are certain 
characteristics of this past condition that are too precious to let go, for instance: 
 
PCT 9: ‘...one factor that, fortunately, distinguishes us from the Anglo-
Saxon world is our concept of university fee...it’s not like the American universities 
that you have to give the student their degrees because they have paid a lot of 
money...here our students pay based on their family’s revenue...and of’ course 
we select the best students and we do not have these sorts of tensions...but this 
Americanisation of university is fast growing at ScPo...which is not good news…’ 
 
In a similar manner, another participant seemed concerned about the 
change that was happening in the relations between students, the lecturers, and 
the university and said:   
 
PCT 9: ‘...students’ feedbacks are an important part of ScPo Paris 
evaluation...and if there is a problem different sources will be looked at to verify 
the situation...the challenge is how to say this to a professor who has been 
teaching at ScPo for years...a student, for instance, complained that they were 
distracted during the exam because another student was eating and the professor 
did not stop the student!’ 
 
What can be detected from the above comment is a fear from the worst, 
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i.e.,   ‘the McUniversity’ (Hayes, 2017). The French HE system, as discussed, is 
characterised by sharp hierarchies and therefore the older professor's’ role is that 
of a ‘mandarin’ which cannot yield to the new rules of quality management. The 
McUniversity promotes a ‘therapy culture’ which requires reminding the students 
that they are safe intellectually and socially and this stands in contradiction with 
the established understandings in the French HE and ScPo that consider 
students as responsible individuals who should only attend to what is their 
concern, i.e., learning and studying and leave the rest to the adults including their 
professors and the administrative personnel. The power of the school seems to 
be challenged with the arrival of an increasing number of international students 
as well as the French students who by studying in dual degrees have experienced 
other approaches to service delivery and draw on these experiences to reflect on 
the quality of their teachers and to fill in their evaluation forms. 
 
 
5.3.2. The case of the LSE 
 
5.3.2.1. The embodiment of the QAA orthodoxies 
 
 An overview of quality enhancement programmes at the LSE reveals the 
existence of a well-established machinery to ensure that ‘the taught offer is of 
high quality and that the programmes are healthy’ (PCT 12). The School has 
made a conscious effort to improve its quality management because the 
dominant understanding at the LSE is that ‘any complex organisation needs to 
have some kind of quality control in place ... so we have to make sure the courses 
and programmes that we offer are of sufficient quality to attract students in 
numbers that will help fund the institution ...’ (PCT 12). In short, the LSE is a 
miniature model of the wider ‘Kaizen à l’anglaise’ that was discussed as part of 
RQ1. The two main findings at the LSE are discussed below.  
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5.3.2.2. More catholic than the Pope: our history, our processes 
 
The first finding at the LSE demonstrates a dominant quality culture across 
all activities of the School which meticulously replicates external quality 
frameworks, notably the QAA quality code. By looking at the pattern of internal 
quality at the LSE, it is obvious that the School has developed a full-fledged 
quality panopticon combining horizontal and vertical surveillance. It has done so 
by adopting a Hegelian dialectic approach to QAA’s external scrutiny, as 
explained below. 
 
It is in the mid of reactions to QAA’s subject review that the LSE 
considered, ‘the subject review was a very unconstructive process and was not 
a good use of faculty time to engage with this kind of process...  and so, the 
academic board of the LSE, the senior academic decision-making body... voted 
in 2001, that the school would secede from the QAA, that we will no longer be 
accountable to QAA.’ (PCT 12).  
 
As was previously discussed, the English HEIs are bound by the 1997 
Dearing Act. This means, the QAA ‘Code of Practice’ applies to all universities 
that are receiving public funding and they should be accountable to the Funding 
Council (HEFCE).  Therefore, the above announcement by the LSE was more of 
a power manoeuvre of an autonomous university which- by the logic of its funding 
sources- considered it should be more accountable towards its international fee-
paying students rather than the QAA.  As one participant mentioned:  
 
PCT 12: ‘quality is important especially in a place like the LSE where the 
school is counting on the student's’ fees to a greater extent than any other UK 
institution...but at the same time the School was thinking if we are not going to be 
accountable to the QAA, what are we going to do instead?... and so, we went 
through building more or less what the QAA would have expected of us but in 
kind of an internal way.’ 
 
This is an interesting comment from several viewpoints. Firstly, negating 
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QAA facilitates creating an internal system as a ‘collective defence mechanism’ 
against an external threat. As such, the new internal quality mechanisms rely on 
the common-sense logic of the inmates in the panopticon (departments and their 
academics) which means resistance would be hard to mobilise.  This policy of 
‘us’ and ‘them’ is kept in check through a narrative of risk that reminds all 
members of the LSE ‘that the internal quality system shields them against the 
horrors of the QAA as much as possible’ (PCT 12). Subsequently, the two 
players, i.e., the LSE quality management and the departments realise that they 
will be better off if they cooperated and acted for the good of the group rather 
than their individual self-interest. Thus, they’d arrive at a stable state (Nash 
equilibrium) in which they interact and change strategies only if the other would 
do so. From a Foucauldian perspective, this leads to the internalisation of external 
norms and creates a capillary power among inmates.  
 
Secondly, the position that the LSE took killed two birds with one stone. It 
created a renewed powerful external identity for the School and reinforced its 
internal popular authority.  One of the participants explained that ‘first and 
foremost the LSE wanted the QE mechanisms to align with the university’s 
academic history and culture, this works for the university and if it also happens 
to be in compliance with the QAA it would be great.’ (PCT 20). This could be 
interpreted using the Hegelian ‘negation of negation’ through which the internal 
quality scheme adopted by the LSE is understood as “a new concept, a higher, 
richer concept than the previous one, for it has been enriched by its negation or 
opposite; it contains in itself the old concept, but it contains more than this 
concept alone...” (G. Hegel, Soch. vol. 5 Moscow, 1937, p. 33)55.  
 
Consequently, the internal quality becomes the ‘popular’56 against the 
external ‘vulgar’ mechanisms pushing the otherwise segmented departments to 
prefer the internal quality religion to the alien external one. In addition, as the new 
system is built on the internal history and culture of the university, it creates a 
sense of belonging and persuades the inmates that their responsibility in the 
                                                
55 From the online website ‘The Free Dictionary’ where translated articles of ‘The Great Soviet 
Encyclopaedia (1979)’ are available in English. 
http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Negation+of+the+Negation%2C+Law+of+the  
56 A distinction used by Bourdieu (1990:150), In other words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, 
Policy Press. 
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quality panopticon is based on values, traditions, and affective rational action.  
 
Once this new social contract was in place and the departments 
spontaneously embraced ‘freedom to’ but not ‘freedom from’ (Fromm, 2007) in 
the new quality regime, the School started its internal QE processes based on a 
genuine trust in its departments. This initial process is reminiscent of the UGC 
and its trust-based funding of universities. One of the participants explained:  
 
PCT 4: ‘the annual programme review, for instance, was for long left to the 
departments...now this worked OK for departments that took it seriously and it 
worked less well for those who didn’t… and it was difficult for the School as the 
awarding body to assure the quality and standards of the awards when the data 
were in different formats and were products of different kinds of local processes.’ 
 
This internal push for centralisation is further reinforced by the 2011 
external audit report that finds that ‘leaving arrangements for course monitoring 
and periodic programme review to departmental discretion is not wholly aligned 
with the Code of Practice, Section 7: Programme design, approval, monitoring 
and review’.  What happened next at the LSE resembles the events that followed 
the end of the binary system in England. At the time, the quality systems used by 
the polytechnics were adopted and applied to the whole HE system; similarly, at 
the LSE, the central QE system was developed based on the more sophisticated 
and developed systems that were used by some departments. One participant 
commented on this and said:  
 
PCT 12: ‘So eventually the LSE moved towards standardising a common 
practice across the school so that we have comparative data across departments 
and that’s a sort of the system developed in the LSE and the QAA would give the 
LSE credit for that.’  
 
 Once the gaze is centralised, the School, then, engages in a continuous 
improvement by adopting top-down and bottom-up mechanisms to ensure the 
high quality of its programmes. For instance, each department has three 
committees including: Teaching and Learning, Research; and Staff and Student 
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Liaison Committees. These committees hold one meeting each term to review 
progress and to attend to possible shortcomings. One participant talked about the 
significance of these meetings as they ‘allow triangulation of data on aspects of 
academic and student’s life that cannot be gathered solely from student’s 
evaluation’ and added: 
 
PCT 12: ‘the School is constantly having this sort of existential discussion 
about ‘what is teaching’... ‘how can we make it better?’...and I think this is a 
successful hallmark of a successful quality culture that you are always self-
reflective, you are always thinking how you could do things better and I think that's 
why our processes are successful.’  
 
The Annual Programme Monitoring Exercise is also part of this continuous 
effort to improve quality of teaching and learning ‘to capture that self-reflection in 
some sort of a measurable document and then to use that measure to effect 
change in a timely way. (PCT 4). As Morley (2003: 14) explains, under QA ‘the 
organisation, or unit of analysis, becomes the reflexive project for which all 
organisational members are responsible’. This is reminiscent of the Japanese car 
industry’ and of’ course the Foucauldian panopticon.  
 
In addition to its well-elaborated internal processes, the LSE welcomes 
external reviews as ‘they examine the health of the programmes with a fresh pair 
of eyes and so can observe and comment on specific points that the internal eyes 
may not see as such. (PCT 4). The external audits are necessary conditions for 
the LSE to reproduce ‘an arbitrary legitimised culture which indirectly supports 
the maintenance of existing power relations in society, whilst at the same time 
maintaining apparent independence’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977:67 quoted in 
Mann 2008:78). 
 
Additionally, this comment demonstrates a change of strategy in the LSE’s 
approach to external audits from denial, to apathy, and eventually to 
transformation. As Ulrich (2006) explains, in a risk society, ‘relations of definitions 
are to be conceived analogous to Marx’s relations of production’ where the 
inequalities in defining risks are enabling for powerful actors. In fact, the LSE 
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reproduced itself as a powerful actor in the midst of the orchestrated resistance 
that pushed QAA to adopt a more distant approach of institutional audit and 
abandon the subject reviews. For instance, one participant said:  
 
PCT 12: ‘I think the QAA should be focusing their gaze much more 
intensely on the new entrance to the sector, the new providers that the 
government has allowed and it should give institutions with a sort of mature and 
sophisticated internal arrangements a bit of break really’. And as it was discussed 
previously, this has been suggested as part of the new role of QAA in a risk-
based management of quality under the auspices of OfS.  
 
The above comments indicate that the LSE has internalised the external 
quality panopticon in every aspect of its organisation, although not enough to 
receive a gold award in the 2017 TEF rankings. The next finding demonstrates 
the width and breadth of this internalisation. 
 
 
5.3.2.3. Students at the heart of the system and the staff too 
 
In conformity with external discourses that emphasise the role of students- 
as delineated in both literature review and RQ1- the LSE has developed a 
sophisticated quality regime to ensure that ‘At the end of the day… it can 
guarantee students have an enriching sort of an experience but that it is fulfilling 
and of a good quality for our faculty too’. (PCT 12)  
 
In fact, what sharply divides the LSE from ScPo is that the former follows 
the general English tradition and provides pastoral support to both its students 
and staff. One participant referred to this fact and said:  
 
PCT 4: ‘there is a lack of pastoral care in the French system that is 
striking...I mean if you sit in front of the class and behave as a good student, the 
teacher pays attention to you and praises you, if you are at the back and you had 
difficulties, the teacher wouldn’t even bother talking to you...and this is one thing 
students appreciate very much when they study at the LSE because each student 
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has an academic advisor...so there is always at least this one person that you 
can go to if you have difficulties…’ 
 
 This therapy culture is provided because ‘some of the LSE programmes 
are very expensive and students invest a lot of money’ (PCT 12). Besides, 
‘students are the main source of funding at the LSE (PCT 12). And once the role 
of students is reconstructed as consumers, they are entitled to quality pedagogy. 
As Morley (2003: 29) states: ‘quality teaching is no longer perceived as a gift, but 
as a right’. And of’ course when there is a right, there is a responsibility hence the 
engagement of students in evaluations, quality enhancement, and committees.  
 
To provide students with a quality education and avoid the risk of under-
funding, the LSE pays specific attention to pastoral and academic needs of its 
staff: ‘each member of the staff who is not a professor has got a mentor. So, if an 
academic’s performance has not been up to the expectations, there will be no 
sanctions but remedies and the role of the mentor is to help an academic that is 
facing problems in delivering quality teaching’ (PCT 4).  
 
In the Foucauldian panopticon, pastoral care is a modern matrix of 
individualisation and therefore an exercise of distributed power. It uses the 
Christian technique of pastoral power adopting two modern dimensions: one is 
globalising and quantitative and provides information on how academics compare 
in rankings; and the other is analytical, salvation-oriented, individualising and 
continuous.  
 
What is also important in the above comment is that staff are not kept in 
the dark. From their very arrival at the Institute, they are not only informed but 
also trained on the teaching and learning standards of the School. From a 
Foucauldian perspective, the visibility of norms is a trap; they are only visible 
because they constitute an invisible web of power that help internalisation of the 
employers’ norms. It ensures performativity to reassure both the fee-paying 
students and the external auditors, but perhaps not to ensure the actual quality 
of teaching and learning. 
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The dissemination of information and training are ensured by an office 
called Teaching and learning Centre (TLC) that is non-existent at ScPo. One 
participant explained: 
 
PCT 12: ‘there is a yin and yang dimension to it all...one office manages 
all the data gathered from annual programme reviews, student evaluations, the 
committee meetings, and the external audits and the other says...oh wow, there 
is a consistent information on the teaching of this academic and so they reach 
out and they plan for remedial training arrangements.’ 
 
Drawing on such a detailed system of quality enhancement, the internal 
LSE rewards for teaching excellence replicate the Teaching Excellence 
Framework that has been proposed by HEFCE, as one participant explained:  
 
PCT 4.: ‘if they have a consistently high teaching scores, they would 
automatically get a pay increase just for that, and if they have performed well in 
other respects...for example...citizenship or public engagement or research... 
they get either a lump sum of money or a raise in their annual salary. So, there 
are different ways available to reward performance.’  
 
In addition, the TLC helps initiate the younger generation of staff who join 
the School into their teaching role. For instance:  
 
PCT 12: ‘... the TLC offers a ‘certificate in higher education’ where new 
faculty members have to take a yearlong course module on how to be a good 
teacher, how to design your lectures, how to design classes and seminars, how 
to speak …. how to communicate, how to mark an exam, really important stuff.’ 
 
In his classic work on organisations Goffman (1961) examined the ways 
institutions changed the behaviour of their inmates to reproduce themselves. The 
above-mentioned certificate is one way that the LSE can make sure that existing 
practices are reproduced; the centralisation of quality management and 
committee meetings are the others. An equivalent to this certificate does not exist 
in the French HE and neither does it at ScPo. And if there had been efforts to 
ameliorate the contractual academics’ experiences at ScPo it has only focused 
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on ‘providing them with a training on how to use computers and the School’s 
moodle pages and ‘creating a shared computer room’ (Sciences Po Strategy, 
2013:5). 
 
 To conclude and answer RQ2. on quality mechanisms at the LSE and 
ScPo: In short, both institutions seem to operate in conformity with the national 
approaches to quality. Consequently, they employ two contradictory philosophies 
of risk.  
 
Despite some efforts, generally speaking, ScPo adopts a laissez-faire 
philosophy assuming that everything would fall in place as individual students and 
staff members would eventually find their ways and that everything is safe as long 
as they have not proved to be dangerous. As such the School draws on the 
benefits of disorder rather than targeted planning. It seems that the school has 
privileged reactivity and has invested in improving its external ranking rather than 
pursuing a shift in its internal ways of understanding and enhancing quality. 
Nonetheless, if panopticon is understood as existence of norms and regulations 
then there are both external mechanisms- such as the accreditation bodies, the 
reports of the Audit Court (Cour des comptes), and Hcéres evaluation reports- 
and internal mechanisms such as the students’ evaluation that regulate ScPo’s 
educational activities. 
 
 The LSE has created a detailed quality panopticon mirroring the external 
English HE environment. The panopticon at the LSE is polyvalent, neutral, 
distributed, and continuous. The underlying worldview of the School is 
reminiscent of Foucault’s knowledge- power concept that holds ‘in knowing they 
control and in controlling they know’. The risk philosophy at the LSE is that of 
precaution and has therefore translated into an institutional Kaizen culture with 
its systems of continuous improvement, performance rewards, and customer 
satisfaction. The School aims are to satisfy students and other stakeholders and 
to safeguard academics and the institution against consequences of being 
labelled at the lower end of the quality continuum.  
 
However, the fact that ScPo and the LSE hold almost distant places in 
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rankings may be due to some other additional conditions. According to Mény 
(2009) one primary condition is the autonomy and resources of universities and 
the other is the willingness to mobilise all parties and enter the competition by 
giving up on some of those sacred cows that no government can touch, e.g. the 
selective CPGE. With regards to the first condition: both Schools are 
autonomous; the LSE has almost double the resources of ScPo, they both 
receive public funding (the LSE: up to 15% and ScPo: 50%). It may, therefore, be 
a matter of willingness and authority in bifurcating from established regulations 
that affects the performance of ScPo, although the School has made a real effort 
in climbing the rankings. One participant commented on this and said: ‘in Britain 
we are very pragmatic, when a regulation does not work we suspend it, we are 
flexible ...whenever you talk to the French you have the ‘règlement’ thrown at 
you’... however the dual degree between the LSE and ScPo works very well 
because ‘it combines the British creativity, intellectual autonomy, originality and 
fun with French rigour and structure and building a level of connaissance ... an 
ideal education system’ (PCT4). 
 
It would be interesting to see the impact of these two internal quality 
cultures and philosophies on the daily practices of academics. The next RQ 
delineates these. 
 
5.4. RQ3. How do academics perceive and enact quality in their 
professional practice in England and France? 
 
This section presents and discusses the findings from the interviews with 
twelve academics at ScPo and the LSE. It attempts to understand the impact of 
two different institutional quality cultures on both the senior and junior academics. 
Academics’ perceptions of quality is still a relatively underdeveloped subject 
according to several studies (Joao Rosa, 2014; Lomas, 2007). The topic that is 
even less scrutinised is the impact of unclear institutional quality strategies or 
even lack of internal quality cultures on academics probably because such a 
condition simply seems unimaginable following the Bologna Process.  Therefore, 
by answering this question, this study fills an existing gap and provides a first-
hand insight into the reality of academics’ daily lives at ScPo and the LSE. For 
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the sake of clarity, I have divided the findings in each university to two parts: 
senior permanent academics’ and junior contractual academics’ perceptions. 
 
5.4.1. Sciences Po Paris: senior academics’ perception of quality 
 
 All three senior enseignant-chercheur (teacher-researchers) interviewed 
in this study, talked- sometimes extensively- about their resentments and 
anxieties when they were first ‘thrown into a university class’ and the fact that 
neither at university nor at ScPo- in fact ‘at any moment of their long teaching 
career’ had they been trained on pedagogy, class management, or psychology 
of teaching and learning. Their training and employment exams have never 
prepared them as ‘teachers’ but as ‘specialists in a discipline’. One participant 
continued by saying: 
  
PCT 1: ‘I thought I was...I mean... I really wanted to do my best as a 
teacher but I was frustrated and so were those poor students and at the same I 
didn’t feel safe talking about my frustrations with anyone at the university…there 
was no office or a person for this purpose.’ 
 
Two interpretations can be drawn: ScPo is part of a wider pattern where 
higher education teaching is left to the ‘professionality (behaviour of individual 
actor)’ (Morris, 2008:120) of academics. A lack of support at national and 
institutional levels de-professionalises teaching because ‘subject knowledge 
alone cannot professionalise teaching; knowledge of pedagogy professionalises 
the teaching of subject knowledge’ (Darling-Hammond et al (2002:286). The 
second interpretation is in fact based on comments of all three academics who 
mentioned that due to lack of pastoral support and academic training they had to 
adopt coping strategies. As they gradually gained knowledge in teaching, they 
‘informally learnt from exchanges with their peers’ (PCT 5) or ‘consulted their 
parents who happened to be school teachers’ (PCT 1) or ‘kept it all to themselves 
and gradually learnt through trial and error’ (PCT 2). In fact, these comments are 
in line with the findings in RQ2 that revealed that ScPo relies on the ‘benefits of 
disorder’ and the informal exchanges among peers rather than developing an 
inclusive policy to enhance its quality of teaching and learning. 
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 Furthermore, all three academics referred to a deterioration of the 
Directorate of Studies and Education from 2000 onwards in the midst of multiple 
reforms of the school’s policy that has prioritised research over teaching; 
internationalisation; and the creation of departments. Two academics talked 
positively about the fact that the School has hired specialists who help 
researchers in engineering their research projects for EU grants, however, they 
all talked about the ‘recent mess’ at the School despite the fact that everyone at 
school is working even more than before. For instance, one participant said: 
 
PCT 5: ‘... academics’ point of contact with the Directorate is a person 
called ‘chargé de mission’, these people used to stay at the school for the whole 
duration of their career, sometimes 40 years or so, there was stability, permanent 
communication, and a sense of teamwork...  with the arrival of Richard Descoings 
who was concerned about the turnover of jobs, the chargé de mission became 
the weakest link between the Directorate and academics...in the past eight years, 
I have personally seen five chargé de mission…they leave because they cannot 
cope with all the workload...the result is I haven’t had a chargé de mission for the 
past 18 months...it’s a complete mess…’ 
 
The above comments are indicative of the fact that the School has created 
a Foucauldian power relation with academics where ceremonies and rituals of 
the past are dismantled and are replaced with a machinery that assures 
dissymmetry and disequilibrium. By doing so, the School has sought two direct 
benefits for the central administration. The fact that the chargé de mission 
frequently changes reduces the power of the departments and their academics 
to reject or to oppose the central administration’s practice because the 
communication remains disrupted. In fact, while the asymmetry in knowledge 
means more power for the central administration the system remains inefficient 
and redundant hence causing frustration and the resignation of the chargé de 
mission. 
 
Another participant added: ‘In 2009 the School created the disciplinary 
departments which further complicated things… now we had two parallel 
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systems: the department and the central administration...they detested each 
other… the department refused yielding to the central administration while they 
also refused doing the administrative things themselves...the direct impact on me 
as an academic is that still today when I have a problem with my classes or 
students, I don’t know who I should talk to, the department or the absent or the 
overwhelmed chargé de mission…’(PCT 2).  
 
 This situation can be looked at from two different angles. From the 
departments’ side, it is reminiscent of a situation in economic theory called the 
tragedy of commons. This happens when in a shared-resource system, ‘the 
identity and needs of individuals take precedence over those of the collective’ 
(Morgan, 2006:286) therefore generating pathological patterns in the whole 
system. From the central administration’s side, it seems to be a dialectical 
situation where a new initiative inevitably generates its negation in the form of a 
struggle of the opposites. This situation of resistance between the two opposites 
reaches an equilibrium point where the whole system experiences stalemate as 
it can be observed in the comment above. If I revert to the chaotic Lorenz 
attractors, I can say that taking the whole system from this point to another 
equilibrium point requires a smart management which shall use internal system-
wide attractors such as ‘teaching excellence awards’ to reduce the resisting 
forces and empower agents of change from within each department. 
 
At the moment when this study was conducted there was no such scheme 
at ScPo. However, all three academics referred to two institutional practices that 
are in place. The first one was their induction programme during which they 
received information on what the School expectations are- mostly in 
administrative terms.  The second one was the students’ evaluation that they 
interpreted as ‘the iron fist of the central administration in a velvet glove’ (PCT 5). 
They, all confirmed their teaching practice was guided by both above-mentioned 
administrative practices- of course to a larger extent by the students’ evaluations. 
But they also expressed their doubts as to the equal impacts of such practices on 
senior and junior academics. One participant said: 
 
PCT 1: ‘They give you this paper of their expectations but it remains 
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superficial because once, as a public servant, you are nominated to work at ScPo, 
you will be there for the rest of your academic life, the institution cannot get rid of 
you even if students’ evaluation of your course is persistently negative’ 
 
Another participant said: ‘well I want to be the ‘good student’ and I reply to 
students’ emails, send them feedbacks...I have even changed my style because 
I saw in students’ comments that I didn’t give them enough time to talk and 
debate...but while I am making a real effort without any external recognition, my 
colleagues are building their research profiles without really being concerned by 
the students’ evaluation’ (PCT 2). 
 
One interpretation of the two above comments is that clear external and 
internal quality assessment criteria, as constraining as they may be, potentially 
judge all inmates on equal terms. Paradoxically, the quality panopticon is 
egalitarian as it ‘offers greater transparency so that unethical and corrupt 
behaviour can be detected more easily’ (Mongkol, 2011:37). The norm-setting 
aspect of quality create a sense of continuity, development, and shared values 
that although arbitrary allude to continuity survival, and equal opportunity. At its 
current stage, ScPo lacks a commonly shared quality culture and everyone 
seems to be trying to outwit or outmanoeuvre everyone else in a Machiavellian 
power quest. It indicates that ScPo is part of a wider society that is cursed by 
inegalitarian competitions and deep individualisation that characterise extreme 
capitalism; these are of’ course underneath a thick coat of republican sugar, i.e., 
‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’. 
 
 In this regard, one of the participants referred to several factors that inhibit 
attempts towards a shared quality culture in teaching at ScPo. 
 
PCT 5: ‘you should know that in France no inspector or auditor can enter 
a university class on the basis of autonomy and independence of universities. In 
addition, the social image of a university teacher is that of a know-all magistrate 
…. and so, when you hire teachers there is in fact no record of their teaching...and 
it is not part of employment processes in France, whether you are hiring local or 
international colleagues, to ask for such information...as a result what the school 
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can do is to count on the personal goodwill of academics and to manage the crisis 
when it strikes.’ 
  
This means that ScPo, similar to the rest of the French HE, might be 
involved in a perpetual crisis management because ‘the ideal of higher education 
teachers as autonomous professionals, in love with their disciplines and 
dedicated to serving their students, within collegially governed institutions, is 
largely a myth, although an eloquent and inspiring one’ (Scott, 2014)57. It may 
also mean that in addition to the political elites’ willingness to maintain the 
prestige of their ScPo degrees, the School finds itself against ‘a nation that does 
not like the reform’ according to the comments of the newly elected President of 
the republic, Mr. Macron during his visit to Poland on 25th August 2017. And this 
mentality seems not to have changed so much from the time General De Gaulle 
said: ‘How can one govern a country with more than 200 cheeses ... I can’t help 
the French from being French’. 
 
But these do not explain the lack of a clear educational quality frame at 
ScPo, particularly as the School seems to be aggressively making profit of its 
presence in the international market. For instance, ‘the courses are provided à la 
carte without any continuity and general learning outcomes for a Masters’ degree 
just because the School thinks it has to remain attractive and so jumps on a 
professional’s idea of a course on...I don’t know...the French West Indies, for 
example, without thinking if this is even relevant to one 18-years’ old academic 
and professional trajectory... I mean, I, a permanent professor at ScPo Paris and 
I have no idea of the ‘maquette pédagogique’ -the themes covered as part of a 
Masters’ programme.’ (PCT 5).  It also doesn’t justify the fact that ‘the students 
are not given enough time to digest what they learn in the class and are provided 
with not enough pastoral and tutorial assistance while they are constantly told 
that they are excellent and so are deprived from a chance to fail’ (PCT 1).  Neither 
does it justify the fact that ‘students’ evaluations are taken as the main quality 
assurance process… and you don’t know who has access to the academics’ 
ranking that is based on students’ evaluations’ (PCT 2). 
 
                                                
57 Foreword to ‘Professional life in modern British higher education’, ed. by Bryan Cunningham (2014). 
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These undermine the delivery of real pedagogy which is ‘about passing on 
the knowledge of a discipline to a student and help them become independent 
and confident in that field, this means that there must be a real focus on teaching 
and learning processes and objectives and a coherence across and within offers 
which is not the case at the moment at ScPo Paris...it’s a real pity’ (PCT 1). 
 
5.4.2. Sciences Po Paris: junior contractual academics’ perceptions of 
quality 
  
Perhaps it is for the sake of subverting the power of the State and escaping 
the complications of dealing with nominated permanent academics that ScPo has 
opted for hiring more than 90% of its teaching staff on short-term contractual 
basis. This way, ‘if they do not adhere to the in-house frames, then you simply 
say ciao’ (PCT 7). 
 
 Of’ course, none of the three contractual academics who participated in 
this study were told to go away. On the contrary, all said that they are passionate 
about teaching and their experience has been very fulfilling. Additionally, 
students’ evaluations of their courses have been very positive. All three had 
taught in other institutions including the LSE and kept comparing them with their 
experiences at ScPo. 
 
One thing that they all referred to, without me even asking, was their own 
employment process which they thought undermines the quality of teaching at 
ScPo. They all said that ‘everything happened over phone conversations or 
emails with professors or the ‘responsable pédagogique’ and that the institution 
was not involved in any of these exchanges. One of them added: 
 
PCT 18: ‘at the LSE, you have to send your CV, a motivation letter, your 
intentions for teaching…. then you have an interview at the School, and you do 
not set your feet in a class until 200 people have reviewed and approved your 
application as a graduate teaching assistant (GTA) while at ScPo Paris I got the 
job through emails with a professor who knew me and the administration was 
only involved when they paid for my tickets’. 
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  Therefore, unlike the LSE, ScPo cannot or it may be fair to say is not willing 
to secure equality of opportunity through ‘careful monitoring and regulation of 
recruitment and promotion procedures’ (Swift, 2006:100) because this could 
undermine the power of its network of graduates, alumni, and the political elite 
who want to teach at the School. Here, visibility will be a trap for the central 
watchtower rather than the inmates of the panopticon. 
 
Following their initial comments, all three interviewees expressed their 
surprise over the authority and freedom of the teaching assistants (TAs) at ScPo 
and the fact that ‘no guideline was provided by the school regarding the teaching, 
assessment, and the content...no one actually checked either’ (PCT 18), and 
neither did the ‘school provide any training on time and class management or 
syllabus design...nothing’ (PCT 14). As a result, all three ‘felt anxious and lonely’ 
and ‘taught in ways that in the hindsight they think were not relevant to the level 
of the students or their expectations’ (PCT 13). One participant added: 
 
PCT 14: ‘... their induction programme was utterly irrelevant to my teaching 
practice...because it was mostly about using computers and logging in and out of 
your account... on top of that…later on... there was no structural coordination 
mechanism among the TAs who worked with the same professor which was 
confusing for us and the students as well...besides there was no formal peer 
review or gathering where you could get to know other TAs from other courses in 
the school...no communication really….and if anything happened it was only 
informal...’  
 
From the above comments, it is evident that ScPo has failed in creating a 
community of practice among contractual academics.  A lack of common 
guidelines or training for novice teachers not only bears negative affective 
impacts on both students and teachers but it also deprives the academics from 
‘a set of restricted code... where immediacy of the relationship is stressed’ 
(Bernstein, 2003:59). In fact, ‘colleagues forced to associate with one another to 
effect general or liberal education are more likely to develop a sense of common 
profession than those who operate in airtight compartments’ (Clark, 1983:93) as 
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is the case with ScPo contractual academics.  
 
However, it seems to me that institutional activities that are judged to be 
chaotic or due to a lack of insight among the managers, are in fact very well 
planned under the surface. The situation at ScPo manifests itself as another 
example of the French national laissez-faire approach and their national 
educational strategy of ‘debrouillez-vous’: figure it out yourself. However, 
underneath this approach there is a real capitalist benefit for the School. The 
contractual academics form a secondary labour market who are less skilled and 
lower paid compared to permanent academics and are easily replaceable by the 
very nature of their contracts and the informal methods of employment. ScPo 
draws at least two direct economic benefits from this labour market. Firstly, they 
call for little to nothing of capital investment in the form of training and education 
as they are hired and fired along the vagaries of the School’s business cycle. 
Secondly, they provide a buffer ‘that allows the organisation to expand output in 
good times and to contract in bad, leaving the organisation’s operating core and 
elite primary labour force relatively unaffected’ (Morgan, 2006:302).  
 
But this approach may potentially have degrading impacts on these 
academics, the students, and the quality of the educational offer. In the absence 
of teaching and pastoral support systems, for instance, all three interviewees 
looked for ways to cope with the situation: one ‘talked to their mother who was a 
teacher in their country’ (PCT 13); the other ‘talked to their peers in the other 
university where they held monthly meetings (PCT 18); and the last one ‘asked 
students’ opinion on the ways they best learnt or how they preferred to be 
assessed’ (PCT 14). From an organisational point of view, the anxiety and stress 
of these junior academics exert a negative influence on coalition building and 
subverts coherence and harmony across the School and its offerings. 
 
Lack of a coherent and overarching quality framework bears several other 
impacts. For instance, ‘the quality of the courses, professors, and TAs at ScPo 
Paris is completely random...besides people who teach at ScPo are mostly 
professionals who teach by sharing their experiences in anecdotes, at the LSE 
they are mostly academics...it makes a huge difference in terms of quality of 
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teaching…’ (PCT 18). And besides ‘when you are not given clear standardised 
instructions as a young teacher… eventually you end up wondering how you can 
be fair to students in your assessment...I mean the French students love their 
exposé (PowerPoint presentation), they have been brainwashed into it...it is the 
only way they can show off their individual superiority...but if you are a student 
from Singapore or the US...you don’t necessarily see this as the ONLY way to 
learn a topic...so changing pedagogical approaches inside a university like ScPo 
Paris is not only a challenge on the managerial side but it also a 
difficult...aaa...task to change students’ minds ...’ (PCT 14). The good news is ‘no 
guideline means freedom to do what you want to do...so I talked to my mom who 
is a very good teacher back home...and I said what the heck...I am not going to 
oblige all students to do the exposé thing...I changed it to a collective debate and 
it was a fantastic experience’.  
 
These comments reveal that the world of these academics in ScPo is far 
from the daily lives of the British academics whose daily practice is saturated with 
a Foucauldian panopticon surveillance. In the absence of clear academic 
standards, the academics at ScPo feel anxiety and stress, adopt coping 
strategies, and move like swarms between these strategies and their passion for 
teaching. In the absence of the gaze, they form their identities sometimes as 
detached disinterested individuals, and sometimes as revolutionary ‘progressiste’ 
teachers who oppose the dominant philosophies of the School and the students. 
As part of their revolt, perhaps, they were more eager to participate in my study 
compared to their counterparts at the LSE for whom ‘quality’ has attained 
banality. The last comment above is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s assertion that 
‘humans have a will to power’ and personally reminded me of Schmeller (1847) 
Carmina Burana: 
‘Burning inside with violent anger, 
Bitterly I speak to my heart, 
Created from matter, of the ashes of the elements, I am like a leaf played 
by the wind  
If it is the way of wise man, 
to build foundations on stone, 
I am a fool, like a flowing stream.’ 
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The next part delineates academics’ perceptions at the LSE. 
 
5.4.3. The LSE: senior academics’ perceptions of quality 
 
The overall message detected from interviews with senior academics at 
the LSE is that they support the internal quality system of the School because ‘it 
is only very rational for the School to provide a high quality offer for its fee-paying 
students’ (PCT 16) ‘by investing in the human capital at the school and by 
improving academics’ skills and competencies through different modes of 
training, committee meetings, annual awards, or even by organising the informal 
outings we usually have with other academics and students’ (PCT 19). And so 
‘as inauthentic as some of the procedures may sound, the mechanisms at the 
LSE do create collective interests towards maintaining quality...you know you 
become one of the ants that is taking food home for everyone else in the nest’ 
(PCT 17). 
 
This indicates several factors. The image of the ‘ant’ connotes to a shared 
code in which each member has a responsibility as part of a collective 
organisation. In turn, it creates a sense of belonging and a functional 
interdependence that was missing in the case of ScPo academics. Additionally, 
since all ants are equal inmates in the panopticon, they see positive aspects in 
the quality standards that are ‘directed at institutions as a whole; the opposite 
happens when those systems are directed at individual academics’ performance 
(Rosa et al. 2012:364). From a Foucauldian perspective, it means ‘what is 
arbitrary has become normalised, what is demanded, the subject demands of 
itself’ (Mann, 2008:118).   
 
Of’ course academics’ positions demonstrated different degrees of 
acceptance and adaptation as previous studies have also shown, e.g., (Newton, 
2000; Westerheijden et al., 2007). For instance, their opinions were divided when 
it came to students’ evaluations. One participant said: 
 
PCT 17: ‘I think it is helpful for the seminars and lectures to receive 
 146 
 
students’ evaluation but what is the impact of these evaluations on the students 
themselves? ... does it help them really? ... you see...I think students’ evaluations 
are useful but to a certain degree...my question is a very existential one...does 
this system of students’ evaluation really enhance quality of their learning or does 
it only message quality of the School and so attracts more fee-paying students…’ 
 
This comment connotes to a concern among academics in several studies 
(Harvey & Newton, 2004; Rosa et al., 2006; Teelken & Lomas, 2009) over the 
fact that QA mechanisms in Europe have not improved students’ learning 
experiences to a great extent. It also refers to the fact, that students’ evaluations 
may be part of the marketing strategy at the LSE rather than a tool for real 
enhancement of academics’ practices and students’ learning. Underlying this 
concern, is perhaps a question of the identity of academics that is reconstructed 
under the increasingly intrusive gaze of the institutions and their students. As 
Deer (2003) explains, in England the interests of students and the HEIs have 
combined to undermine traditional academic values and as a result the whole 
profession has felt the strain. 
 
 Of’ course the two other participants saw more positive than negative 
impacts in students’ evaluation. For instance, one participant said: 
 
PCT 16: ‘…students’ evaluations are interesting often gratifying, 
occasionally a bit more unsettling ... but on the whole that they are useful … and 
you know students are pretty good at evaluating what is good teaching and what 
is not good teaching.’ 
 
All participants referred to the usefulness of the annual programme review 
and committee meetings and considered that the presence of external assessors 
from other universities as well as student representatives were helpful in 
scrutinising the quality of the programmes and helped progress in teaching and 
research at the School. One participant added: 
 
PCT 19: ‘...so as a new member of the teaching staff at the LSE, you may 
have slightly reduced teaching hours, slightly reduced administrative 
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responsibilities so that you can focus on developing your research portfolio, you 
would have major review after the first five years as to see whether or not... your 
ten years was agreed to and then only after that you can start getting more 
teaching responsibilities...so I felt the School really supported me in this regard.’ 
 
 Several reflections can be developed based on the above comments. One 
is that a culture of departmental meetings- in which issues are democratically 
discussed and voted for- has remained intact from the time when Clark 
(1983:112) pointed out this particular characteristic in the English HEIs. This is a 
characteristic that divides the British and the French HE systems as in the latter 
‘a typical bureaucrat is spatially separated from faculty and even on coffee breaks 
interacts with other administrators’ (Clark, 1983:149). Furthermore, quality control 
in the British HE has been based on peer surveillance at Clark’s time and it still 
is today, at least at the LSE. Colleagues share critical comments on one another’s 
teaching and research and hence are involved in a permanent self-formation. 
While ‘challenging the calibre of peers can be seen as a way of reversing the 
gaze and resisting domination’ (Morley, 2003:114), the process remains 
productive for both peers involved.  
 
 Speaking of support systems that are in place for academics, two of the 
participants judged the annual excellence award and the activities of the TLC as 
empowering and positive. One participant said: 
 
PCT 16: ‘I think the school is very clear in what it wants from teaching and 
research at the school and so once when I had a personal problem that I thought 
was having a negative impact on my teaching...well I simply had a chat with the 
department’s director and then we set a date with the people from the Teaching 
and Learning Centre...and so I had a mentor and it helped me a lot at the 
time...you know in mentally being able to deal with my teaching and my personal 
issue…’ 
  
 This is in line with the findings of RQ2 about the LSE providing pastoral 
care and training for its academics and demonstrates the positive impacts these 
may have. The above comment also indicates that capabilities of academics in 
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delivering a course is judged against and governed by conditions that are non-
negotiable and as a result create a panopticon in which all inmates consciously 
adhere to norms and procedures. Furthermore, this reveals that quality 
mechanisms activate and exploit a range of feelings including shame, guilt, 
loyalty, and responsibilisation as Morley (2003:87) asserts. It demonstrates 
capillary power that such systems produce ‘as we become dominated by the 
process itself’ and as ‘the quest for efficiency tend to become our new slave 
drivers’ (Morgan, 2006:296). 
 
In this regard, one of the participants had an interesting opinion to share:  
 
PCT 17: ‘...you see one of my colleagues won that excellence 
award...personally it reminded me of the Mcdonald’s employee of the month 
award...but then I talked to that colleague and realised that they had mixed 
feeling...so there was this anxiety to keep up the good work...but of’ course this 
person was also extremely proud and happy...and so I don’t know if that’s 
because the mood is different or it’s because this new generation of younger 
faculty just accept these mechanisms as part of life...I don’t know really but it 
seems to work well for everyone so I better keep my opinions to myself…’   
 
Based on all above comments, it is evident that an internal QE scheme is 
well established and clearly communicated with academics and despite concerns 
over their true impact on students’ learning, a majority of the senior academics 
who participated in this study stated that they saw positive elements arising from 
the quality processes. 
 
5.4.4. The LSE: junior academics’ perceptions of quality 
 
 The responses of junior academics were more coherent in the sense that 
they all found the schools’ employment approach ‘very clear but very long too’ 
(PCT 20);  they thought ‘the fact that they check your syllabus means you really 
make an effort to do research and update your course...and that applies to 
everyone...so even if you are a professor it’s not like... well OK...I’ll just dust off 
what I’ve been teaching for 30 years and stand up for the lecture and talk at them’ 
(PCT 3) ;and besides ‘you know they are watching you but at same time 
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supporting you...so you just follow the rules’ (PCT 15). 
 
 These comments manifest the productive impacts of the quality 
panopticon that is in place at the LSE. The last comment by PCT 15 is interesting 
as it reveals that ‘academics know how “to play the game” and thereby subvert 
these control mechanisms’ (Teelkan & Lomas, 2009: 262). This same participant 
continued by saying: ‘you sense you are part of a sect and you have to do certain 
rituals without really believing in them... but then I think for our generation that is 
somehow brainwashed into these sort of systems...well I have talked to my 
friends...you know...so I think it’s really reassuring for us…’ 
 
In the same vein, another participant welcomed the coherent quality 
system across all activities at the School and said:  
 
PCT 18: ‘...so at the LSE they want to make sure that everyone teaches 
at the same level and with the same quality not necessarily with the same style, 
you may feel that you are not that free to do what you want but then as a new 
teacher do you really want to do what you want... I was freer at ScPo compared 
to the LSE... but unsure and insecure…. and in the hindsight, I know I would have 
done many things differently although my teaching received a good feedback 
from students.’ 
 
This is further evidence that the normative nature of institutional quality 
codes creates a sense of belonging and confidence, particularly among novice 
teachers. For instance, one participant said: 
 
PCT 3: ‘... for instance there is a course called LSE100...it’s obligatory for 
all students...it’s an introductory course to help them think like social 
scientists...and so everything about this course … the reading list … the syllabus 
… the whole course is prepared by the School and you just go there and you 
have to teach what is already there ... but you still feel free and confident to teach 
with your own style because you have already been trained to teach ...  and then 
you have the feedback on the course...and you have people who check on you…’ 
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Hence, ‘you see that there is a real consistency across different courses 
at LSE’ (PCT 20) and even though ‘sometimes you feel like it is more about 
window-dressing’ (PCT15), one knows ‘everything is formal and the convener 
looks after your back’ (PCT 3) and so ‘things are not messy as they are at ScPo 
... I mean courses got cancelled...people didn’t show up... TAs didn’t even know 
each other...you didn’t know what the exam will be like...no, no, the LSE is a 
complete different world’ (PCT 18). Besides, ‘they are very sophisticated in 
changing courses and updating is done all the time...so that’s another important 
part of quality processes at the LSE’ (PCT 20).  
 
All these comments reveal that the quality code at the LSE bears a positive 
impact on the daily practices of junior academics. By maintaining clarity and 
continuity in communication, the gaze clarifies these young academics’ duties as 
equal inmates in the panopticon. 
 
To conclude and answer RQ3. on the academics’ perception of quality 
at the LSE and ScPo, it is important to note that educational quality at ScPo is 
left to the voluntarism of academics while at the LSE a real machinery is in place 
to accommodate the demands of the students and enhance quality. 
  
As it was observed, despite some disenchantments among senior faculty 
members at the LSE, the general culture of quality at the School is appreciated 
by both senior and junior academics. It provides them with a clear frame of 
reference and guides their activities and therefore they consider that the quality 
standards are, in general, ‘empowering and egalitarian’ (PCT3). At ScPo, a lack 
of a clear quality framework as well as the School’s non-transparent policy in how 
students’ evaluations are used has created a sense of ‘resentment and anxiety’ 
(PCT 1) among both senior and junior academics. The junior academics are not 
empowered by this institutional policy and feel excluded and uncertain in their 
practice.  
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6.1. Reflections 
 
Based on the conceptual framework of this study, it is evident that QA 
initiatives of the EHEA may be reproduced only to the extent they facilitate local 
power relations. Within the national sphere, there is a shared perception of quality 
which is negotiated between the national bureaucratic institution, their funding 
and accountability policies and discourses on the one hand, and the HEIs’ 
autonomy and internal quality management, on the other. As Ulrich (2006:343) 
explains in these local contexts ‘no single player or opponent can ever win on 
their own, they are dependent on alliances’. There might be some hegemonic 
struggle as was the case between the French universities and the State, or in the 
case of the vice chancellors and quality mechanisms in England. However, all 
local actors are linked and operate in a quasi-market environment where they 
negotiate their roles, identities, and the norms that differentiate their position and 
authority. In fact, there is no argument over the existence of norms, the power 
struggles are more about whose interest is better reflected in those norms.  
 
If panopticon simply means that there are norms and regulations that 
govern the HEIs and that these norms are internalised by HEIs as they are under 
surveillance and external forms of scrutiny, then the quality panopticon has surely 
been created in both France and England.  But does that mean the inmates in 
the panopticon are powerless subjects who mechanically serve systems of 
power? Foucault said Yes, the outcomes of this study critiques his answer. The 
points that distinguish Foucault’s panopticon from the panopticon model 
elaborated in the conceptual framework of this study are discussed below.  
 
For Foucault powerlessness was structured into inmates’ existence. His 
panopticon was not empowering for the inmates who internalised the external 
norms. He considered this disciplinary power has infected all major social 
institutions and was producing obedient and productive subjects. What is missing 
in his view of power is the autonomy of the subjects. This is what makes his 
panopticon a one-way model. He does not recognise that inmates in the 
panopticon are autonomous subjects who can influence and change power 
relations, that they can be agents of change, and that power is a negotiable truth. 
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For him, power -and not agency of the inmates- is at the source of all relations 
and this power divides the authority and the role of those in the central 
watchtower and the inmates. His panopticon only empowers the central 
watchtower: the gaze. The panopticon, for him, is an instrument of social control 
with no benefits for the watched.  
  
The outcomes of this study challenges Foucault’s reading of power and 
agency of the subjects. The findings of RQ1 and RQ2 demonstrated that local 
political bureaucracies and HEIs are agents of reform and may resist external 
power by different strategies including, for instance, delaying their adoption. This 
was the case in France and the late establishment of the first quality agency in 
2006 as was discussed. Likewise, the binary divide that is safeguarded in France 
was discarded in England both with the same goal of maintaining the power of 
the State and the elite. In RQ1, academics in both contexts reacted to former 
shapes of external quality assurance, i.e. the grading system in France and the 
subject review in England and forced both national quality agencies to step back 
and change their evaluation strategies. Similarly, in RQ2 it was observed that the 
word ‘quality’ was replaced with ‘evaluation’ only to avoid further resistance from 
French academics and universities. In RQ3, senior academics’ voluntary inaction 
at ScPo has slowed down attempts of the central administration in creating 
departments and at the LSE academics have an alliance with the central 
administration and have their say in quality enhancement through different 
committees.  
 
Therefore, no matter how tight the quality panopticon grabs HEIs and its 
people, they have their mechanisms to negotiate and subvert the power of the 
gaze. In fact, they do so as they occupy and share the central watchtower with 
other actors. Foucault’s panopticon God is dead. The central watchtower is now 
home to multiple Gods including the students, the quality agencies, the national 
regulatory bodies such as HEFCE, for example. In the case of England, the 
students are increasingly occupying the central watchtower, while in France the 
State and the political elite still grab hold of their historical power and their modern 
reproduction means, i.e., the grandes écoles. 
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What is evident in both cases of French and English HE is this: as God 
has left the scene all the inmates live in a world of risk. This is how the evaluative 
State justifies its activities and paves its way towards more power. Of’ course, the 
French State is still in its early stages of an evaluative State and as was discussed 
has been using softer approaches to reduce chances of power struggle with 
academics and universities. In England, God has long been absent and this has 
pushed for elaborated risk-management schemes, aggressive marketing, and 
competition across the system. What is common in both HE systems is that ‘key 
institutions of modernity including the universities are suspects and sources of 
risk’, as Ulrich (2006) explained. Therefore, everyone should communicate, 
coordinate, and compete to have a space in the central watchtower because the 
power now lies with those who can define risk. Anyone who still believes in God 
is hence a risk atheist and does not belong in the watchtower.  
 
The above reflection implies the following: a) Foucault’s panopticon does 
not allow resistance and negotiations. On the contrary, this study’s conceptual 
framework allows the gaze to simultaneously belong to multiple actors who resist 
and object to one another’s decision and power; b) Foucault’s panopticon was 
not empowering, this study’s conceptualisation of a panopticon is; and c) 
Foucault’s panopticon was a one-way power relation between the tower and the 
inmates, in this study power is even more distributed with any inmate having the 
power to watch others. 
 
More importantly, this study showed that the more developed the quality 
panopticon is, the more confident are its inmates. It was clearly observed that in 
the case of ScPo academics, lack of clear academic standards, pastoral care, 
and training on pedagogy had a crippling effect on their practice. Interestingly, 
even the senior academics at ScPo were keen to work based on an egalitarian 
and clear institutional quality framework. The junior academics in both the LSE 
and ScPo were even more in need of a norm-setting quality panopticon to guide 
their early steps towards a high-quality teaching practice.  
 
In the absence of norms and pastoral care, all ScPo academics adopted 
coping strategies and relied on different sources of support and their own 
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performativity to teach. Perhaps the fact that the chargé de mission cracked 
under a heavy load of responsibility and left ScPo is an example of how lack of 
an overarching clear standard leads to disempowerment and inefficiency of the 
whole system while everyone at ScPo is working harder and for longer hours in 
the secluded departments and schools.  
 
This was not the case at the LSE. The quality panopticon was a beast that 
had to be fed by constantly. There were some eligible doubts about the real 
impact of quality norms on students’ learning and on the practice of academics 
as they learnt how to play the game. Nonetheless, the academics and heads of 
departments considered the school’s quality panopticon as empowering and 
egalitarian and with a positive effect on their daily practice. This finding can be 
complementary to a study by Luke (1997) that showed more accountability and 
transparency inherent in QA mechanism have provided new opportunities for 
women and other marginalised groups in higher education in Australia. 
 
Based on the above arguments, this study holds that Foucault’s 
panopticon fails to distinguish acceptable and unacceptable forms of power. And 
so do many studies that have judged external and internal QA mechanisms as 
panoptic power models in which academics’ practice is not transformed as they 
perform according to regulations, e.g., (Newton, 2002; Morley 2003 Laughton, 
2003; Stensaker et al., 2011). The English HE system is more akin to the model 
panopticon but Foucault could not predict that it would result in a better outcome. 
It failed to assume that the more extensive surveillance of HE quality in England 
has not been all bad news. 
 
This study did. It did so by adopting a conceptual framework that showed 
even power itself is an inmate of the panopticon. It is negotiated, altered, 
redefined, and redistributed as patterns of HE systems change. It also did so by 
reflecting the voices of the inmates. I knew some of the comments may be 
considered as another instance of the recent French-bashings and that the 
French side’s reactions could be somehow similar to my native compatriots who 
would, at any similar occasion, immediately take their ancient kings ‘Darius and 
Korous’ out of the grave as a witness to their prestige and supremacy. 
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Nonetheless, I reflected what was the lived experiences of participants in both 
HE systems and institutions with integrity and honesty. There were many 
occasions that their comments were against my personal experiences at ScPo. 
But as Voltaire’s statue looks over my shoulders every time I pass the centre of 
our small town, I knew ‘I could disapprove with what they said, but I was ready to 
defend it to death’.  
 
Generally speaking, though, my personal and professional experience 
also confirm the outcomes of this study. I have been privileged to work with 
teachers in developing countries and have witnessed how by keeping the best of 
their students’ interest at heart they tactfully resist and undo the official curriculum 
or the social norms- I remember my own primary teachers did so. But, I have also 
learnt that while we reject one panopticon, we create others only to prove that 
‘civilisation is a hopeless race to discover remedies for the evils it produces’ as 
Rousseau had said. In his Persian Letters, Montesquieu says: ‘This king is a 
magician; He exercises his empire over the very spirit of his subjects, he makes 
them think as he wishes’. Based on the findings of this study and the fact that the 
French society is defining layers of new regulations only to abide with its 
aristocratic elitist past, I assume that this king (the State) has more panopticon 
power over its subjects in the ‘Aristocratic Republic of France’ compared to the 
‘Republican Monarchy of England’.  
 
I have three more reflections to share.  
 
The first one is to clarify whether and how the panopticon metaphor can 
still be relevant and useful given its conceptualisation in the study. My short 
answer is yes based on the following arguments. Firstly, the components of the 
original Foucauldian panopticon, i.e., the watchtower, the inmates, the existence 
of layered and distributed power and norms are all still evident in the conceptual 
framework of this study which reflected the current governance of higher 
education and its quality in the two cases. Secondly, that- as I have argued- the 
watchtower may be occupied by more than one interest group supports the very 
existence of the watchtower and is in line with the Foucauldian notion of 
distributed power where the quality machinery assures difference, dissymmetry, 
and disequilibrium and it doesn’t matter who is running the machine as long as 
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its norms are internalised by all interest groups involved. As Sheridan (1977:197) 
explained: ‘the more numerous those anonymous and temporary observers are, 
the greater the risk for the inmate of being surprised and the greater his anxious 
awareness of being observed’. 
 
The panopticon model developed in this study reiterates the tenets of 
Foucauldian panopticon and modifies it based on the current state of affairs in 
QA mechanisms. It operates based on the freedom of its inmates (HEIs and their 
academics), transparent negotiations and communications, common-sense 
values (of quality and accountability and customer service) thus facilitating the 
internalisation of such norms into the collective conscious of all interest groups. 
It is, therefore, a reflection of how QA systems function through the power of a 
panopticon in today’s multi-actor higher education systems. A prisoner with an 
electronic ankle bracelet is still a prisoner whose actions are regulated although 
not located in the prison. In a similar vein, the fact that quality norms exist and 
are negotiated among different powerful interest groups indicates the relevance 
and the usefulness of the panopticon as a metaphor.  
 
The second reflection is an update to Clark’s triangle of coordination. I 
have already proposed modifications to the interest groups at each angle of the 
triangle in the conceptual framework. Here I am reverting to Clark’s original 1983 
model to propose an update.  As shown in Figure 9 below, he placed the French 
and the British HE in certain positions. 
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Figure 9. Clark’s triangle of coordination 
 
Based on the findings and the conceptual framework of the study, I have 
been able to locate and tweak the place of the French and the English HE as 
shown in Figure 10 below. As observed, the French HE has moved towards the 
market and the English HE (as part of the British HE) has moved a bit closer to a 
coordination point between the State and the market. In both cases academic 
oligarchy is reduced while the role of students and quality agencies- as part of 
the market- has increased. 
 
 
Figure 10. Modifications to Clark’s triangle 
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As my last reflection, I’d like to wear another one of my hats. As a private 
pilot, I am trained on risk management and I practise it at every stage of a flight. 
But apart from the information on the weather of the day and some basic safety 
rules, pilots do not feel obliged to share a minute-by-minute report of the risks to 
the passengers. That is, unless there is a major risk and even then, the golden 
rule is ‘to pilot, to pilot, to pilot’ and then to communicate with the tower and later 
with the passengers, if necessary. I think, the role of the pilot and the passengers 
could be adopted to the relationship between the academics, the HEIs, and their 
students. Of’ course students should have their say, but their real goal of being 
at a university, i.e., learning, shall not be overtaken by a consumerist surveillance 
frenzy.  
 
6.2. Further Research 
 
While I lived with my thesis, I developed several ideas for further research 
based on this study. It would be interesting to divide academics based on their 
gender instead of the type of their contracts, for instance. It would be also of 
interest to see the impact of the increasing number of international students at 
ScPo and the ways their power dynamics could eventually change internal quality 
approaches. A historical review of elements of change in French and English HE, 
in addition to quality, is another idea I had. At the LSE, my personal question was 
where to next? Has the lecture had its day? are there different other ways for 
teaching and assessing? Therefore, a research on innovation capacities at the 
LSE could be an interesting idea. I also thought that a comparative research on 
students’ experiences in both places is a worthwhile endeavour and 
complementary to the findings of this research. This study could also be 
conducted using other approaches and methods. For instance, quality could be 
delineated from a Weberian perspective to understand to what extent it 
represents values, traditions, and rational social actions.  And finally, if ScPo 
happened to adopt a QA mechanism similar to the LSE, how would it affect its 
position at the local and the global market. 
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Appendix 4.    The Interview Schedule 
 
 
  
No. 
National 
Case 
Institution Interviewees 
date 
(2015) 
durati
on 
language/ method 
1 France Hcéres manager 17 March 1:05 French/ face to face 
2 France ScPo QA manager 26 March 56:00 French/ face to face 
3 England QAA manager 13 April 1:01 English/ SKYPE 
4 France/  ScPo  Dept manager 16 April 1:03 French/face to face 
5 England/  LSE  QA manager 16 April 1:02 English/ SKYPE 
6 France/  ScPo  senior 
academic 
28 April 00:55  English/ face to 
face 
7 France/  ScPo junior 
academic  
29 April 1:01 English/ face to 
face 
8 France/  ScPo  junior 
academic 
29 April 00:53 English/ face to 
face 
9 France/  Scpo  senior 
academic 
5 May 1:02 English/face to face  
10 England  LSE  junior 
academic 
14 May 1:04 English/ SKYPE 
11 England  LSE  junior 
academic 
15 May 00:56 English/ SKYPE 
12 England  LSE  Dept manager 18 May 00:58 English/ SKYPE 
13 France ScPO  junior 
academic 
18 May 00:59 English/ face to 
face 
14 England  QAA manager 19 May 1:02 English/ SKYPE 
15 France  ScPo  senior 
academic 
20 May 1:00 French/ face to face  
16 England LSE  senior 
academic 
21 May 00:52 English/ SKYPE 
17 England LSE senior 
academic 
22 May 00:54 English/ SKYPE 
18 England LSE  senior 
academic 
24 May 1:01 French/ face to face  
19 England LSE junior 
academic 
25 May 1:03 English/SKYPE 
20 France Hcéres manager 26 May 1:02 French/ face to face  
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Appendix 5.  A sample extract from an interview: 
     The case of England 
 
Interviewee: one other thing, before I forget it, which I wanted to mention to you which I 
don’t think that it fits with your quality appraisal...not exactly, but in terms of actual….how 
we look for quality in students. Well, I think it does actually fit your theme. When we 
select our candidates, when we make our choice of candidates for the programme we 
either meet in person….aaa... we usually have a marathon teleconference call where we 
have looked at all the...each application form…. we have looked at the application and 
their references, their grades, and their personal statements and everything and then we 
go through it at great length for each candidate and then we decide. But what is very 
interesting to see is this different sort of criteria that the French colleagues have that 
they’re doing what I’d call more of a... well they are looking for technical skills going 
through a sort of box-ticking like: has a student done an internship? has the student got 
certain technical and computer skills? what are the the students’ math scores like? would 
you believe!? 
Interviewer:  Interesting point...yes, yes I believe you! 
Interviewee: I leave my temper and I say don’t tell me about math scores, nobody’s 
interested in…. in Britain nobody is remotely interested in your math scores …. 
employers aren’t interested , universities aren’t interested, nobody wants to study math 
and I couldn’t care less what their math scores….because we are not anyway admitting 
them into an advanced quantitative masters’ programme...one is that the courses are 
very humanities based actually and the other is that they are not hard science...they are 
soft social sciences...you know...so I’m saying don’t tell me about math scores and I’m 
very British in that way and I am much more...I go straight for the personal statement , 
the ‘lettre de motivation’ that my French counterparts are less interested in. I want a very 
personal, very sort of textured, something with originality, creativity in it and even some 
extricity to it…. something that make somebody just interesting and make me want to 
meet this person. I’m not looking for an automaton who can tick every box and who’s got 
every computer skills and has got good math scores...i’m just not interested in that kind 
of person...who would just want to get a job in a waterhouse or whatever...I just want a 
person who is keen to learn and enlarge their mind,  someone who has some kind of 
intellectual enthusiasm that they may pursue it in their own time  and for example if they 
are interested in history, do they go to listen to great historians give a public lecture… 
I’m just not interested in these kinds of technical, career advancing statements.  
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Appendix 6. A sample extract from an interview:  
The case of France 
 
Interviewer: et donc, vous dites qu’il y a une sorte de complexité...que l’assurance qualité est un 
sujet sensible?  
 
Interviewee: Oui, tout à fait. Même dans la dernière loi de juillet 2013, vous l'avez lue, je 
commence aussi par la connaitre, on a quand même du mal à trouver des références directes à 
l'assurance qualité, il n'y en a pas beaucoup ou bien il faut vraiment lire entre les lignes. Cela vaut 
tout dire. Comment dire, je donne mon propre avis, mais je ne crois pas me tromper, il n'y pas de 
directives nationales concernant l'assurance qualité, concernant les processus d'évaluation 
d'assurance qualité, de mise en place de services de l'assurance qualité que ce soit en interne ou 
en externe. Il n'y en a pas non plus pour une autre raison. 
 
L'autre raison est que les universités sont autonomes depuis la loi 2007, la loi de liberté et de 
responsabilité des universités, le ministère a dit aux universités vous voulez être autonomes, Ok, 
vous aurez plus d'autonomie, d'abord vous nous demanderez moins de choses, et puis vous pouvez 
faire ce que vous voulez, et si vous voulez être autonomes vous allez vous trouver dans un système 
compétitif et de concurrence. Il faut dire les choses, derrière cette loi, il y'a l'idée que les 
universités veulent prouver qu'elles sont grandes et qu'elles peuvent faire des choses, bon allez-y. 
Mais s'il y en a une qui a plus d'étudiants que l'autre il faut bien être visible de Shanghai, visible 
dans les rankings, le fameux choc de Shanghai. Ce qui est une aberration et une absurdité totale. 
Personne dans les universités françaises ne sait ce que c'est le classement Shanghai. Un 
universitaire sur dix seulement, peut être sait ce que sont les critères de classement de Shanghai, 
les autres ne le savent pas. Tout le monde parle de classement de Shanghai (répété 3 fois) mais 
personne ne sait ce qu'il y'a véritablement dedans. Passons. 
 
Alors, voilà, ce que je peux vous dire, le contexte français…. en France il n'y a pas de directive 
au niveau national. Il y'a des volontés individuelles de la part des universités de mettre l'accent 
ou moins sur l'assurance qualité, les process assurance qualité, etc et du coup, la culture de la 
qualité, elle va avec, c'est-à-dire que il y'a des universités où la qualité est développée et il y a des 
universités où elle est nettement moins développée. On a deux visions qui viennent d'en haut et 
d'en bas et qui souvent d'ailleurs sont des visions qui s'affrontent, qui se télescopent et qui se font 
mal. En effet il y'a des tensions, pour en avoir il y en a, il y a bien des tensions depuis dix ans, 
elles sont plus ou moins exacerbées en fonction des moments politiques que la France traverse 
 
Les universités qui ont un service d'assurance qualité interne, je donne un exemple que je connais 
bien, la personne qui a été recrutée pour s'occuper de l'assurance qualité, la première chose qu'elle 
a faite, seule chose qu'elle fait pour l'instant, c'est des questionnaires de satisfaction de services. 
Oui des questionnaires de satisfaction, des questionnaires où vous notez si vous êtes très content, 
moyennement content, on est d'accord, ce n'est pas l'assurance qualité, c'est du questionnaire de 
satisfaction. Sauf que pour l'instant, je l'ai dit l'autre jour dans un conseil d'administration, si j'ai 
bien compris un tel est responsable de l'assurance qualité, mais pour le moment il nous explique 
qu'il va envoyer tel questionnaire concernant la satisfaction des étudiants sur la nourriture, des 
repas servis au self, concernant les horaires de la bibliothèque, concernent que sais-je, vous 
voyez... Et je leur dis pour moi ce sont des questionnaires de satisfaction pour savoir si le 
consommateur est content. Mais c'est pas de l'assurance qualité. Et là, le vice-président en charge 
des formations qui me dit en souriant t'as raison et me dit pour l'instant on fait que ça, parce que 
on ne sait faire que ça.  
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Appendix 7. Invitation email to interviewees 
(English version) 
 
 
 
You are kindly invited to participate in the below research project: 
 
Title of the research: The quality panopticon in higher education: a comparative 
analysis of France and England 
 
The main aim of this research is to analyse the socio--political explanations that are at 
the root of local conceptions of quality in higher education. It aims to understand the 
impact of national and institutional policies and discourses in the construction of quality 
regimes in French and English higher education systems. The study also aims to explore 
the impacts of such external/internal quality systems on the actual practice of academics 
in both contexts. The main methods of data collection include desk review and semi--
structured interviews with quality agencies’ and institutional managers, as well as senior 
and junior academics in two sample elite universities, i.e., Sciences Po Paris and the 
LSE. To this end, the following research questions are raised: 
 
1. how is quality in higher education defined and constructed in the cases of 
England and France? 
2. What quality management mechanisms are in place in the two-selected elite 
higher education institutions in England and France? 
3. How do academics perceive and enact quality in their professional practice in 
these two institutional cases?  
 
Ethical framework: The proposed study will be conducted in accordance with the 
guidelines of the British Educational Research Association (BERA, 2011). All interviews 
will be conducted respecting BERA criteria of ‘informed consent’, ‘confidentiality and 
anonymity’.  
Should you choose to participate in this study, therefore, you may rest assured that you 
will receive a pseudonym and all information probable to reveal your position and/or 
department will be removed. Additionally, your participation being on a voluntary basis, 
you have the possibility to withdraw from the study at any moment and for any reason.  
 
In your role as……. your contribution to this study is of great significance and will be 
highly appreciated.  
Should you kindly volunteer to participate, please respond to this mail and propose 2-3 
time slots when you can be available for an interview of 1 hour.  
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Appendix 8. Invitation email sent to interviewees 
(French version) 
 
Dans le cadre de la thèse de doctorat de Madame Juliette Torabian 
"La qualité panoptique dans l'enseignement supérieur : une analyse comparative de la 
France et de l'Angleterre" 
 
La qualité de l'enseignement supérieur est devenue un concept "à la mode" dans le 
monde et surtout en Europe après la conférence de Bologne en 1999 et celle de Bergen 
en 2005. En dépit des initiatives prises dans ce domaine en Europe, la qualité de 
l'enseignement supérieur reste un sujet profondément politique et renfermé dans les 
frontières nationales de chaque pays européen. C'est-à-dire la qualité est perçue et 
interprétée différemment dans chacun de ces pays et leurs institutions de l'enseignement 
supérieur. Étant donné que les institutions de l'enseignement supérieur sont ‘autonomes’ 
et ‘libres’, nous pouvons observer un éventail d'approches et de ‘cultures’ de qualité 
propres à chacune des institutions. 
 
L'idée centrale de cette recherche est de comprendre et d'analyser les raisons socio-
politiques qui sont à l'origine des différentes approches dans les deux contextes français 
et britanniques. Dans chacun de ces contextes, j’ai sélectionné un exemple de pratique: 
SciencesPo en France et LSE en Grande Bretagne. 
 
Ce qui m’amène aux problématiques de recherches qui sont les suivantes : 
- quels sont les objectifs nationaux et leurs impacts sur les institutions de l'enseignement 
supérieur (les défis et les tensions) ; 
- quelles sont les interprétations de ces institutions de l’enseignement supérieur ? 
Autrement dit quelle est leur approche qualité (la globalité de la gestion de qualité et de 
la culture organisationnelle) 
- quelle est la perception du corps enseignant de cette approche de la qualité et quelles 
sont les conséquences dans leur pratique professionnels (défis et tensions). 
 
L'étude proposée sera menée conformément aux directives de la British Educational 
Research Association (BERA, 2011). Toutes les interviews seront réalisées en 
respectant les critères BERA du « consentement éclairé », de la « confidentialité et de 
l'anonymat ». 
 
Si vous choisissez de participer à cette étude, vous pouvez être assuré que vous 
recevrez un pseudonyme et toutes les informations susceptibles de révéler votre position 
et / ou votre département seront supprimées. De plus, votre participation étant volontaire, 
vous avez la possibilité de vous retirer de l'étude à tout moment et pour n'importe quelle 
raison. 
 
Dans votre rôle en tant que .... votre contribution à cette étude est d'une grande 
importance et sera très appréciée. 
 
Si vous souhaitez volontairement participer, veuillez répondre à cet e-mail et proposer 2 
ou 3 plages de temps lorsque vous pouvez être disponible pour une interview d’une 
heure. 
 
